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The distinctive claim Moltmann makes in his second major work, The Crucified God, is 
that the two characteristic features of Christianity, the cross and the Trinity, are 
inseparable and thus must always be thought together. It is only in the context of the 
doctrine of the Trinity that the cross can be properly understood, and only in the 
context of the cross that the doctrine of the Trinity has any ground. The core of 
Moltmann’s innovations derive from the latter. That is, for Moltmann the cross is of 
central significance to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
This thesis consists of two chapters of exposition followed by three chapters of 
analysis and discussion, a final comparative chapter, and then a conclusion. The first 
two chapters trace the development of the significance of the cross for the doctrine of 
the Trinity through The Crucified God and The Trinity and the Kingdom, respectively. 
Chapter three begins the discussion by outlining and assessing Moltmann’s 
methodology. The latter half of the chapter provides a case study of his use of Scripture 
by looking at the function of Mark 15:34 in his theology. Chapter four discusses 
Moltmann’s innovations regarding divine passibility. After clarifying the grounds on 
which he rejects divine impassibility and, for him, the related Chalcedonian distinction 
between divine and human natures in Christ, it critically assesses his rationale for 
divine suffering and addresses his claim that there is enmity between Father and Son 
in the crucifixion. Chapter five discusses Moltmann’s construal of the relationship 
between immanent and economic Trinity. It begins by addressing the ambiguous 
relationship between history and eschatology in this area of his theology. Then it 
provides a critical assessment of Moltmann’s construal of this relationship in light of 
Karl Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity. Chapter six expounds and discusses a passage from 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theo-Drama which provides a helpful mediating position 
between Moltmann’s proposals and classical theism. The thesis concludes with a 
commendation of the value of his theologia crucis for hermeneutics, of his theology of 
divine passibility for a global, twenty-first century theology, and of his trinitarian 
panentheism as a potential alternative to classical theism for imagining the God of 
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The Christian faith consists above all in the confession of the Holy Trinity, and it glories 
especially in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. 
–Thomas Aquinas 
 
The scriptural basis for the Christian belief in the triune God is not the scanty 
trinitarian formulas of the New Testament, but the thoroughgoing, unitary testimony 
of the cross; and the shortest expression of the Trinity is the divine act of the cross, in 
which the Father allows the Son to sacrifice himself through the Spirit. 






Jürgen Moltmann, born in Hamburg in 1926, is a theologian who has exercised 
considerable influence in modern trinitarian theology.1Along with Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, he is perhaps the foremost German Protestant theologian in the twentieth 
century to follow Karl Barth in his contention that the Trinity is at the heart of Christian 
theology, leading the way for a new generation. The distinctive claim he makes in his 
second major work, The Crucified God, is that the two characteristic features of 
Christianity, the cross and the Trinity, are inseparable and thus must always be thought 
together. It is only in the context of the doctrine of the Trinity that the cross can be 
properly understood, and only in the context of the cross that the doctrine of the 
Trinity has any ground. The core of Moltmann’s innovations derive from the latter. 
That is, for Moltmann the cross is of central significance to the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Statements like the following are characteristic of his theology: 
When the crucified Jesus is called the ‘image of the invisible God’, the meaning 
is that this is God, and God is like this. God is not greater than he is in this 
humiliation. God is not more glorious than he is in this self-surrender. God is 
not more powerful than he is in this helplessness. God is not more divine than 
he is in this humanity. The nucleus of everything that Christian theology says 
about ‘God’ is to be found in this Christ event (CG, 205).2 
I have restricted the scope of my thesis to two of Moltmann’s major works, CG 
and The Trinity and the Kingdom. Because his output is voluminous, writing a thesis of 
this length does not permit enough space for a full exploration of Moltmann’s works.  
In Theology of Hope (1964), his first major work, Moltmann claims that “From 
first to last, and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward 
looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the 
present” (TH, 16). Such an eschatological orientation is seen most clearly in the 
                                                        
1 Quotes on previous page from Thomas Aquinas, “De Rationibus Fidei,” in S. Thomae Aquinatis 
Opuscula Theologica, vol. 1, ed. Raymund Verardo, 253-268 (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954), 253, 
cited in Bruce D. Marshall, “Trinity,” in The Blackwell Companion to Modern Theology, ed. Gareth Jones, 
183-203 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 191; and Bernhard Steffen, Das Dogma vom Kreuz. Beitrag zu 
einer staurozentrischen Theologie (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann, 1920), 152, cited in CG, 241. 
2 Unless otherwise stated, all italics are original for in-text citations of Moltmann’s works. 
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resurrection of Christ. Moltmann continues this theme into CG and develops it across 
the scope of his theological career.  
CG (1972), Moltmann’s next major work, arose out of critical responses to TH, 
as well as Moltmann’s desire to grapple more seriously with human suffering. Whereas 
TH was founded on “the raising of the crucified Christ,” in CG Moltmann was 
“inescapably reminded of the other side of that foundation: the cross of the risen 
Christ.” He writes, “Hope without remembrance leads to illusion, just as, conversely, 
remembrance without hope can result in resignation” (CG, ix). Nonetheless, like TH, 
“The whole of theology was drawn as if by a magnifying glass into a single focus” (x). 
This time that single focus was the crucifixion. In CG Moltmann takes the cross beyond 
its conventional location in soteriology, situating it firmly in christology and the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, he consistently endeavours to think through these three 
areas of theology together. 
In CG, Moltmann develops two fundamental conclusions for the doctrine of the 
Trinity that have followed him throughout his career. First, Moltmann sees in the cross 
the panentheistic unity of God and history, immanent and economic Trinity. He 
presents a radical reading of Karl Rahner’s maxim, often referred to as “Rahner’s rule”: 
“The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the 
economic Trinity” (CG, 240).3 The immanent Trinity denotes God in himself (in se and 
ad intra) and the economic Trinity denotes God for us, in relation to creation (pro nobis 
and ad extra). This terminology can be misleading as immanent is usually employed in 
opposition to transcendent. However, here it is the immanent Trinity that is 
transcendent. The immanence of the immanent Trinity refers not to God’s immanence 
to creation but God’s immanence to himself.4 It is this traditional distinction that 
Moltmann repudiates, striving to understand the two together. Second, closely 
following his first conclusion, Moltmann rejects the traditional doctrine of divine 
impassibility, God’s inability to suffer. For Moltmann, the cross requires that Christ 
suffers not only in his human nature, but in his divine nature also. Indeed, he contends 
                                                        
3 Cf. Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. by Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 22, “The 
‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity” 
(emphasis original). 
4 So Moltmann, TKG, 151, “The economic Trinity designates the triune God in his dispensation 
of salvation, in which he is revealed… The immanent Trinity is the name given to the triune God as he 
is in himself.” 
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that this absolute distinction between divine and human nature, later clarified and 
applied to the person of Christ at the Council of Chalcedon, was originally developed to 
secure soteriological claims. If God is prone to suffering in his divine nature then 
created natures have no hope of being ultimately redeemed from suffering and death. 
But Moltmann rejects the distinction and argues instead that it is necessary to speak of 
the suffering of the trinitarian God of love whom we encounter in the cross. Although 
there are some antecedents in Moltmann’s earlier theology it is not until CG that he 
extensively addresses the relationship between the cross and the Trinity. Nor does his 
later work surpass CG in the attention he gives to the relationship in this work. 
In TKG (1980), his first in a series of “systematic contributions to theology,” 
Moltmann substantively develops the earlier proposals of CG.5 By this point he has 
abandoned the single focus methodology of TH and CG, instead developing theology “in 
a particular systematic sequence,” though without any attempt to produce a complete 
“system.” Unlike conventional systematic theology then, TKG is the beginning in a 
series of “contributions” (TKG, x). Here Moltmann has moved beyond the theologia 
crucis methodology of CG. His aims are more modest, though he maintains his 
distinctively speculative and polemical approach. While advancing his earlier 
commitment to divine passibility, the greatest development in thinking through the 
relationship between cross and Trinity in TKG is his more mature construal of the 
relationship between immanent and economic Trinity. Here Moltmann traces the 
suffering of God he sees in the cross event back to God’s life before the world began. 
On the basis of God’s close relationship to the world which Moltmann sees in the cross, 
he finds that God’s suffering with creation begins with the act of creation itself. This 
leads him to develop an alternative concept of divine freedom. Moreover, in TKG, 
Moltmann maintains his rejection of “theism,” which he presented in CG. Moltmann 
employs this term for concepts of God that he deems do not derive from the cross of 
Christ and as such are contrary to revelation. Developing this critique, in TKG 
Moltmann rejects what he identifies as “monotheism,” a polemical term by which he 
characterises trinitarian theologies which for him are not sufficiently trinitarian, 
particularly in the area of divine unity. However, although the development of this 
                                                        
5 CPS (1975), Moltmann’s third major work, did not receive as much attention as the popular 
and popularly debated TH and CG. In this work, his focus was pneumatology, a significant lacuna in his 
earlier works, despite his professed trinitarian orientation in CG. 
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theme is certainly informed by the cross, it does not derive directly from the cross as 
his identification of immanent with economic Trinity or his embrace of divine 
passibility does. To allow adequate space for discussing these latter two aspects of 
Moltmann’s theology I have thus omitted discussion of his rejection of monotheism and 
his alternative proposal for divine unity.6 
Already in TKG it is the Trinity itself, rather than the relationship between cross 
and Trinity, which is the focus. Moltmann’s later works, too, though not diverging from 
but indeed developing his earlier proposals, proceed from different starting points and 
deal largely with different content. Nonetheless, his proposals in CG and TKG should be 
seen in context. Where possible, I have highlighted important antecedents in earlier 
works and developments in later works, most often in the footnotes. I have also 
attempted to clarify some of Moltmann’s more ambiguous claims with reference to 
works where similar topics are treated more thoroughly or from a different angle. 
In researching for this thesis I have encountered many voices who are critical 
of Moltmann’s theology. While critical engagement is something Moltmann invites, 
and, indeed, something essential to the task of theology, it is often disheartening to 
reach the end of a chapter or article engaging with his theology only to find an almost 
complete dismissal of his proposals. As Richard Bauckham observes, “too many 
criticisms of Moltmann are based on careless reading and misunderstanding of his 
work.”7 In chapters three to six, where possible, I have subjected Moltmann’s theology 
to critical analysis in comparing his proposals with those of select contemporary 
theologians who differ fundamentally in their convictions. However, I have also 
endeavoured to read Moltmann as sympathetically as possible, commending his 
theology where, if not consonant with the tradition and its reading of Scripture, it is at 
least internally coherent, whatever those standards are by which this coherence might 
be measured! I do not expect this small contribution to conclude the conversation in 
any way. Nor have I attempted to catalogue exhaustively all the critiques which have 
                                                        
6 On Moltmann’s rejection of traditional conceptions of divine unity, see Randall E. Otto, 
“Moltmann and the Anti-Monotheism Movement,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 3:3 
(2001): 293-308. Karen Kilby also provides a thoroughgoing critique of the closely related social 
trinitarian trend of which Moltmann is a part in her “Trinity, Tradition, and Politics,” in Recent 
Developments in Trinitarian Theology: An International Symposium, ed. Christophe Chalamet and Marc 
Vial, 73-86 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014). 




been levelled against his theology. Rather, I have engaged with the critiques which I 
have seen widely and insistently represented in the literature, or those which I deem 
to advance the conversation in other ways. 
This thesis consists of two chapters of exposition followed by three chapters of 
analysis and discussion, a final comparative chapter, and then a conclusion. In the first 
two chapters I trace the development of the significance of the cross for the doctrine 
of the Trinity through CG and TKG, respectively. In chapter three I begin the discussion 
by outlining and assessing Moltmann’s methodology. In the latter half of the chapter I 
provide a case study of his use of Scripture by looking at the function of Mark 15:34 in 
his theology. In chapter four I discuss Moltmann’s innovations regarding divine 
passibility. After clarifying the grounds on which he rejects divine impassibility and, 
for him, the related Chalcedonian distinction between divine and human natures in 
Christ, I offer a critical assessment of his rationale for divine suffering and address his 
claim that there is enmity between Father and Son in the crucifixion. In chapter five I 
discuss Moltmann’s construal of the relationship between immanent and economic 
Trinity. I begin by addressing the ambiguous relationship between history and 
eschatology in this area of his theology. Then I provide a critical assessment of 
Moltmann’s construal of this relationship in light of Karl Barth’s doctrine of the Trinity. 
In chapter six I provide an exposition and discussion of a passage from Hans Urs von 
Balthasar’s Theo-Drama which I argue provides a helpful mediating position between 
Moltmann’s proposals and classical theism. Lastly, in the conclusion, I return to 
Moltmann’s theology to offer some final reflections.  
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1. The Crucified God 
 
1.1. The Dialectic of Soteriology and Christology 
Before examining the radical claims Moltmann makes in CG for the doctrine of the 
Trinity, it is important to see the context in which he intends these claims to be read. 
From the very outset, Moltmann’s aim is explicitly soteriological: “only the crucified 
Christ can bring the freedom which changes the world because it is no longer afraid of 
death” (1).8 Knowing the crucified Christ is knowing the salvation which comes from 
him, and vice versa. 
In chapter one, Moltmann addresses the twin crises of relevance and identity 
for the contemporary church. The various sufferings of the twentieth century brought 
the relevance of the church, theology, and faith into question. Although some Christians 
were innovative, even radical, in expanding traditional theological and ecclesial 
boundaries in the attempt to remain relevant in a changing society, for many others 
this meant a complete break from the old Christianity that was otherwise inhibiting 
social progress. On the other hand, many who remained in the churches withdrew from 
their involvement in the world, decrying new ecclesial and theological developments 
as assimilations to modern society that compromised Christian identity. In view of this, 
Moltmann argues that “each of these crises is simply a reflection of the other; and… 
both crises can be reduced to a common denominator” (25). That common 
denominator is identity in the crucified Christ. This is the crucified Christ without 
whom there would be no church. Only thus can the church offer the world something 
beyond the contingencies of the contemporary. Yet this is also the crucified Christ 
whose identity is not in withdrawal from the world but in solidarity with the 
godforsaken. Only thus can the church move beyond its self-defensive preservation of 
a static identity and seek to find this identity instead in new tradition and new 
experience. 
Moltmann’s dialectic of relevance and identity in the crucified Christ illustrates 
the broader dialectic of soteriology and christology, which is implicit throughout CG. 
The church derives its relevance from its identity in Christ (christology) and expresses 
                                                        
8 All references to CG in this chapter are given as page numbers in parentheses. 
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this identity through its relevance in becoming new for the world (soteriology). The 
christological concern, the person of Christ, is inseparable from the soteriological one, 
the work of Christ. To say one without the other would be misleading. In chapter two, 
Moltmann demonstrates that Christ’s identity in the cross confronts church and 
society, calling into question every human interpretation of the cross. Here Moltmann 
establishes the centrality of the cross to Christianity. In chapters three to five, he 
contends that the cross is fundamental to Jesus’ eternal identity. In chapter six, he takes 
this a step further, exploring the implications of the cross for the Trinity. Finally, in 
chapters seven and eight, Moltmann comes full circle to address two more 
contemporary soteriological questions, the psychological and political liberation of 
humanity in light of God’s identity in the cross. Although my focus in this thesis is on 
Moltmann’s christological and trinitarian claims, the soteriologically oriented opening 
chapter and concluding chapters of CG should remind the reader that Moltmann 
consistently strives to situate his christology and doctrine of the Trinity in the sphere 
of soteriology, and vice versa. 
1.2. The Cross as the Ground and Critique of Theology 
In chapter two, Moltmann examines some of the different ways that the cross has been 
interpreted throughout history, claiming that the cross always stands beyond these 
interpretations as the ground of their possibility. As such, it is also their critique. First, 
the cross stands despite religious and humanistic rejections of it throughout history as 
“unaesthetic, unrespectable and perverse” (33). Such rejections inevitably strip 
Christianity of its uniqueness by removing that which defines it, reducing it to “one of 
the phenomena of world history” (37). Second, the cross stands as unique against 
Christian attempts to repeat it in the celebration of mass. The distinctiveness of Jesus’ 
sacrifice cannot be repeated, but only witnessed to in proclamation. Third, while the 
cross has justifiably been a source of comfort for those who suffer throughout history, 
it must also be distinguished from these sufferings. Jesus did not suffer passively. He 
actively took the cross upon himself. Worse, as much as it has been a source of comfort 
to suffering human beings, the cross has also been misused by their oppressors to 
justify these sufferings through the promise of reward in the next life. When 
understood correctly, the cross not only comforts those who suffer but confronts their 
masters and rulers, calling them to repentance. For the slaves and underclasses, then, 
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it raises them up and liberates them from their suffering not only eschatologically but 
in the present too. 
Fourth, the cross calls Jesus’ followers to actively suffer in the world, as he did. 
But this is not just any kind active suffering. Following Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Moltmann 
contends that Jesus’ suffering involves rejection: “Suffering can be celebrated and 
admired. It can arouse compassion. But to be rejected takes away the dignity from 
suffering and makes it dishonourable suffering” (55). Nonetheless, while other human 
beings can participate in Jesus’ cross up to this point, they cannot participate in his 
unique abandonment by God. This is the one aspect of Jesus’ suffering that sets it apart 
from all other suffering: “Jesus suffered and died alone. But those who follow him suffer 
and die in fellowship with him” (56). His suffering in abandonment is unique and 
unrepeatable, and it is significant apart from any significance that believers may accord 
to it. 
Finally, this leads into the theologia crucis of Paul and Martin Luther, where the 
uniqueness of the cross is acknowledged and given its rightful, central place in the life 
of the church. The identity of Christ, indeed, of God, is located in the crucifixion. 
Moltmann pits this in opposition to “pure theory” of God, i.e., theology which attempts 
to arrive at an understanding of who God is apart from his relationship to the world 
(68). Rather, the cross means that theology “must become a critical theory of God” (69). 
As critical theology, theologia crucis does not merely reorient theology to God in the 
crucified Christ, commending yet another static identity of God at which to arrive. A 
true theologia crucis is dynamic, continually bringing the iconoclasm of the cross into 
the present and informing Christian praxis: “It does not state what exists, but sets out 
to liberate men from their inhuman definitions and their idolized assertions, in which 
they have become set, and in which society has ensnared them” (72). 
1.3. Christology in Historical and Eschatological Context 
Having established his theologia crucis, in chapter three Moltmann goes on to develop 
his christology. The person of Christ is at the centre of Christianity, but his identity is 
not always clear. This has been a problem with all christologies throughout the 
centuries: “they correspond so much to the needs of their age, place of origin and 
intended purpose that one cannot avoid the suspicion that they are illusory and 
artificial” (83). Moreover, Moltmann notes that christology has also often been a point 
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of contention among Christians. The dispute has centred on whether emphasis is given 
to Jesus’ historical identity, “Jesusology,” or his eschatological identity as the risen 
Christ, christology (83). But Moltmann contends that these are not mutually exclusive 
foci. Christology finds its legitimation in the historical figure of Jesus, and study of this 
historical figure finds its legitimation in christology which points to the eschatological 
lordship of God. 
Many patristic theologians and some German Idealists9 undertook christology 
“from above,” presupposing Jesus’ divinity. The former understood God as the 
antithesis of finite being: eternal, immutable, impassible, etc. The latter reformulated 
the ontological proof for God’s existence, arguing that God was not only substance but 
subject: “he is not thought of as the basis of something else, but for his own sake” (90). 
However, in either case, predicating an a priori divinity of Jesus tended to obfuscate his 
human identity. Christology from above thus “makes the particular features of the real, 
historical human being Jesus of Nazareth and the arbitrary occurrences of his life 
inessential” (91). 
Alternatively, many modern Protestant theologians undertook christology 
“from below,” focussing instead on the humanity of Jesus. Moltmann writes, “Since the 
Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the rise of modern technology, the relationship 
between man and nature in most fields has been reversed.” That is, “The problem of 
modern man is no longer so much how he can live with gods and demons, but how he 
can survive with the bomb, revolution and the destruction of the balance of nature” 
(92). The value of christology is no longer in taking human beings beyond their finite 
limitations but rather in demonstrating how to live in the midst of these limitations. 
The metaphysical orientation has been replaced with an ethical one. Nonetheless, like 
christologies from above, these also proceed from an a priori, subsuming Jesus’ history 
under contemporary anthropologies.  
A better approach to christology is found in the Jewish messianic milieu of Jesus’ 
own time, where the focus is on neither his divinity nor humanity but his eschatological 
identity: “Are you the one who is to come?” (Matt 11:3).10 Even here, though, 
christology’s relationship to Jesus “must not be one of questioning, but of being 
                                                        
9 Moltmann mentions Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling. 
10 All biblical citations in this thesis are taken from the New Revised Standard Version (1989), 
unless otherwise stated. 
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questioned; must not be one of demanding an answer but of giving an answer” (CG, 
103). Christologies must be answers given in faith to Jesus’ own question, “Who do you 
say that I am?” (Matt 16:15). However, no complete answer can be given according to 
present or historical categories, not even those provided already in the history of 
Israel. This is what the Jewish messianic milieu recognises. Jesus’ identity is 
eschatological, situated in the future. Moltmann writes,  
The life, words and actions of the Jesus of the synoptic gospels are centred not 
upon himself, but on the future which is called the ‘kingdom of God’. His God 
and Father is to reveal him as the one who he truly is (104). 
Similarly, “the centre of his existence is outside himself” (106). Christology is thus not 
defined only by incompletion but, positively, by its orientation to Jesus’ future, 
anticipating a decisive answer in new creation. Nonetheless, this negative aspect is still 
fundamental. It emphasises the nature of christology as “essentially unconcluded and 
permanently in need of revision” (106-107). As such, it complements Moltmann’s 
earlier argument that the cross is the ground of theology which continually critiques 
it. It is not until the consummated kingdom that the incompleteness of theology 
epitomised in the cross finds its completion. 
1.3.1. The Historical Significance of the Crucifixion 
In chapter four, Moltmann frames his dialectic a little differently. He argues that the 
crucifixion must be examined from both the standpoint of Jesus’ resurrection as well 
as his life before his death. If Jesus’ death is defined completely by his resurrection then 
this “would rapidly lead to a Christ-myth in which the death of the bringer of salvation 
was an important fact, but not Jesus himself and what brought him to the cross.” 
Conversely, if it is defined only by his life, “ultimately neither the death nor the life of 
Jesus would have any special importance beyond that of the comparable life and death 
of great prophets or demagogues” (112). As such, history must be undertaken 
theologically and theology must be undertaken historically. 
The importance placed on Jesus’ history is evident throughout church history. 
In the New Testament, “the experiences of Christ and the Spirit at the present moment 
were subjected to criticism and linked to the history of Jesus himself” (115). So, too, 
with its emphasis on sola scriptura, the Reformation sought to remind the church of its 
roots in Christ. Continuing with this Protestant conviction, the quests for the historical 
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Jesus also sought to ground Christian practice in the person of Christ. However, the 
quests went further than the Reformers, employing historical criticism to question the 
apostolic witness and the faith of the first Christians. This led to an impasse in New 
Testament scholarship, with some figures emphasising the fundamental differences 
between the preaching of Jesus and those who came after him, and others emphasising 
the overt similarities. 
In contrast, Moltmann suggests that it is not so much historical criticism as it is 
the cross which is “the true critique of the kerygma of Christ” (119). Jesus differed from 
John the Baptist in that the content of his message was inseparable from his person. It 
was authoritative on the basis of the one who preached it and the hour at which he 
preached it, with the kingdom having come in his ministry. Jesus’ preaching has no 
meaning if abstracted from his person and time. Yet on the cross, “his preaching dies 
with him” (122). Moltmann writes, 
He who proclaimed that the kingdom was near died abandoned by God. He who 
anticipated the future of God in miracles and in casting out demons died 
helpless on the cross. He who revealed the righteousness of God with an 
authority greater than Moses died according to the provision of the law as a 
blasphemer. He who spread the love of God in his fellowship with the poor and 
the sinners met his end between two criminals on the cross (125). 
The cross is thus not only the basis of christology but its “basic problem” (125). It calls 
into question all the claims, explicit and implicit, made by Jesus. 
Moltmann goes on to investigate the significance of Jesus’ death in theological-
historical context. In his Jewish context, Jesus was a blasphemer. He claimed an 
authority greater than Moses and Torah. He claimed God’s authority to forgive sins and 
preached justification for sinners. As such, he was in conflict with the human 
authorities who saw in the law hope for the “exaltation of the righteous who suffer 
injustice on earth, and the putting to shame of the lawless and godless” (129). In his 
Roman context, Jesus was a rebel. His crucifixion was undertaken not by the religious 
authorities (the punishment for blasphemy was stoning) but by Rome. He was 
punished as an enemy of the state and its gods. 
The most significant aspect of Jesus’ crucifixion, however, is his being forsaken 
by his Father on the cross, “the true inner pain of his suffering and death” (145). This 
theological aspect distinguishes him from all in history who came before him and all 
who would come after him. Socrates found liberty in his death. Zealot and Christian 
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martyrs found freedom and hope in their deaths. In contrast, according to the synoptic 
accounts of Jesus’ distress in Gethsemane and Mark’s account of Jesus’ cry on the cross 
(Mark 15:34, 37), Moltmann argues that “Jesus clearly died with every expression of 
the most profound horror” (CG, 146). Later Christian tradition downplayed this aspect 
of Jesus’ death by presenting Jesus as confident or triumphant on the cross, as is seen 
in a textual variant of Mark 15:3411 and the passion narratives of Luke and John. So, 
too, Mark’s use of Psalm 22:1 for Jesus’ last words probably reflects theological 
concerns more than a historical account of Jesus’ last words. Yet, this account 
nonetheless preserves the horror of the cross. Therefore, “it seems to be as near as 
possible to the historical reality of the death of Jesus” (147). 
However, this is not merely an expression of a deeper psychological struggle. 
Moltmann is undertaking the task of theological history. Jesus’ cry of dereliction 
demonstrates a profound abandonment by his Father: “Just as there was a unique 
fellowship with God in his life and preaching, so in his death there was a unique 
abandonment by God” (149). Moreover, because the identity of the Father is in his 
relationship to the Son, Moltmann understands that this abandonment in some sense 
also characterises the Father. It calls into question not only Jesus’ existence as the one 
whom the Father has chosen, but his Father’s existence as the one who is faithful to his 
Son: “in his rejection, the deity of his God and the fatherhood of his Father… are at 
stake” (151). This leads Moltmann to claim that the abandonment does not just take 
place on the plain of history but “within God himself,” which he characterises with 
sharp terms like “stasis,” “God against God,” and “enmity” (152).12 
1.3.2. The Eschatological Significance of the Crucifixion 
In chapter five, Moltmann addresses the second part of the dialectic he established in 
the previous chapter, this time looking at the crucifixion from the standpoint of Jesus’ 
resurrection. Without the resurrection the crucifixion would hardly be worth 
                                                        
11 “My God, what hast thou to reproach me for?” (147). Moltmann does not provide a source. 
12 Moltmann also quotes Goethe’s ”nemo contra Deum nisi Deus ipse” (152). That is, “nothing 
against God but God himself.” The implied dualism in these statements is more poignant in Moltmann’s 
earlier TH, 131, 
Yahweh's coming glory shows itself in overcoming the experienced judgment and turning it to 
blessing… it shows itself in the overcoming of God by God— of the judging, annihilating God 
by the saving, lifegiving God, of the wrath of God by his goodness. 
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investigating, nor would it have received so much attention throughout history. Yet, 
Moltmann asks, “does the primitive Christian belief in the resurrection do justice to the 
life and death of Jesus, or has it put something else in Jesus’ place?” (161). 
Jesus’ resurrection from the dead points to the future coming of God, where the 
world will be made new. It expresses his eschatological identity. Whereas, “In the 
modern historical sense we talk of Jesus of Nazareth, because in historical terms and 
temporality his origin should explain his future and his beginning his end,” in an 
eschatological sense, Jesus’ “future determines and explains his origin and his end his 
beginning” (164). Moreover, the resurrection of Jesus and his subsequent appearances 
to the disciples are a foretaste and anticipation of new creation. Jesus’ resurrection is 
not merely revivification. A revivified body would die again, as did Lazarus. Nor is it 
merely life after death, as in other religions. In Jesus’ resurrection, the eschatological 
defeat of death has been brought into the present, giving hope to human beings and 
liberating them for their future: “Without this eschatological consciousness of time, all 
the things that the Christian church claims and proclaims as being present: the 
forgiveness of sins, reconciliation and discipleship in love, are fundamentally 
impossible” (170). 
Yet the resurrection is grounded in the crucifixion. Otherwise it is only an 
abstract hope for the world beyond. Indeed, it is in the crucifixion that new creation 
has been brought into the present: “The new and scandalous element in the Christian 
message of Easter was not that some man or other was raised before anyone else, but 
that the one who was raised was this condemned, executed and forsaken man” (175). 
Jesus’ crucifixion means that all can be included in the eschatological renewal. This 
must be seen in the context of the hope for a general resurrection in Daniel 12:2, which 
Moltmann understands as an extension of the Jewish hope that God’s righteousness 
will prevail. Even death cannot come against the Lord of all. However, Moltmann asks, 
“Is this symbol of the general resurrection of the dead a symbol of hope?” No, he argues, 
“For the unrighteous it is rather a symbol of fear. It would be better for them to stay 
dead. But for the righteous it is an uncertain hope, for no one can say with certainty 
that he is righteous” (174). It is only in the resurrection of the crucified Christ that all 
people can participate now in the eschatological renewal: “He [Jesus] anticipates the 
coming righteousness of God under the conditions of human injustice… [T]he ‘end of 
history’ is present in the midst of the relationships of history” (185). Understood this 
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way, the resurrection does not replace Jesus’ crucifixion but it is the eschatological 
expression of the love already present in the crucifixion. 
1.4. Theologia Crucis against Theism 
While theological investigation of the cross usually focusses on soteriology, for 
Moltmann “this is not radical enough” (201). In chapter six, he seeks to understand 
what the cross means for God himself. Others have sought to do this before Moltmann, 
but he finds their contributions to be wanting. They either do not take the implications 
of the cross far enough, maintaining divine immutability and impassibility, or they 
operate with “a simple concept of God which is not sufficiently developed in a 
trinitarian direction” (203).13 Instead, Moltmann first aims to “begin from the totality 
of the person of Christ,” rejecting the Chalcedonian distinction between human and 
divine nature (206). This framework has not only placed unnecessary limitations on 
how the crucifixion can be understood, but it has often also meant that the emphasis is 
placed on the relationship between the two natures, distracting from the biblical 
emphasis on the relationships between Father, Son, and Spirit. The former also 
precludes any implications of Jesus’ passion for divine immutability or impassibility. 
Second, Moltmann aims to read the cross in a thoroughly trinitarian manner. He will 
“abandon the concept of God and… speak of the relationships of the Son and the Father 
and the Spirit at the point at which ‘God’ might be expected to be mentioned” (207). 
1.4.1. Theism and Theologia Crucis 
In chapter one, Moltmann distinguished between analogical and dialectical knowledge 
of God. Historically, analogical theology was an adaptation of the Platonic 
epistemological principle, “like is known only by like” (26). Knowledge of God could 
only be attained through that which was like him in some way, such as his creation, his 
acts, or his self-revelation. But this epistemology could not be applied absolutely. If so, 
God would not be able to reveal himself at all because, being known only through like 
things, “God is only known by God” (26). Thus Moltmann argues that analogy must be 
supplemented with dialectic: “God is only revealed as ‘God’ in his opposite: godlessness 
                                                        
13 Moltmann names Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Heribert Mühlen, and Hans Küng on 




and abandonment by God” (27). Moreover, this is necessary because any likeness to 
God apart from the cross is self-deification. Human beings can only know God where 
he meets them, in his opposite. It is true that in knowing God human beings do not 
ultimately remain in this godlessness. They gain analogical knowledge in being 
conformed to the image of Christ. Analogy is still valid and necessary, then; it just 
begins with the dialectical knowledge of God revealed in his opposite. 
This can be better understood in the context of Moltmann’s exposition of 
Luther’s theologia crucis, and his accompanying rejection of “theism.” Luther 
confronted the church for what he saw as the “misuse of [God’s] name for the purpose 
of a religious consummation of human wisdom, human works and the Christian 
imperialism of medieval ecclesiastical society” (208). Such abuse received its 
theological justification in the natural theology of his day following Peter Lombard and 
Thomas Aquinas, a theologia gloriae which inadvertently functioned to divinise human 
beings through their natural knowledge of God. Conversely, Luther proclaimed a 
theologia crucis where God is revealed not in the glorious things of creation as 
proclaimed by human beings but in his humility on the cross. Moltmann traces this 
natural theology back to Stoic philosophy, which affirmed (a) the presence of the divine 
Logos throughout the cosmos, and (b) the rational nature of all human beings, by which 
they come to know the Logos and thus the divine. Although the Christian expression of 
this made a sharp distinction between divine and creaturely being, underscoring the 
limits of reason, the distinction could still be bridged by means of the analogia entis, 
the analogy between creaturely and divine being. Significantly, in his theology Peter 
presupposed the “excellentia of man”: “His capacity is heightened by his power to 
reason for [sic] the visible to the invisible, from the many to the one, from realities to 
the one who brings about reality” (CG, 209). 
However, for Luther, it is on the cross that the invisible God makes himself 
visible. While sinful human beings attempt to know God through natural theology, in 
their sin they misuse this knowledge for their self-divinisation, projecting human 
desires for glory and power onto the identity of God. Yet God has made himself known 
in weakness and suffering. Moltmann identifies this misuse of the knowledge of God 
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with what he terms “theism.”14 In theism, the doctrine of God is developed out of the 
limits of finite being: “it must embrace all the determinations of finite being and 
exclude those determinations which are directed against being.” Because finite being 
is mutable, passible, and mortal, etc., God is thus immutable, impassible, and immortal. 
While Christian theology distinctively reimagines God in light of the life and death of 
Jesus, for the most part it has maintained the theistic distinction between infinite and 
finite being. The tradition did this for soteriological reasons: “Otherwise finite being 
could not find a support and stay against the threatening nothingness of death, 
suffering and chaos in the divine being. Death, suffering and mortality must therefore 
be excluded from the divine being” (214). 
Further along in CG, Moltmann provides a more complete genealogy of theism 
in interrogating the origin of divine apatheia (impassibility) and immutability in 
Christian theology. Plato popularised the notion that God is good and perfect, in 
contrast to the poetic depictions of the gods. He is in need of nothing and therefore 
does not change to become anything other than that which he is. Nor can he be affected 
by anything because change arises from deficiency. After Aristotle, suffering and 
emotion were also excluded from the divine being, but God still had will and thought. 
Here the doctrine of divine apatheia also took on an ethical dimension. The virtuous 
person imitated God and as such was not swayed by their passions. Later, Christianity 
adopted apatheia into its doctrine of God and gave it a distinctively Christian character 
that centred on divine love: “What Christianity proclaimed as the agape of God and the 
believer was rarely translated as pathos.” Rather, “true agape derives from liberation 
from the inward and outward fetters of the flesh (sarx), and loves without self-seeking 
and anxiety” so that “apatheia could be taken up as the enabling ground for this love 
and be filled with it” (269). 
For Moltmann, the theistic concept of God does not derive from the cross. In the 
spirit of Luther’s theologia crucis, then, “the time has finally come for differentiating 
the Father of Jesus Christ from the God of the pagans and the philosophers” (215). Such 
a distinction, which the early church recognised, led to the development of the doctrine 
of the Trinity. But the rejection of theism must be decisive and ongoing because the 
                                                        
14 “Theism here primarily refers to that natural knowledge of God which is taken up by the 
Catholic and Protestant tradition in the article ‘De Deo uno’, and then more generally to monotheistic 
philosophy in its political, moral and cosmological significance” (281 n.36). 
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cross continues to confront every theologia gloriae in Christian doctrine. Theistic 
insights may be maintained where they aid proclamation of the crucified Christ, but 
where they obscure this they must be shed. 
Like theism, the concept of God against which conventional atheism rebels is 
founded on the distinction between finite and infinite being. However, atheism does 
not embrace this concept of God but rejects it. From “an unjust and absurd world of 
triumphant evil and suffering without reason and without end it does not see the 
countenance of a God, but only the grimace of absurdity and nothingness” (219). Yet 
problems arise if the space left open by the absent God of theism is consequently filled 
with human beings: “Protest atheism is in error if it supplies a human genre or human 
society as its vanguard… with inherited theistic divine predicates, saying that it is 
immortal, that it is always right, that is grants security and authority, etc.” (223). For 
Moltmann, neither theism nor atheism adequately address the problem of suffering. 
1.4.2. The Chalcedonian Distinction between Christ’s Divine and Human 
Natures 
Moltmann goes on to analyse the Chalcedonian distinction between divine and human 
natures in the person of Christ, epitomised by Cyril of Alexandria. He understands this 
distinction to be a further expression of the theistic distinction between infinite and 
finite being.15 While Ignatius and early Good Friday liturgies could apparently speak 
unproblematically of the suffering of God in Christ, subsequent christology “came very 
near to docetism, according to which Jesus only appeared to suffer and only appeared 
to die abandoned by God” (227). This was because the fathers distinguished between 
the divine and human natures of Christ, locating his suffering in his human nature but 
                                                        
15 In the later WJC, Moltmann provides a more in-depth critique of the Chalcedonian doctrine. 
First, an anhypostatic human nature suggests the non-historicity of Jesus’ person so that “we cannot 
talk about ‘Jesus of Nazareth’” (51). Second, if Jesus is sinless in his human nature then this nature is 
also immortal and thus eternal. It is impossible to speak of either Jesus’ birth or death, undermining 
the soteriological value of the cross. Third, by situating Christ’s personhood in his divine nature it 
inevitably favours statements regarding his eternal history over those regarding his humanity. Fourth, 
the doctrine is based on a priori metaphysical concepts rather than the history of Jesus which 
emphasises the relationship of the Father and the Son. Finally, it was developed in the imperial context 
of “The church’s concern for orthodoxy in doctrine and liturgy, and for the exclusion of heresy,” which 
“was entirely in line with the emperor’s concern for a unified imperial religion” (54). Moltmann here 
instead opts for a “christology on the road” where “The church exists in contradictions and in conflicts” 
(55). Jesus’ humanity and divinity remain important, but they are dialectically related: “we have to 
look at Jesus’ humanity in order to know his divinity, and we have to contemplate his divinity so as to 
know his humanity” (69). Cf. HTG, 36-37. 
19 
 
excluding it from his divine nature. The distinction affirmed the participation of God in 
human nature by which human beings could participate in the divine nature, a divine 
nature which is immortal. But it also imposed limitations on understanding the cross. 
For example, despite persistently emphasising the unity of the two natures in the one 
person of Christ, Cyril of Alexandria interpreted Jesus’ cry of dereliction as a vicarious 
cry for forsaken humanity, having nothing to do with his own forsakenness. So, too, 
Thomas Aquinas referred Christ’s suffering to his human nature, but precluded all 
suffering from his divine nature. 
Following Cyril, Chalcedon also affirmed the unity of the two natures in the one 
person of Christ. Christ’s person is the second person of the Trinity. His divine nature 
is thus eternal. Conversely, Christ’s human nature is anhypostatic, i.e., it has no 
personhood independent of the divine Son who became flesh. Yet this asymmetry 
between divine and human natures in the person of Christ meant that the same 
problem arose: suffering, death, and divine abandonment could not without difficulty 
be predicated of Jesus’ divine person. In answer to this, theologians developed the 
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum. Both divine and human attributes and 
actions could be predicated of the person of Christ. The two natures were united in 
him, albeit without confusion: the divine nature remained divine and the human 
remained human. It was thus more exact to refer to a praedicatio idiomatum, as 
Melanchthon did in Reformation times. Conversely, Lutherans emphasised the 
communicatio to the extent that “Christ and God form a unity not only in revelation, but 
in their very being” (233). This was a communicatio idiomatum realis, in contrast to 
Reformed christology which Lutherans renounced as a merely verbal communicatio. 
However, Reformed theologians questioned whether Lutheran christology necessarily 
produced a tertium quid, “a monster with fleshly Godhead and divinized flesh” (233). 
For Moltmann, it is Luther’s articulation of the communicatio idiomatum that 
better characterises the one person of Christ. Luther’s christology allows for Christ’s 
forsakenness and suffering to be predicated in a real sense of God, rather than isolated 
in Christ’s human nature. However, Luther speaks too generically of God, neglecting to 
distinguish between the divine nature of God and the three persons of the Trinity. This 
results in “paradoxical distinctions between God and God: between the God who 
crucifies and the crucified God; the God who is dead and yet is not dead” (235). In 
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contrast, Moltmann intends to maintain Luther’s core emphasis on the one person of 
Christ while presenting it in a more thoroughly trinitarian manner. 
1.5. The Trinitarian God of the Cross 
Having addressed what he understands as the shortcomings of theism in the Christian 
tradition, Moltmann goes on to develop his alternative. Historically, the symbol of the 
cross and the doctrine of the Trinity have distinguished Christianity from other 
religions and systems of belief with which it came into contact. Moltmann thus poses 
the question, “Is there an inner logical connection between the two special features of 
Christianity, faith in the crucified Jesus and in the triune God?” (236). If not, then they 
can be understood independently of each other. But the answer is affirmative. Indeed, 
the cross can only be demonstrated as unique to Christianity in the context of the 
doctrine of the Trinity, as an event occurring not only in created history but in the 
trinitarian history between the Father and the Son. Conversely, lest it is to sink into 
irrelevance or obscurity, the doctrine of the Trinity must be articulated in terms of its 
roots in the historical event of the cross. 
1.5.1. The Identity of the Eschatological God in History 
Moltmann argued earlier that the full significance of Christ’s crucifixion can only be 
understood from the standpoint of his resurrection: 
As the New Testament shows, not only in the epistles but also in the gospels, 
Christian faith essentially reads the history of Jesus back to front: his cross is 
understood in the light of his resurrection, his way to the cross in light of the 
saving meaning of his cross, his words and miracles in the light of his Easter 
exaltation to be Lord (162). 
Christ’s eschatological identity in the resurrection as Lord is his identity in the 
crucifixion. On this basis Moltmann advocates reading the cross with a “reversed sense 
of time”: “he died as the risen Christ and was made flesh as the one who was to come” 
(184). 
Similarly, the New Testament characterises God as “him who raised Jesus from 
the dead” (Rom 8:11; cf. Gal 1:1). This identity is so prominent that 
All earlier divine statements from the history of Israel, from the law of the 
covenant or from the state of the world in general fade into insignificance… in 
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comparison with this new eschatological definition given by God of himself 
(188). 
Moltmann goes so far as to say that this prominence requires that the predicate “must 
therefore be understood as a divine name” (189).16 
Applying his eschatological reversal of time, Moltmann asks, “What was the 
‘God who raised Jesus’ doing in and during the crucifixion of Jesus?” (190). Paul 
certainly saw that he was there in some sense. As his famous claim suggests, “God was 
in Christ” (2 Cor 5:19, KJV). But to find in the cross the God who raised Jesus 
immediately confronts any a priori conception of God: “Must one not abandon all that 
has been imagined, desired or feared in respect of ‘God’ if one is to understand God 
thus in the crucified Christ?” (190). Moltmann draws out just what this might look like 
later on in CG. The identity of the Father, specifically in his abandonment of the Son, is 
constituted in the event of the cross. 
This eschatological reversal also applies to the identity of the Son. Whereas in 
pre-Pauline theology, Jesus’ sonship is constituted in his resurrection (Rom 1:3-4),17 
Paul situates this constitution in the broader context of Jesus being sent by the Father 
(Gal 4:4). Moltmann does not specify where this sending begins, whether with Jesus’ 
baptism, the incarnation, or before the creation of the world. He only claims that for 
Paul, “The foundation of the coming of Jesus is his being sent by God” (CG, 191).18 The 
                                                        
16 It is a divine name that identifies God with his acts in history in the same sense as “I am the 
Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of slavery” (Deut 5:6). 
17 Following the biblical scholarship of his time, Moltmann takes Paul here to be citing an 
adoptionist formula of the early church. There is not enough space in this thesis for a lengthy 
discussion of this notion. However, for a recent outline and critical assessment, see Matthew W. Bates, 
“A Christology of Incarnation and Enthronement: Romans 1:3-4 as Unified, Nonadoptionist, and 
Nonconciliatory,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 77 (2015): 107-27. 
18 Although Moltmann supports an adoptionist exegesis of the pre-Pauline tradition in Rom 
1:4, in his own theology he rejects adoptionism: 
The qualification of his person to be the Christ of God and his enthronement as Kyrios could 
not be dated from his resurrection on, as though it had not happened before, or as though the 
earthly Jesus was merely the forerunner of the heavenly Christ. That would not do justice to 
the identity of his person but would tear him apart into two persons, one earthly and one 
eschatological (181). 
Nonetheless, Moltmann predominantly situates Jesus’ sonship in his resurrection in CG: “His [Jesus’] 
office is upheld not by the incarnation of the eternal Son of God… but by the future of the kingdom 
which is inaugurated in and around him” (98). “His future determines and explains his origin and his 
end his beginning” (164). Yet the incarnation is not entirely absent from CG: “Following Philippians 2, 
Christian theology speaks of the final and complete self-humiliation of God in man and in the person of 
Jesus. Here God in the person of the Son enters into the limited, finite situation of man” (276). 
Admittedly, this aspect of Moltmann’s christology remains ambiguous in CG. In TKG he develops his 
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sonship of the one who is constituted Son of God in the resurrection is inseparable from 
his being sent and from the event of the cross. Paul reads the eschatological 
constitution of Jesus’ sonship in the resurrection backwards into history. For him this 
constitution is “at work in the sending of Jesus by God and in his being given up by the 
Father” (192). Similarly, Mark also “depicted the divine Sonship of the risen Christ in 
the way of Jesus to the cross” (193). Jesus’ eschatological sonship stretches backwards 
to his baptism (Mark 1:11) and, significantly, a Roman centurion confesses him to be 
the Son on observing his cry of dereliction and death, ahead of his resurrection (15:39). 
The identity of the Son, specifically in his abandonment by his Father, is also 
constituted in the event of the cross. 
1.5.2. In Defence of Divine Mutability and Passibility 
In contrast to the theistic rejection of mutability and passibility, Moltmann argues that 
it was indeed possible for Christ to suffer as God in his passion. First, divine 
immutability need only rule out passive mutability, i.e., “God is under no constraint 
from that which is not God” (229). But his freedom allows for an active mutability in 
which he can change himself or allow others to change him. Similarly, second, God’s 
impassibility may mean that he does not suffer unwillingly, but it need not mean that 
he is incapable of suffering if he actively chooses it: “The justifiable denial that God is 
capable of suffering because of a deficiency in his being may not lead to a denial that 
he is incapable of suffering out of the fullness of his being, i.e. his love.” (230). 
In addition to this defence, Moltmann provides three main rationale for 
attributing suffering to God.19 First, the cross is central to God’s revelation in history 
and, as per the eschatological reversal expounded in the previous subsection, central 
to his identity. Indeed, the identities of Father and Son are inseparable from this event. 
Moreover, it is the cross’s centrality to the gospel which requires setting aside the 
Chalcedonian distinction between Christ’s two natures, a distinction that was 
                                                        
doctrine of the Trinity to address the eternal origins of the trinitarian persons. He also explicitly 
addresses the relationship between the constitution of Jesus’ sonship in the resurrection and his 
eternal sonship, writing, 
Paul did not see this as being in any way a contradiction of the statement that Jesus is God’s 
own Son in eternity. The temporally marked beginning of Jesus’ ministry as ‘the Son of God in 
power’ and the statements about the pre-existence of the Son… stand side by side, without any 
attempt to reconcile them (TKG, 87). 
19 On these see Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 47-53. 
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developed out of commitment to an a priori doctrine of divine impassibility. Second, 
since God is love he gives himself for his creation on the cross: 
[A] God who cannot suffer is poorer than any man. For a God who is incapable 
of suffering is a being who cannot be involved. Suffering and justice do not affect 
him… But the one who cannot suffer cannot love either (222).20 
This leads Moltmann to rethink the traditional notion of God’s omnipotence: “a God 
who is only omnipotent is in himself an incomplete being, for he cannot experience 
helplessness and powerlessness” (CG, 223).21 
Finally, only divine suffering provides a legitimate theodicy. Protest atheists 
reject theism, characterising God as a “deceiver, executioner, sadist, despot, player, 
director of a marionette theatre.” He is “sleeping, erring, bored, helpless and clownish” 
(221). For protest atheism, with which Moltmann agrees in its characterisation of the 
theistic God, the chief problem with the absolute distinction between finite and infinite 
being is that such a distinction “passes over the history of suffering of this world. Either 
it must be tolerated, or it will be compensated for by the second world in heaven.” But, 
“This answer is idolatry” (225). It is idolatry because it confidently puts hope in God 
without admitting that the reality of suffering already means the end of God. It has 
failed to take seriously suffering’s affront to God and thus worships no God at all. As 
shown above, any atheism which assumes that the answer to suffering lies with human 
beings makes the same idolatrous mistake as theism. Adapting the philosophy of Max 
Horkheimer, then, Moltmann suggests that the only reply to the suffering which theism 
and atheism alike attempt to alleviate is in the hope that the righteousness of God will 
                                                        
20 As Moltmann states emphatically in TKG, 22, 
If God is incapable of suffering, then… Christ’s passion can only be viewed as a human 
tragedy… God is inevitably bound to become the cold, silent and unloved heavenly power. But 
that would be the end of the Christian faith.  
21 Cf. Moltmann’s citation of a passage from Elie Wiesel’s Night, where Wiesel describes a 
Jewish youth being hanged and suffering for an hour in front of everyone at a concentration camp. 
When someone asks, “Where is God now?” Elie answers to himself, “Here He is—He is hanging here, on 
this gallows.” Elie Wiesel, Night, trans. from French by Stella Rodway (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 
1960). (The edition and material quoted here differ from that cited in CG. The citation in CG is 
incomplete). Moltmann responds, 
Any other answer would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other Christian answer to the 
question of this torment. To speak here of a God who could not suffer would make God a 
demon. To speak here of an absolute God would make God an annihilating nothingness. To 
speak here of an indifferent God would condemn men to indifference (CG, 274).  
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prevail.22 Such a hope does not find its answer in the present but looks beyond the 
present to the future because no answer has of yet been decisively given: 
“Horkheimer’s critical theory is not content with any answer and keeps the question 
alive” (225). It is this question that Moltmann sees in Jesus’ cry of dereliction. And in 
Christ taking up this question, God himself joins in the human protest against suffering. 
1.5.3. The Constitution of Father and Son in the Cross 
After the patristic period, the doctrine of the Trinity became increasingly irrelevant in 
the Christian faith, “isolated speculation and a mere decoration.” In response to this, 
Moltmann proposes a new project where 
We would have to find the relationship of God to God in the reality of the event 
of the cross and therefore our reality, and consider it there… in that case the 
nature of God would have to be the human history of Christ and not a divine 
‘nature’ separate from man (239). 
He finds support for his thesis in Rahner’s rule: “The economic Trinity is the immanent 
Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity” (240). The rule emphasises 
the inseparability of God’s identity in himself from his identity in relation to creation. 
But Moltmann goes further than Karl Rahner and provides a more radical rule that 
centres the doctrine of the Trinity in the crucifixion: “The material principle [i.e., 
content] of the doctrine of the Trinity is the cross of Christ. The formal principle [i.e., 
form] of the knowledge of the cross is the doctrine of the Trinity” (241). 
While in what follows from this rule it is not always clear what he is proposing, 
for Moltmann the emphasis certainly falls not on the origin of economic in immanent 
Trinity but on the economic or historical constitution of the immanent Trinity. He 
writes, “He [God] is love, that is, he exists in love. He constitutes his existence in the 
event of this love” (244). The cross is “an event concerned with a relationship between 
persons in which these persons constitute themselves in their relationship with each 
other” (245). Moltmann does not say that the trinitarian relations originate in the 
cross. In CG he leaves the question of origin unanswered. Rather, the respective 
personhoods of Father and Son are inseparable from the historical constitution they 
                                                        
22 Moltmann takes up Horkheimer’s concept of the “wholly other.” He admits that Horkheimer 
does not mention God but nonetheless finds this to be a helpful concept for theological reflection on 
the trinitarian God of the cross. 
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undergo in the crucifixion, a constitution which is ongoing until its consummation and 
completion in the coming kingdom of God. Thus, although for the early church and Karl 
Barth the immanent Trinity is “a closed circle of perfect being in heaven” (255),23 for 
Moltmann, 
The relationships in the Trinity between Father and Son are not fixed in static 
terms once and for all, but are a living history. This history of God or this history 
in God begins with the sending and delivering up of the Son, continues with his 
resurrection and the transference of the rule of God to him, and only ends when 
the Son hands over this rule to the Father (265). 
Because Jesus reveals the Father, Moltmann sees a correlative association of the 
Father’s fatherhood with the crucifixion: “In the surrender of the Son the Father also 
surrenders himself, though not in the same way.” Although the Son suffers 
abandonment, he cannot suffer death. Only the living suffer.24 It is rather the Father 
who suffers his Son’s death in grieving him. Such an interpretation avoids both 
patripassianism, which modalistically equates the suffering of the Father with that of 
the Son, and theopaschitism, which, although attributing suffering to God, does not do 
so in trinitarian terms. It also avoids paradox so that Moltmann does not have to say, 
“God is dead and yet not dead” (244). Father and Son experience different aspects of 
death, and this suffering is constitutive of their respective identities. In their mutual 
abandonment, the Son suffers “Fatherlessness” and the Father suffers “Sonlessness.” 
And if the Father is without his Son then he is no longer Father either: “he also suffers 
the death of his Fatherhood in the death of his Son” (243).25 Father and Son not only 
become their opposites in losing each other, i.e., non-Father and non-Son, but their 
                                                        
23 Cf. p.203, “For all his polemic against Luther’s distinction between the deus revelatus and 
the deus absconditus, Barth himself comes very close to the same sort of thing.” Moltmann writes this 
in relation to Barth’s distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity, though he 
does not provide a citation for his characterisation of the fathers’ or Barth’s doctrines of the Trinity as 
a closed circle. 
24 In CG and TKG, Moltmann focusses on Jesus’ sufferings in Gethsemane and the crucifixion. 
Any post-mortem suffering that might be located in Christ’s descent into hell is already present pre-
mortem: “in full consciousness that God is close at hand in grace, to be abandoned and delivered up to 
death as one rejected, is the torment of hell” (CG, 148). “Luther rightly referred Christ’s descent into 
hell to his dying forsaken by God and not to his preaching in the kingdom of the dead” (CG, 158 n.70; cf. 
TKG, 81, 234 n.34). Elsewhere Moltmann can speak of the suffering of Jesus in his descent into hell. See 
Jürgen Moltmann, “Descent into Hell,” trans. by M. Douglas Meeks, Duke Divinity School Review 33:2 
(Spring 1968): 115-119; idem, “The Logic of Hell,” in God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jürgen 
Moltmann, ed. Richard Bauckham, 43-48 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2001). 
25 Cf. p.218, God “has revealed himself and constituted himself in nothingness.” 
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respective fatherhood and sonship is defined by these opposites. Moltmann sees the 
constitution of Father and Son in the cross in that to be Son is to be abandoned by the 
Father, and thus also to be non-Son. To be Father is to abandon the Son, and thus also 
to be non-Father. As such, the identities of Father and Son contain their negations in 
history. 
1.5.4. The Constitution of the Spirit in the Cross 
Pneumatology is not a major feature of CG. Moltmann’s presentation of the constitution 
of the Spirit’s personhood is therefore not as pronounced. Indeed, he never explicitly 
affirms that the Spirit’s personhood is constituted in the crucifixion in any way 
analogous to the constitution of Father and Son. Nonetheless, he emphasises the 
Spirit’s connection with the crucifixion.  
The Spirit arises from the unity of the Father and the Son. On this Moltmann 
appeals to Jesus’ willing assent to the crucifixion in his prayer in Gethsemane, and Gal 
2:20 where Paul makes Jesus himself the subject of paradidōmi: He is “the Son of God, 
who loved me and gave himself for me.”26 The Son thus does not passively participate 
in the crucifixion. He actively gives himself up, which demonstrates his shared will with 
the Father. In this unity Moltmann situates the Spirit:  
[W]hatever proceeds from the event between the Father and the Son must be 
understood as the spirit of the surrender of the Father and the Son, as the spirit 
which creates love for forsaken men, as the spirit which brings the dead alive 
(244). 
It is “the event of Golgotha, the event of the love of the Son and the grief of the Father 
from which the Spirit who opens up the future and creates life in fact derives” (247). 
The origin of the Spirit in CG is even more ambiguous than that of the Son. This 
statement seems to suggest that the Spirit comes into being in the crucifixion. Whether 
or not this is the case, Moltmann is emphasising the inseparability of the Spirit from 
the united will of Father and Son in Christ’s going to the cross. 
1.5.5. The Soteriological Significance of God’s Constitution in Nothingness 
In the Spirit, Father and Son are taken beyond their negation to the eschatological 
consummation of their personhoods. Their shared love from which the Spirit derives 
                                                        
26 Cf. Rom 8:31-32, where the Father is subject, with Rom 1:24, 26, and 28. 
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overcomes the abandonment of the Son in which they are separated. The future in 
which God overcomes the negations of “Fatherlessness” and “Sonlessness” has come 
into the present through the Spirit, in Jesus’ resurrection.27 This is not to say that the 
pain of the crucifixion no longer matters in light of the coming kingdom. Here 
Moltmann’s soteriological orientation and his rejection of theism as soteriologically 
destitute is especially relevant.  
In theism, the changeable, mortal, and corruptible creation is delivered by an 
unchangeable, immortal, and incorruptible God. If he were passible then there could 
be no hope for salvation from passibility. But Moltmann sees this as problematic 
because “the positive position does not arise magically or miraculously from the 
negation of the negative.” Indeed, a salvation conceived in terms of the negation of 
suffering “also negate[s] the relative goodness of creation and the transitory and 
mortal happiness of this life.” Eschatological consummation becomes “terrifying and 
boring” (230). Rather, God only truly negates suffering in taking it on himself on the 
cross. That is, he does not offer human beings redemption from suffering by 
transporting them to a reality that never has known nor ever will know suffering, but 
he takes on this suffering himself and overcomes it so that creation, which suffers 
already, can follow him: “Only if all disaster, forsakenness by God, absolute death, the 
infinite curse of damnation and sinking into nothingness is in God himself, is 
community with this God eternal salvation, infinite joy, indestructible election and 
divine life” (246). The constitution of Father and Son in their negation thus functions 
soteriologically in allowing for the panentheistic inclusion of human beings in the 
trinitarian relations: “the Father delivers up his Son on the cross in order to be the 
Father of those who are delivered up.” (243). So, too, Christ “humbles himself and takes 
upon himself the eternal death of the godless and the godforsaken, so that all the 
godless and the godforsaken can experience communion with him” (276). On the cross, 
because the Father’s own Son undergoes a unique and even greater abandonment than 
all the divine abandonments of human beings, these divine abandonments are included 
                                                        
27 Cf. TH, 198, 
The experience of the cross of Jesus means for them [the disciples] the experience of the god-
forsakenness of God’s ambassador – that is, an absolute nihil embracing also God. The 
experience of the appearance of the crucified one as the living Lord therefore means for them 
the experience of the nearness of God in the god-forsaken one, of the divineness of God in the 
crucified and dead Christ – that is, a new totality which annihilates the total nihil. 
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in Christ’s. Yet because even this abandonment is overcome in the resurrection, all 
creation can find in the resurrection restoration and hope for the coming kingdom. 
1.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have demonstrated how Moltmann understands the cross as central 
to christology and the doctrine of the Trinity. He opens CG by addressing the problem 
of relevance and identity for the contemporary church, a problem he links to the 
relationship between soteriology and christology. But in the cross these are 
inseparable. Through his critical engagement with historical and contemporary 
interpretations of the cross, Moltmann’s own theologia crucis comes to the fore. The 
cross is that which distinguishes Christianity from all other historical phenomena. It is 
unique and unrepeatable in that Jesus actively suffered, was rejected, and was 
abandoned by his God. Because it is unique it stands beyond and continually confronts 
every human theology and theory, both inside and outside the church. 
In his christology, Moltmann explores the relationship between Christ and the 
crucifixion. Jesus himself problematises christology as it can only be undertaken in 
response to his question, “Who do you say that I am?” Even then, the answers given are 
provisional because the ultimate answer is still to come. This complements theologia 
crucis, which continually confronts idolatrous appropriations of the cross. Moreover, 
because the crucifixion takes place in Jesus’ own history it not only calls into question 
the church’s theology but the identity of Jesus and his Father as well. It takes place as 
an event within God. The crucifixion also grounds proper interpretation of Jesus’ 
resurrection, directing hearers of the gospel to the universality of God’s love as 
manifested in the cross, a love for the blasphemous, rebellious, and godforsaken. 
Moltmann goes on to contrast theologia crucis with alternative concepts of God. 
In the cross, God reveals himself in his opposite: suffering and helplessness. This differs 
from theistic concepts of God, which are developed out of the limits of finite being, and 
from particular forms of atheism which substitute God with human beings. Indeed, 
because God is love it is necessary that he suffers on the cross. He remains immutable 
and impassible but he actively chooses to allow his creation to affect him. The 
Chalcedonian distinction between divine and human natures in Christ is a further 
expression of the theistic distinction between infinite and finite being. It obscures the 
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reality of Jesus’ suffering in the cross by confining it to his human nature, whereas the 
biblical narrative does not suggest, let alone necessitate, such a qualification.  
Finally, Moltmann presents his proposals for the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Following the pattern he sees in the New Testament, the eschatological identity of 
Father and Son in the resurrection must be read backwards into the crucifixion. Here 
Moltmann finds the negation of Father and Son in the crucifixion. But the Spirit is 
constituted in their united will, and takes them beyond this negation into the 
resurrection. On the cross the Son takes on and overcomes human godforsakenness so 
that in his resurrection creation can become new creation and be reconciled to God.  
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2. The Trinity and the Kingdom 
 
2.1. Relevant Continuities with and Developments of CG 
As with CG, in TKG Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity remains grounded in christology: 
“The present book is an attempt to start with the special Christian tradition of the 
history of Jesus the Son, and from that to develop a historical doctrine of the Trinity” 
(19).28 Indeed, Moltmann devotes a whole section, “The History of the Son” (61-96) to 
this christological centre of the Trinity. Nonetheless, in contrast to CG, TKG is more 
consciously derived from the whole trinitarian history of the life of Jesus. Because 
Christ is never known in isolation from the Father and the Spirit, “The history of Jesus 
the Son cannot be grasped except as part of the history of the Father, the Son and the 
Spirit” (16).29 This means that Moltmann explicitly moves from the christological focus 
of the cross as the primary ground for his doctrine of the Trinity in CG, to the broader 
ground of the trinitarian history of Christ in TKG. 
With this broader starting point, Moltmann explores aspects of the Trinity 
which are left relatively unaddressed in CG. Richard Bauckham writes, 
It seems as though in The Crucified God Moltmann meant to say that the Trinity 
is actually constituted by the event of the cross. If so, he quickly retreated from 
that position to the view that God is eternally Trinity.30 
In TKG, Moltmann affirms the eternal processions (162-170, 182-7),31 and he can state 
that Jesus’ sending “includes the whole coming, the whole appearance and activity of 
                                                        
28 All references to TKG in this chapter are given as page numbers in parentheses. 
29 Historically, “the dogma of the Trinity was evolved out of christology.” At the same time, 
however, Jesus’ history is always trinitarian. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity “is the theological 
premise for christology and soteriology” (TKG, 129). In his later theology, especially SL, Moltmann 
devotes greater attention to the doctrine of the Trinity’s ground in pneumatology. See Laurence W. 
Wood, “From Barth’s Trinitarian Christology to Moltmann’s Trinitarian Pneumatology,” Asbury 
Theological Journal 55:1 (2000): 51-67. 
30 Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 155. Many others have made this observation regarding 
CG. The strongest is perhaps from John W. Cooper, “Moltmann’s Perichoretic Panentheism,” in 
Panentheism – the Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present, 237-258 (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2006), 241: “the Trinity is actualized at the cross. Without the cross there would be 
no Trinity.” 
31 Cf. Moltmann’s developing understanding of this relationship in CPS, 54:  
If [the foundation of Jesus’ mission] is in God himself, does it then correspond to God, or does 
God only appear in this manner, a manner which perhaps does not correspond to him at all? If 
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Jesus seen in the light of his divine origin” (71). “God himself finds in Christ his eternal 
counterpart” (86). Father and Son still constitute their identities in the cross but this is 
an ongoing constitution which begins before the crucifixion. Moltmann also pays more 
attention to pneumatological questions. In CG he prioritises christology and its relation 
to the doctrine of the Trinity. The focus of his pneumatology is post-crucifixion.32 In 
TKG this eschatological location remains,33 but the Spirit is not reduced to eschatology: 
“The Father eternally ‘breathes out’ the Holy Spirit” (182). Moreover, the Spirit is a 
distinct subject, like Father and Son: “If the Spirit is only termed the unity of what is 
separated, then he loses every centre of activity. He is then an energy but not a Person. 
He is then a relationship but not a subject” (142).34 As such, the Spirit is at work in the 
crucifixion. He does not merely arise out of it, but is prior to it so “The common sacrifice 
of the Father and the Son comes about through the Holy Spirit” (83).35 
                                                        
we push our question further back like this, then we cannot find anything in God which is 
antecedent to the sending of Jesus and in which this sending was not included. As God appears 
in history as the sending Father and the sent Son, so he must earlier have been in himself. 
Nonetheless, the concept of origin for Moltmann is not completely unproblematic. “This thinking in 
terms of origin derives from cosmology and can therefore only be haltingly applied to the mystery of 
the Trinity.” While nonetheless employing the concept of origin, in accordance with his broader 
doctrine of the Trinity such thinking must avoid “monarchical reduction” and emphasise “the equally 
primordial character of the trinitarian Persons” (TKG, 166). 
32 Although cf. Moltmann’s discussion of P. Kuhn’s Jewish theology in which God suffers in 
history with Israel through his Shekinah (CG, 272-274). 
33 “[I]n the whole of the New Testament the Spirit is understood eschatologically” (88). 
34 Moltmann takes this a step further in rethinking the trinitarian taxis historically and 
eschatologically: 
In the sending, delivering up and resurrection of Christ we find this sequence: Father – Spirit – 
Son. In the lordship of Christ and the sending of the Spirit the sequence is: Father – Son – 
Spirit. But when we are considering the eschatological consummation and glorification, the 
sequence has to be: Spirit – Son – Father” (94). 
Moreover, in the eternal taxis, which becomes a process in history, “It is even difficult to perceive that 
the second Person has any priority over the third Person of the Trinity. Word and Spirit, Spirit and 
Word issue together and simultaneously from the Father, for they mutually condition one another” 
(170). Rethinking the trinitarian taxis in these ways allows Moltmann to present a radical restatement 
of the Spirit’s subjecthood: “In this respect [i.e., eschatologically], the Spirit is not an energy proceeding 
from the Father or from the Son; it is a subject from whose activity the Son and the Father receive their 
glory and their union” (126). 
35 Nonetheless, while Moltmann extends the scope of his pneumatology in TKG significantly, it 
is not until WJC and SL that he develops an understanding of the Spirit’s role in the cross that can 
complement his earlier focus on the Father and the Son. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Spirit’s 
connection to the crucifixion is already highlighted. Jesus surrenders himself “through the eternal 
Spirit” (Heb 9:14). So, too, in the Gospel of Mark Jesus warns his disciples to pray, lest they fall into 
temptation: “the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak” (Mark 14:38). Here, the Spirit makes 
Jesus’ self-surrender possible so that “The value of the sacrifice does not depend solely on the one 
surrendered. It has to do with the mode of the surrender too” (SL, 63). Moreover, as the Spirit of unity, 
the Spirit is the one who brings the crucifixion beyond itself into the resurrection as one event: 
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In TKG Moltmann also develops major themes and concepts from CG. He 
includes a longer survey of the literature on divine passibility, beginning with the 
patristic theologian Origen. Moltmann goes on to examine more modern voices such 
as Abraham Heschel and rabbinic/kabbalistic theology, various nineteenth and 
twentieth century Anglican theologians, Spain’s Miguel de Unamuno and his theology 
of the congoja of Christ and the world, and Russia’s Nikolai Berdyaev and his theology 
of God’s suffering in freedom (23-47). When it comes to the relationship between 
immanent and economic Trinity, Moltmann now bases his identification of the one 
with the other in the notion that God is a living God, rather than attempting to base this 
exclusively in the cross. As the living God, he constitutes himself in relation to his 
creation: 
We shall start from the assumption that the relationship between God and the 
world has a reciprocal character, because this relationship must be seen as a 
living one. Every living and life-promoting determination of someone else has 
its origin in self-determination, and it reverberates on that self-determination. 
A purely one-sided relationship is not a living relationship at all (98).36 
Nonetheless, the cross still plays a central role in this identification: 
The cross is at the centre of the Trinity. This is brought out by tradition, when 
it takes up the Book of Revelation’s image of ‘the Lamb who was slain from the 
foundation of the world’ (Rev. 5.12). Before the world was, the sacrifice was 
already in God. No Trinity is conceivable without the sacrifice of love, without 
the crucified Son (83).37 
                                                        
“Looked at pneumatologically, Christ’s death and rebirth belong within a single movement.” They are 
“the birth-pangs and birth-joys of the Spirit” and “the sowing and growth of a plant” (SL, 65). 
Secondly, Moltmann can speak of the unique suffering of the Spirit. Because the Spirit who 
gave Jesus power in his ministry goes with him to the cross, “the Spirit who was Jesus’ active power 
now becomes his suffering power.” Thus, “The sufferings of Christ are also the sufferings of the Spirit, 
for the surrender of Christ also manifested the self-emptying of the Spirit” (WJC, 174). Yet the Spirit’s 
suffering is nonetheless distinct from Jesus’: “The Spirit is the transcendent side of Jesus’ immanent 
way of suffering” and “the Spirit binds itself to Jesus’ fate, without becoming identical with him” (SL, 
62). Moltmann has already argued that it is not the Son but the Father who suffers death in grieving. 
So, too, the Spirit suffers the Son’s death but in yet another way: “what the Spirit ‘experiences’ – 
though we must not overstress the metaphor – is surely that the dying Jesus ‘breathes him out’ and 
‘yields him up’” (SL, 64; Mark 15:37; John 19:30). 
36 Cf. 64, “His [Jesus’] history is the history of the reciprocal, changing, and hence living 
relationship between the Father, the Son and the Spirit,” emphasis added. 
37 Cf. 160, referring to CG Moltmann writes, 
In order to grasp the death of the Son in its significance for God himself, I found myself bound 
to surrender the traditional distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity, 
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The basis of the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity in the living God 
is also complemented by Moltmann’s emphasis on divine love in TKG. If God is love, as 
the cross attests, then love requires him to communicate himself not only to that which 
is like him, his Son, but to his Other, creation. And in his love he also seeks to be loved: 
“If God is love, then he does not merely emanate, flow out of himself; he also expects 
and needs love” (99). 
Another theme which Moltmann develops in TKG is his critique of theism. Here, 
however, he has extended this critique to “monotheism,” a term he uses to denote what 
he deems to be subordinationist or modalist doctrines of the Trinity, including most 
Western trinitarian theology after Augustine. This direction is already evident in CG. 
Following Karl Rahner, Moltmann distances his doctrine of the Trinity from those 
which “first describe the unity of the nature of God and then distinguish between the 
three divine persons or hypostases, as in that case one is essentially dealing with four 
beings.” He refers to such thinking derisively as “monotheistic” (CG, 240). But the cross 
necessitates that trinitarian unity be rethought: “the unity contains not only identity of 
substance but also the wholly and utterly different character and inequality of the 
event of the cross” (CG, 244).38 In TKG Moltmann significantly develops his doctrine of 
trinitarian unity, presenting collective unity as an alternative to substantial unity (129-
150, 171-178). 
2.2. The Relationship between Immanent and Economic Trinity 
Moltmann advocates a position of no compromise on the identity of immanent with 
economic Trinity: 
The thesis about the fundamental identity of the immanent and the economic 
Trinity of course remains open to misunderstanding as long as we cling to the 
distinction at all, because then it sounds like the dissolution of the one in the 
other (160). 
                                                        
according to which the cross comes to stand only in the economy of salvation, but not within 
the immanent Trinity. 
38 Cf. also Moltmann’s critique of the “earthly eschatology” of the church in TH, 159: 
The world is led by the one Church to the Christ who is one with the one God, and is thus 
brought to unity and salvation. The eschatological expectation of what has ‘not yet’ happened 
becomes a noetic expectation of the universal disclosure and glorification of what has already 
happened in heaven. 
Moltmann decries such thinking because it dehistoricises the biblical narrative. 
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Thus “there are not two different Trinities.” Rather, “There is only one, single, divine 
Trinity and one, single divine history of salvation. The triune God can only appear in 
history as he is in himself, and no other way” (153). Nonetheless, Moltmann still 
employs some kind of distinction between economic and immanent Trinity, which will 
become clear in the following. 
2.2.1. The Trinity and the Act of Creation 
It is on the cross that God enters into the suffering of his creation. Yet while this is the 
culmination of his suffering in history, to the extent that Father and Son lose their 
respective fatherhood and sonship, it is not, in historical terms, the first instance of 
divine suffering. On the cross Moltmann sees the confirmation of God’s suffering 
throughout all history: “From the foundation of the world, the opera trinitatis ad extra 
correspond to the passiones trinitatis ad intra” (160). That is, if the cross reveals God’s 
solidarity with human beings in suffering then it also reveals that this suffering begins 
not in the crucifixion but with the creation of the world. Whereas creation is 
traditionally understood as an outward act, external to God, Moltmann asks, “can the 
omnipotent and omnipresent God have an ‘outward’ aspect at all?” (108). No, he 
responds. Before the creation of the world there is only God. And if there is only God 
then there is no outside, lest something else compete with God for this ontological 
space. It is therefore necessary for the Creator to limit himself: “In order to create 
something ‘outside’ himself, the infinite God must have made room for this finite 
beforehand, ‘in himself’” (109). As such, God’s suffering and constitution in history 
begin at creation. 
To make this move, Moltmann must reconceive divine freedom. He asks, “Is the 
suffering God free or is he a prisoner of his own history?” In the nominalist concept of 
divine freedom, which Moltmann associates with Karl Barth, God “is compelled to 
nothing. He can do and leave undone whatever he likes. His creative and suffering love 
is founded on his groundless decision” (52).39 But Moltmann finds this dissatisfactory: 
“The reasoning ‘God could’, or ‘God could have’, is inappropriate… God’s freedom can 
never contradict the truth which he himself is.” Thus, “not to reveal himself and to be 
                                                        
39 Moltmann continues, “Karl Barth tried to get over the nominalist doctrine of potentia 
absoluta, especially in his criticism of Luther. None the less, in his doctrine of God’s primordial decision 
a nominalist fringe remains” (52). 
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contented with his untouched glory would be a contradiction of himself” (53). 
Significantly, the nominalist concept of freedom does not correspond to God’s suffering 
in love on the cross. It understands God’s freedom formalistically, not materially. But 
Moltmann sees in the cross a priority of God’s love over his freedom: “The theology of 
the divine passion is founded on the biblical tenet, ‘God is love’” (57; 1 John 4:16). God’s 
freedom must therefore be understood in terms of the love which is in the cross, “a 
self-evident, unquestionable ‘over-flowing of goodness’” and “therefore never open to 
choice at any time” (TKG, 55). 
Such an understanding of divine freedom differs markedly from the nominalist 
concept: “For the loving God, nothing is a matter of indifference. Before an equivocal, 
an undecided God, nothing is significant” (152). If choice is above love in the divine 
nature then the decisions God executes in his freedom become arbitrary. Moreover, if 
freedom is prior to love then “God has two natures,” the immanent nature of freedom 
and the economic nature of love (54). Thus, 
The notion of an immanent Trinity in which God is simply by himself, without 
the love which communicates salvation, brings an arbitrary element into the 
concept of God… Consequently this idea safeguards neither God’s liberty nor 
the grace of salvation (151). 
Moltmann proceeds to state his position positively, providing six theses based 
on the tenet, “God is love.” First, “Love is the self-communication of the good.” As self-
communication it can give itself completely to the other without being dissolved in the 
other (57). Second, “Every self-communication presupposes the capacity for self-
differentiation.” In communicating himself God both differentiates what is 
communicated from himself and also identifies it with himself. His self-communication 
is not possible as a “solitary subject” but only as Trinity: “If God is love then he is at 
once the lover, the beloved and the love itself” (57). Third, in self-communication God 
seeks his Other by creating and caring for the world. Freedom is defined in terms of 
love so “Love not only has the potentiality for this, but the actual tendency and 
intention as well” (58). Fourth, God’s free love for the world arises from the Father and 
Son’s necessary relation of love. The Father creates out of his love for the Son and the 
Son redeems out of his love for the Father. Whereas intra-trinitarian love is love of “like 
for like,” God goes beyond this to create and love his Other because “Like is not enough 
for like.” Nonetheless, this love for the Other takes place within the mutual love of 
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Father and Son and is thus “no different from the love he himself is in eternity” (58-
59). Fifth, the act of creation requires God’s self-limitation and is therefore internal as 
well as external. In desiring that the world freely respond to him, God limits himself in 
giving creation the freedom to deny him. In this he opens himself up to suffering from 
his creation, which subsequently becomes suffering with and for his creation. Finally, 
because God suffers with the world, his own deliverance from suffering is in the 
world’s deliverance from suffering, and vice versa. 
While grounding God’s freedom in the love of the cross, however, Moltmann is 
careful not to make the creation of the world an external or internal necessity to God’s 
being. On the one hand, “it is impossible to conceive of a God who is not a creative God” 
and “God cannot find bliss in eternal self-love if selflessness is part of love’s very 
nature” (106). Yet, 
If we lift the concept of necessity out of the context of compulsive necessity and 
determination by something external, then in God necessity and freedom 
coincide; they are what is for him axiomatic, self-evident. For God it is axiomatic 
to love, for he cannot deny himself. For God it is axiomatic to love freely, for he 
is God. There is consequently no reason why we should not understand God as 
being from eternity self-communicating love. This does not make him ‘his own 
prisoner’. It means that he remains true to himself (108).40 
For Moltmann, then, the cross demonstrates that the history of creation in the 
economic Trinity belongs to God’s own history. That which has been called the 
immanent Trinity must be understood as already open for the inclusion of creation and 
indeed directed already towards creating the world. 
2.2.2. The Doxological Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity  
An interesting innovation Moltmann introduces in TKG is the idea that immanent and 
economic Trinity can be distinguished doxologically. Traditionally, the doctrine of the 
immanent Trinity attends to God’s intra-trinitarian life or his being, whereas the 
doctrine of the economic Trinity attends to God’s work ad extra. Moltmann can thus 
acknowledge and uphold this distinction, albeit in a different way that is in accordance 
with his identification of economic with immanent Trinity: “In doxology the thanks of 
the receiver return from the goodly gift to the giver. But the giver is not thanked merely 
                                                        
40 Cf. 151, “He is not compelled to love by any outward or inward necessity.” 
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for the sake of his good gift; he is also extolled because he himself is good” (153). 
Doxology recognises the immanent Trinity because it recognises that God’s work has 
its source in God himself. However, this does not compromise the identity of economic 
with immanent Trinity because “doxological terms remain inescapably bound to the 
experience of salvation and do not go speculatively beyond it” (153). Doxology finds 
the ground of the cross in God’s immanent life without recourse to a concept of divine 
freedom that is prior to divine love. Following this, Moltmann proposes a new rule: 
“Statements about the immanent Trinity must not contradict statements about the 
economic Trinity. Statements about the economic Trinity must correspond to doxological 
statements about the immanent Trinity” (154). The first part of the rule concerns the 
inseparability of the doctrine of the (immanent) Trinity from the human experience of 
salvation, which God himself experiences in his history with creation. The second part 
of the rule concerns the necessity of recognising the being of God, “the transcendent 
conditions which make the experience [of salvation] possible,” in the doctrine of the 
(economic) Trinity (153). 
Through his doxological doctrine of the immanent Trinity Moltmann develops 
his earlier pneumatology and eschatology. The relationship between doxology and the 
Trinity is not merely epistemological. The (immanent) Trinity is both recognised and 
constituted in doxology. That is, the Spirit constitutes the Father and the Son through 
the praise of the redeemed: “the joy of responsive love in glorification through the 
Spirit determines the inner life of the triune God from eternity to eternity.”41 Moreover, 
doxology “always ends with the eschatological prospect,” looking to the coming of the 
kingdom. God’s constitution takes place in history but also looks forward to its 
eschatological consummation when “What remains is the eternal praise of the triune 
God in his glory” (161). Moltmann has already expounded this eschatological 
constitution in CG. In TKG he maintains this position but more explicitly links it with 
the immanent Trinity. The coming of the kingdom is an “inner-trinitarian process.” 
                                                        
41 Cf. 127,  
In glorification through the Spirit… we find the order of the Trinity reversed. In the wake of 
glorification, the song of praise and the unity proceed from the Spirit through the Son to the 
Father… He [the Spirit] achieves the glorification of God through the new creation’s praise and 
testimony. He creates for the Father in heaven that joy on earth which finally gives him bliss. It 




“Eschatology… is not simply what takes place in the Last Days in heaven and on earth; 
it is what takes place in God’s essential nature” (92). As such, when the Son has 
defeated death, and his sonship, with the Father’s fatherhood, has been consummated 
in his handing over of the kingdom to the Father, “the economic Trinity is raised into 
and transcended in the immanent Trinity” (161). 
2.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how Moltmann develops his understanding of the 
significance of the cross for the doctrine of the Trinity in TKG. Most relevant to this 
thesis is his construal of the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity. 
Moltmann locates divine suffering not only in the event of the cross but in the creation 
of the world. To create, God limits himself and makes himself vulnerable to creaturely 
suffering. Moreover, because God is love his decision to create the world is not based 
in choice but a free assent to the necessity inherent in love. Moltmann maintains that 
the immanent Trinity may be known doxologically, as praise focusses not just on the 
gift of salvation but the giver of the gift. This anticipates the eschatological immanent 
Trinity when God will be in full fellowship with his creation and the economic Trinity 
will be complete.  
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3. Crux Probat Omnia: Moltmann’s Methodology 
 
3.1. Methodology in CG 
3.1.1 Christocentrism and Crucicentrism 
A number of writers have noted that in CG Moltmann derives his doctrine of the Trinity 
from christology. Specifically, for Moltmann, “The crucified Christ is the inner criterion 
of all theology. Take that away and there is nothing specifically christian about the 
church, or about its faith and theology.”42 In this, Moltmann follows Karl Barth.43 With 
Luther, he repudiates any natural theology that would supplant the God who is 
revealed in the cross. Nonetheless, Moltmann arrives at quite different conclusions to 
Barth because, unlike Barth, he rejects the distinction between immanent and 
economic Trinity. This allows him to affirm in the cross the divine suffering of Father 
and Son and their constitution in history. Moltmann’s theological methodology in CG is 
indeed christocentric, but his christocentrism is crucicentric.44 
First, the crucified Christ calls all theologies into question: “[B]ecause of its 
subject, the theology of the cross, right down to its method and practice, can only be 
polemical, dialectical, antithetical and critical theory” (CG, 69). “It does not state what 
exists, but sets out to liberate men from their inhuman definitions and idolized 
                                                        
42 Carl E. Braaten, “A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross,” Journal of Religion 56:1 (1976): 113-
121 (114, emphasis added). Cf. also Gerald L. Bray, The Doctrine of God (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity, 1993), 193, “The influence of Barth’s christocentric trinitarianism can be seen most 
strongly in the work of Jürgen Moltmann”; and Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, “Jürgen Moltmann: Trinitarian 
Panentheism,” in The Trinity: Global Perspectives, 100-122 (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 
2007), 103, “Christology is the starting point of the Trinitarian doctrine for Moltmann.” 
43 E.g., Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/1, ed. and trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas F. 
Torrance (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 119 (henceforth CD I/1), “Revelation in fact does not differ 
from the person of Jesus Christ nor from the reconciliation accomplished in Him. To say revelation is to 
say ‘The Word became flesh’”; CD I/1, 380, the doctrine of the Trinity is an answer to “the 
manifestation of Jesus Christ understood as the revelation of the Logos. It is trying to discuss the deity 
of this revealed, incarnate Logos.” See Henri Blocher, “Karl Barth’s Christocentric Method,” in Engaging 
with Barth: Contemporary Evangelical Critiques, ed. David Gibson and Daniel Strange, 21-54 (New 
York: T. & T. Clark, 2008).  
44 While staurocentric seems to be more commonly represented in the literature, crucicentric is 
sometimes employed instead. The latter is preferable because (a) it is faithful to the Latin root centrum, 
in contrast to staurocentric which combines one Latin and one Greek word (although centrum derives 
ultimately from Greek, the meaning of the Greek root is very much removed from the Latin centrum and 
the English centre which are invoked here), and (b) its similarity to words like crucifix and cruciform 
makes it more readily accessible to a wider audience. 
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assertions” (CG, 72). A theology of the cross requires that theology is always in flux 
because the same theological truths can be liberatory and in line with the gospel in one 
context but oppressive and opposed to the gospel in another. Whereas devotion to the 
cross provided solace for the poor and marginalised because they were closer to the 
crucified Christ than those who exercised power over them, “Too often, peasants, 
Indians and black slaves have been called upon by the representatives of the dominant 
religion to accept their sufferings as ‘their cross’ and not to rebel against them” (CG, 
49). Moltmann points out that Luther, for example, though developing his theologia 
crucis to highlight the abuses of the church, did not apply this same critique to society 
in the Peasant Wars. Rather, he commended the peasants to accept their suffering (CG, 
66). This means that Moltmann’s theology must also be self-critical from the start, lest, 
like Luther, it be used by himself or others for ends foreign to the cross of Christ. 
Significantly, the critical nature of the cross is not limited to human theologies. It 
extends to God himself. Because Christ’s life ends in suffering, abandonment, and 
death, the cross disputes both the claims he made throughout his life and his Father’s 
faithfulness to him. It is thus the “basic problem” of christology and theology (CG, 125). 
Theologia crucis is a critical theology that confronts church and society, as well as the 
God in which these have their basis. 
Second, Moltmann undertakes theology dialectically. In contrast to the 
analogical principle, “like is known only by like,” the staple of classical Western 
epistemology, Moltmann sees in the cross the workings of the dialectic, i.e., “Every 
being can be revealed only in its opposite. Love only in hatred, unity only in conflict.”45 
Thus, “God is only revealed as ‘God’ in his opposite: godlessness and abandonment by 
God” (CG, 27). However, Richard Bauckham claims that Moltmann does not clearly 
explain or justify this principle. If God is only revealed in his opposite then revelation 
does not take place. What is revealed is not God but his opposite! Rather, Moltmann 
seems to employ dialectic to say that God is revealed in the context of his opposite: 
“God is revealed in his opposite because he is love which identifies with what is alien 
to him,” i.e., godforsaken human beings.46 God’s love is known when it is encountered 
                                                        
45 F. W. J. Schelling, Über das Wesen der menslichen Freiheit (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1964) 8913-15, 
89, cited in CG, 27.  
46 Richard Bauckham, “Moltmann’s Eschatology of the Cross,” Scottish Journal of Theology 30:4 
(1977): 301-311 (305). Cf. ExpTh, 69-73. 
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where there is no love. Moreover, this is dialectical because God reveals himself in both 
his opposite and his likeness. He reveals himself in his opposite according to the 
crucifixion but he reveals himself in his likeness according to the resurrection. In the 
resurrection, God has not only become like human beings, revealing himself in his 
opposite, but as they become like him, he reveals himself in his likeness. It is in the 
differentiated unity of the cross – crucifixion and resurrection – that Moltmann’s 
dialectical method has its basis. It follows that theologia crucis is not unfettered, pure 
criticism. If the criticism is the intended end rather than one stage in the dialectic then 
it soon loses its Christian character because it is abstracted from the cross of the risen 
Christ. Such a criticism cannot offer the world anything beyond its own vicissitudes. 
Moltmann’s dialectic means that critical theology grounded in the cross is 
eschatologically oriented. 
Third, on the cross Jesus identifies with godforsaken humanity. If this is who 
God is then all theology is necessarily soteriological. That is, theology must seek to 
know God in connection to the exigencies of concrete, creaturely existence and seek 
God’s deliverance of human beings into new life. This means both that theology is 
informed by human experience so that, for example, Moltmann’s personal experiences 
of guilt and suffering guide his project in CG, and that theology is oriented to the 
liberation of the godforsaken. Moltmann thus addresses contemporary issues such as 
the identity and relevance of the church (chap. 1), and the psychological and political 
liberation of humanity (chaps. 7 and 8). Overlooking such ends means potentially 
forfeiting commitment to the cross in theology. Significantly, this soteriological 
orientation underpins Moltmann’s almost categorical rejection of metaphysics, which 
he sees as abstract and speculative.47 
3.1.2. Too Much Cross? 
Carl Braaten has critiqued Moltmann’s central methodological focus on the 
crucified Christ. CG “suffers from the occupational hazard of systematic theologians in 
particular—the tyranny of the single category.”48 Moltmann admits as much. In writing 
                                                        
47 E.g., CG, 65-81, 207-219, 227-235; TKG, 10-20, 129-151, 191-202. See Daniel E. Rossi-Keen, 
“Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of God: The Trinity beyond Metaphysics,” Studies in Religion/Sciences 
religieuses 37:3-4 (2008): 447-463. Puzzlingly, Rossi-Keen makes little reference to Moltmann’s 
theologia crucis, which is the ground for his rejection of metaphysics. 
48 Braaten, “Trinitarian Theology of the Cross,” 120. Similar critiques have been lodged by 
others. For example, John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (Oxford, NY: Oxford University 
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CG, “The whole of theology was drawn as if by a magnifying glass into a single focus: 
the cross” (CG, x). This “tyranny,” however, allegedly restricts Moltmann’s theological 
trajectory. Whether Braaten’s attribution of theologia crucis to Paul is more or less 
correct, his observation is worth noting: 
The writings of Paul are the main source for the theologia crucis in the New 
Testament, and Paul is not the whole of the canon. His theology cannot even 
determine the sole norm of what is Christian. The theology of the cross does not 
provide theology with all its epistemological presuppositions, its faith contents, 
and its ethical implications. The multiplicity of New Testament confessions and 
theologies cannot be unified by reduction to a theology of the cross.49 
By making the cross his sole focus in CG, Moltmann has failed to faithfully represent 
the diverse biblical witness to Christ. I will return to Moltmann’s use of Scripture later 
in the chapter. Here it is enough to wonder with Braaten to what extent Moltmann’s 
doctrine of the Trinity is viable if it is derived from a “single category.” 
Nonetheless, while “The death of Jesus on the cross is the centre of all Christian 
theology” for Moltmann, “It is not the only theme of theology, but it is in effect the entry 
to its problems and answers on earth” (CG, 204). As Christiaan Mostert writes of 
Moltmann’s theology, 
God is defined by more than the cross. But whatever else is to be said about the 
God whose self-revelation finds its sharpest focus in Jesus Christ cannot, 
without significant loss, be said at any great distance from the place where that 
terrible cry of God-forsakenness was uttered.50 
Throughout CG, Moltmann consistently asserts the differentiated unity of the cross in 
crucifixion and resurrection. It is “from a cross and resurrection-centered christological 
vantage point” that Moltmann derives his conclusions.51 This is particularly evident in 
Moltmann’s eschatological reversal of history.52 Moreover, whereas in CG Moltmann 
                                                        
Press, 1994), 51, writes, “For Moltmann it is the separation of God-forsakenness which is treated 
almost in isolation from other aspects of the passion narratives.” 
49 Braaten, “Trinitarian Theology of the Cross,” 120. 
50 Christiaan Mostert, “Moltmann’s Crucified God,” Journal of Reformed Theology 7 (2013): 
160-180 (166). 
51 Stephen Williams, “Moltmann on Jesus Christ,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical 
Theology: A Critical Engagement, ed. Sung Wook Chung, 104-125 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2012), 122, 
emphasis added. See CG, 204. Though critical of Moltmann’s proposals, Williams acknowledges that 
Moltmann does not derive his theology exclusively from the cross. 
52 See subsection 1.5.1. of this thesis. 
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focusses on the crucifixion, he had already given considerable attention to the 
resurrection, the ground of Christian hope, in his earlier TH. 
It is also notable that two other methodological considerations not derived 
directly from the crucifixion inform CG. First, as can be seen in his dialectical method 
noted above, Moltmann maintains the central theme of TH, the eschatological nature 
of history in its openness to the future. This, like theologia crucis, requires that all 
theology be seen as provisional. Because Christ is being constituted in history, “the 
centre of his existence is outside himself” (CG, 106). The church’s “christology is 
essentially unconcluded and permanently in need of revision” (CG, 106-107). Amid the 
horrors of great suffering, in the resurrection God reveals his righteousness and 
confirms his promise that this righteousness will be consummated in his coming 
kingdom where the world will be put to right. In the meantime, theology witnesses to 
that hope in the present, albeit in an ever-provisional way. 
Second, Moltmann asserts that interpretation of the cross must be governed by 
the doctrine of the Trinity: “The material principle of the doctrine of the Trinity is the 
cross of Christ. The formal principle of the knowledge of the cross is the doctrine of the 
Trinity” (CG, 241). That is, only in its theological context, the unique Christian witness 
to God as Trinity, can the cross begin to be properly understood. According to 
Moltmann, those before him who had similarly sought to make the cross central to 
their doctrine of God had failed to do so in an adequately trinitarian manner (CG, 200-
204). This does not mean that, in contrast to the dynamicity of theologia crucis, 
Moltmann here reverts to an ahistorical principle in the eternal trinitarian persons. 
The Trinity, too, provides an ever-moving ground from which to engage theology as 
Father, Son, and Spirit continue to constitute themselves in history and bring the 
church into a renewed understanding of the gospel. Moreover, the Trinity not only 
determines the shape of theologia crucis but the inverse is also true. Although this 
symmetry is not evident in Moltmann’s formula, it is clear that he presupposes it in 
CG.53 Like crucifixion and resurrection, the relationship between the doctrines of the 
cross and the Trinity is dialectical. Otherwise Moltmann would be restricted to 
interpreting the cross according to more traditional trinitarian tenets, many of which 
                                                        
53 Further down, on the same page, Moltmann seems to basically equate the two: “the theology 
of the cross must be the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity must be the theology of 
the cross” (CG, 241). 
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he rejects. Braaten’s critique, then, oversimplifies Moltmann’s method in CG in 
overlooking its dialectical and trinitarian setting. 
Yet, although the crucifixion is not the exclusive theme of Moltmann’s CG, it 
remains to be shown whether he interprets it in a theologically responsible way. For 
Daniel Castelo, Moltmann lacks context, i.e., “a narrative of God’s history with his 
people,” where the cross does not convey God’s constitution in history but it is “one 
other instance of God’s steadfastness and fidelity to the covenant.” This means that 
“For the uniqueness that the cross of Christ must elicit for the theological task, it is a 
concept no more noteworthy than the incarnation or resurrection.”54 Similarly, for 
Kevin Vanhoozer, “Jesus Christ reveals God neither de novo nor ex nihilo.”55 The new 
covenant is not new for God himself, from whom all new things come, but it is new for 
his people, in which the Gentiles are now included. Here it is not so much Moltmann’s 
focus on the cross as it is what he does with it theologically that is the problem. I will 
discuss this in more detail in the next chapter.56 
3.2. Methodology in TKG 
3.2.1. Experience and Dialogue 
In TKG, Moltmann develops his earlier methodological commitments. Following the 
soteriological orientation of CG, he opens with a discussion of the role of experience 
and practice in theological epistemology. Whereas Friedrich Schleiermacher made 
human experience a central category in theology, Moltmann follows Barth in rejecting 
this because it makes theology about human beings instead of God. However, he 
maintains that experience is valid insofar as it takes into account the inverse, God’s 
experience of human beings. Specifically, divine suffering means that God is known in 
the context of human suffering: “If a person once feels the infinite passion of God’s love 
which finds expression here,” i.e., in suffering, “then he understands the mystery of the 
triune God” (TKG, 4).57 Moltmann also affirms that theology should be oriented to 
                                                        
54 Daniel Castelo, “Moltmann's Dismissal of Divine Impassibility: Warranted?” Scottish Journal 
of Theology 61:4 (2008): 396-407 (405). Castelo cites Phil 2:6-11 and Heb 1:3-4 as biblical examples of 
the threefold incarnation-crucifixion-resurrection pattern of Christ’s life that the fathers recognised. 
55 Kevin Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 418. 
56 See subsection 4.4.1. 
57 Cf. Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” in How I Have Changed: Reflections on Thirty Years of 
Theology, ed. Jürgen Moltmann, trans. by John Bowden, 13-21. (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press 
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practical concerns. But such an orientation must proceed from faith, which consists in 
prayer and reflection as well as practice: “There must be no theology of liberation 
without the glorification of God and no glorification of God without the liberation of 
the oppressed” (TKG, 8). Moltmann thus reminds his readers that although theology is 
necessarily soteriological, it cannot properly be soteriological without recourse to 
divine subjectivity as well as human subjectivity and thinking as well as practice. While 
his appeal to divine experience is certainly influenced by the cross, in TKG Moltmann 
begins to move beyond this starting point to posit divine experience as a necessary 
presupposition of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Perhaps the most important methodological principle informing the 
significance of the cross for the doctrine of the Trinity which Moltmann hones in TKG 
is that of dialogue. He already aimed at this in CG, a book which was “not meant to bring 
the discussion to a dogmatic conclusion, but to be, like a symbol, an invitation to 
thought and rethinking” (CG, 6). This is more pronounced in TKG, which is the first in 
his series of “systematic contributions to theology.” Here Moltmann develops theology 
“in a particular systematic sequence,” though without any attempt to produce a 
complete “system.” TKG and future works are thus “contributions” (TKG, x). Such 
contributions do not aim for objectivity. Rather, they participate in ongoing, critical 
dialogue, seeking the coming kingdom in the present.58 Moltmann’s appropriation of 
sources reflects this. He targets his critical theology in CG and TKG at dominant voices 
such as Augustine, Thomas, and Barth, whose towering theologies often inadvertently 
silence marginalised voices in the tradition. This is thus not so much a concern with 
authorial intention as it is with how these theologies have functioned in church and 
society, as is clear from the obvious influence they exert on Moltmann’s theology. 
Hegel, who is certainly not a marginalised voice in theology, also contributes 
considerably to Moltmann’s conclusions.59 Moltmann’s reliance on Hegel perhaps 
                                                        
International, 1997), 20, “It should be possible to verify theological statements by empathy with the 
experiences of others, whether individual or collective.” 
58 Cf. Joy Ann McDougall, Pilgrimage of Love: Moltmann on the Trinity and Christian Life 
(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), vii, who writes that Moltmann read through her work as 
it was in development and instead of rejecting her critiques encouraged her to engage even more 
critically with his proposals. 
59 On the relationship between Hegel and Moltmann see Brian Spence, “The Hegelian Element 
in von Balthasar’s and Moltmann’s Understanding of the Suffering of God,” Toronto Journal of Theology 
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reflects his need to draw on an alternatively robust system to decentre other dominant 
voices. But Moltmann also enjoins quieter voices, historical and contemporary, inside 
and outside the church, to participate in the conversation on the Trinity. For example, 
he invites input from Jewish (CG, 270-274), atheist, and Marxist voices (CG, 219-227). 
In TKG, too, Moltmann devotes much space to particular theologians, sometimes 
obscure, from different communities around the world who have found comfort in the 
suffering of God (TKG, 23-47). He draws upon Joachim of Fiore, “counted as an 
‘Enthusiast’ and an outsider,” to understand the relationship between the Trinity and 
the kingdom (TKG, 203-209). Again, however, while Moltmann’s dialogical approach 
accords with a commitment to the cross, it cannot be reduced to this commitment. It 
certainly derives from many personal and theological factors. 
If the accusation of Moltmann’s methodological reduction to the cross in CG is 
to nonetheless be maintained, it is at least clear that in TKG (and his many later works) 
he has moved beyond this focus and drawn upon other aspects of theology to inform 
his pursuits. If Moltmann views TKG and further volumes in his systematic 
contributions series as participation in dialogue as opposed to a theological system, 
how much more then should CG, a view of Christian theology from an avowedly 
particular angle, be seen as a participation in this dialogue. 
3.2.2. The Non-Systematic Nature of Moltmann’s Methodology 
What this sketch of Moltmann’s theological methodology in CG and TKG does reveal, 
however, is the piecemeal and generally non-systematic nature of Moltmann’s 
theology. Indeed, George Hunsinger contends that TKG is a “methodological 
mishmash”:  
When Moltmann wants to appeal to experience to validate a theological claim, 
he appeals to experience. When he wants to invoke the testimony of Scripture, 
he does so. When a general philosophical definition makes sense to him, he 
brings it in. When he needs a more specifically theological argument, he does 
not hesitate to construct one.60 
                                                        
14:1 (1998): 45-60; Samuel M. Powell, The Trinity in German Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 173-258. 
60 George Hunsinger, Review of The Trinity and the Kingdom, by Jürgen Moltmann, in The 




It is not until ExpTh (2000), the final volume of his systematic contributions, 
that Moltmann develops a detailed theological methodology. He writes,  
Up to now these questions about method have not greatly interested me, 
because I first wanted to get to know the real content of theology. For me, what 
was more important was the revision of theological issues in the light of their 
biblical origins, and their renewal or reworking in the challenge of the present 
(ExpTh, xiv). 
Moltmann explicitly rejects devoting too much space to methodological questions. 
“Never content with being anything less than programmatic,”61 he is more concerned 
with the soteriological end at which theology aims and the process of dialogue this 
requires than the scientific conditions for its possibility. Moreover, this is mirrored by 
Moltmann’s disregard for “correct theological notions.” Rather, across his career he 
was “much too preoccupied with the perception of new perspectives and unfamiliar 
aspects” (ExpTh, xv). Elsewhere he reflects, “My theological virtue has not been 
humility, but only curiosity and imagination for the kingdom of God.”62 Commitment 
to a methodology might have restricted his exploration of new content and the way he 
engaged certain voices. This is not to say that Moltmann’s theology is bereft of all 
methodology, implicit and explicit. It is clear from the above that he consciously 
develops CG and TKG according to particular methodological commitments. However, 
these commitments (theologia crucis, dialectic, dialogue, etc.), as well as a focus on 
theological content, result in a theology of cross and Trinity that invites critical 
engagement, imagination, and understanding, as opposed to unthinking assent to a 
defined methodology.63 
                                                        
He does not, for example, allow any general philosophical or psychological considerations to 
obscure the biblical witness to Christ’s resurrection and its consequences… Here it is the 
particularity of the biblical witness, however difficult or contrary to experience it may be, 
which Moltmann takes as the basis for constructing his general understanding of Christian 
hope (130). 
61 Douglas B. Farrow, “In the End is the Beginning: A Review of Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic 
Contributions,” Modern Theology 14:3 (1998): 425-447 (426). 
62 Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” 20. 
63 It is true, as Richard Clutterbuck, “Jürgen Moltmann as a Doctrinal Theologian: The Nature 
of Doctrine and the Possibilities for its Development,” Scottish Journal of Theology 48:4 (1995): 489-
506, writes, that  
Moltmann has to be called a doctrinal theologian for his proposals are never expressed merely 
as theological opinions; they are addressed to the churches and are claimed as necessary 
doctrinal adjustments for the corporate life of the Christian community… The Crucified God 
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3.3. Mark 15:34 and Moltmann’s Use of Scripture 
Before discussing the content of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity in the following 
chapters, his approach to Scripture requires attention. The value of his conclusions 
must be assessed in light of his treatment of the biblical witness to God in Christ. 
3.3.1. Overview 
Moltmann would later explicitly extend his dialogical method to Scripture itself. 
Responding to Bauckham’s critique of his exegesis in CoG, Moltmann writes, “Richard 
Bauckham has taken me to be an exegete, and I am not one.” Moltmann instead styles 
himself as “a theological partner in dialogue with the texts which I cite, not their 
exegete.”64 This is because he seeks to avoid losing sight of the God to whom Scripture 
testifies in getting caught up in the correct interpretation of texts. Elsewhere, he admits 
of having become “critical and free” towards Scripture so that he takes it “not as an 
authoritative blueprint and confining boundary,” but rather as “a stimulus to my own 
theological thinking” (ExpTh, xxii). Thus for the later Moltmann, as Kevin Brown 
observes, “all sources are suspect in their authority,” including Scripture.65 
While the development of this approach can be seen in CG and TKG,66 in these 
earlier works Moltmann presupposes the theological authority of Scripture in the 
tradition of the Reformation. It is Scripture through which the church’s theology is 
                                                        
demands that Christian doctrine become more self-consistent by following the implications of 
a stauro-centric doctrine of God, whilst The Trinity and the Kingdom of God identifies a 
misplaced emphasis on the unity of God in the Western tradition as the cause of a disaster in 
theology and practice which can only be reversed by the adoption of a more explicitly 
trinitarian doctrine of God (490-491). 
This is certainly in tension with some of the statements Moltmann makes regarding his theology, 
examples of which I have cited above. However, conversely, if Moltmann’s theology is properly 
dialogical then we would expect to see him making strong proposals. If this were not the case then 
there would be little to dialogue with in Moltmann’s theology. All critiques would have to be dismissed 
as it is difficult to critique that which does not stand on any theological commitments at all! 
64 Moltmann, “The Bible, the Exegete and the Theologian: Response to Richard Bauckham,” in 
Bauckham, God Will Be All in All, 231. 
65 Kevin Brown, “Moltmann’s Use of the Bible,” Diglotting, 28 January 2013 
<http://diglotting.com/2013/01/28/moltmanns-use-of-the-bible/> (18 August 2015). Cf. Donald 
Macleod, “The Christology of Jürgen Moltmann,” Themelios 24:2 (1999): 35-47, “The two means of 
verification normally open to Christians are Scripture and tradition. Neither of these seems 
particularly important to Moltmann” (35-36). 
66 Cf. Jürgen Moltmann and Hans Küng, “Editorial,” in Conflicting Ways of Interpreting the Bible, 
ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, vii (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1980), published in the same year 
as TKG, who write, “Dialogue with the Bible, dialogue with each other about the Bible, and dialogue 
with him to whom the truth of the Bible testifies are for us the heart of ecumenism.” 
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redirected to its source in Christ. This leads Joy McDougall to conclude that since TH, 
“Moltmann has unwaveringly turned to the biblical witness as the chief source and 
norma normans for his theology.”67 For example, in TKG he consistently draws upon 
Scripture to inform his innovations in his doctrine of the Trinity and to subject other 
trinitarian theologies to critique. He rejects Barth’s “monotheistic” doctrine of the 
Trinity on the basis of Scripture: “According to the New Testament… [Jesus’] history is 
the history of the reciprocal, changing, and hence living relationship between the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit” (TKG, 64).68 Nonetheless, Moltmann does not reduce his 
doctrine of the Trinity to what is attested in the biblical texts. This is because “the New 
Testament does not contain any developed doctrine of the Trinity” (CG, 241; cf. TKG, 
16). In CG, Mark 15:34 plays a major role in Moltmann’s understanding of the 
significance of the cross for the doctrine of the Trinity. Other key texts include Rom 
8:31-32 with Gal 2:20, Rom 1:4 with Mark 15:39, and 2 Cor 5:19. The conclusions 
Moltmann draws from these contribute to the further development of his doctrine of 
the Trinity in TKG. 
Yet how Moltmann conceives of the relationship between the historical Jesus 
and Scripture is a significant ambiguity in CG that somewhat undermines his 
commitment to the authority of Scripture. While Moltmann is certainly committed to 
the inseparability of theology and history so that the study of history must be 
undertaken theologically if it is to be undertaken at all, this does not result in a blanket 
affirmation of every theological interpretation of history. Rather, all theological 
interpretation of history must be grounded in the event of the cross. The task of 
christology, then, understanding and proclaiming Christ in ever-new contexts, is 
necessary, though the further it strays from the historical Jesus who was crucified the 
less legitimacy it has (CG, 83-87). Thus, “every Christian must ask whether his faith in 
Jesus Christ is true and is in accordance with Jesus himself, or whether Christian 
tradition offers him or itself something different instead, an idea, a spirit or a phantom” 
(CG, 115). Evidently, for Moltmann this Christian tradition which must be critically 
interrogated extends to the New Testament itself, as I will show below. There is not 
enough space in this thesis to attempt a thorough assessment of Moltmann’s use of 
                                                        
67 McDougall, Pilgrimage, 11. 
68 Cf. TKG, 94, “A theological doctrine of the Trinity can only be biblically justified if the history 
of God to which the Bible testifies, itself displays trinitarian forms.” 
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Scripture. Nonetheless, Moltmann’s interpretation of Mark 15:34 serves as a suitable 
test case because it illustrates his appropriation of historical Jesus research and his 
understanding of the relationship between theology and exegesis. It also plays a 
central role in the development of his theology.69 
3.3.2. The Problem of the Historicity of Jesus’ Divine Abandonment as 
Attested in Mark 15:34 
Moltmann’s interest in the cry of dereliction is in part due to his belief that Mark 15:34 
(cf. Matt 27:46), in contrast to the accounts of Luke and John, “seems to be as near as 
possible to the historical reality of the death of Jesus” (CG, 147). That is, “Jesus died 
with the signs and expressions of a profound abandonment by God” (CG, 147). 
Moltmann does not attempt to argue for the historicity of the very words which Mark 
ascribes to Jesus, but the historicity of what these represent, Jesus’ abandonment by 
God as demonstrated in his pain and grief on the cross. This reflects the theological 
milieu in which Moltmann originally penned CG. If he undertook a similar project today 
he might not show as much concern for such questions. In the context of CG, however, 
this apology for the historicity of the signs of Jesus’ abandonment functions to 
legitimate Moltmann’s claim that such an abandonment is central to understanding the 
cross and thus to developing a properly conceived doctrine of the Trinity. 
Moltmann arrives at this conclusion via two criteria. First, Jesus’ abandonment 
is attested throughout the New Testament. In the synoptic account of Gethsemane, 
Jesus “began to be distressed and agitated” (Mark 14:33). He told his disciples that he 
was “deeply grieved, even to death” (Mark 14:34).70 A possibly similar tradition is 
                                                        
69 E.g., CG, x, 
This cry of abandonment is either the end of every theology and every religion, or it is the 
beginning of a truly Christian theology… We want to produce an answer to the question about 
God with which Christ dies. But he dies with this open question. So a truly Christian theology 
has to make Jesus’ experience of God on the cross the centre of all our ideas about God: that is 
its foundation. 
Cf. TKG, 77-80. Moltmann, “Jürgen Moltmann,” 13, writes of first reading the Bible, “When I came to 
Jesus’ dying cry, I knew, ‘There is your divine brother and redeemer, who understands you in your 
godforsakenness’.” Later he writes of CG, “The whole book can be understood as an attempt to wrestle 
theologically with that death cry” (BP, 191). 
70 Matthew agrees with Mark here. Moltmann implies that Luke also agrees, but Luke does not 
include the Markan perilypos, “deeply grieved” (Mark 14:33; Matt 26:38). For Luke it is the disciples 
who are “sleeping because of grief (lypē)” (22:45). The text-critical evidence for the authenticity of 
22:43-44, in which Jesus sweats blood in anguish and is comforted by angels, is uncertain. See Claire 
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attested in Hebrews: “Jesus offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and 
tears, to the one who was able to save him from death” (Heb 5:7).71 Although he does 
not draw upon it to support this claim, Moltmann later also discovers divine 
abandonment in Pauline theology, suggesting the ubiquity of this theme in the New 
Testament (CG, 241-243).72 Second, the disturbing nature of this abandonment is 
“gradually weakened” in later texts (CG, 146). The manuscript Dgr attests, “[Why] hast 
thou reproached [or, taunted] me?”73 This can also be seen in Luke and John who 
attribute other words to Jesus. Luke portrays Jesus’ trust and confidence in the Father 
with “Father, into your hands I commend my spirit” (Luke 23:46), and John presents a 
victorious Jesus with “It is finished” (John 19:30). Moltmann concludes that Mark’s 
“difficult reading… is as close as may be to historical reality” (CG, 147). 
Since 1972, the methods of historical Jesus research, as well as understandings 
of the general significance of this research to the task of theology, have developed 
considerably. In the contemporary context, the two criteria which Moltmann draws 
upon, identified above, are known as the criterion of multiple attestation and the 
criterion of embarrassment, respectively.74 With multiple attestation, the case for the 
authenticity of a particular feature of Jesus’ life is strengthened according to the 
number of independent sources which attest it. With embarrassment, features that 
would have embarrassed early Christians, thus working against their cause, are 
thought to be authentic because sources would have had no reason to otherwise 
                                                        
Clivaz, “The Angel and the Sweat Like ‘Drops of Blood’ (Lk 22:43–44): P69 and f13,” Harvard Theological 
Review 91:4 (2005): 419-440 (especially 420-425). 
71 James Swetnam, “The Crux at Hebrews 5,7-8,” Biblica 81:3 (2000): 347-361, finds in this 
verse an allusion to Ps 22:24 and relates it to the cry of dereliction in Mark and Matthew (354-356). 
72 Moltmann deduces this from Paul’s application of paradidōmi, “give up,” to Christ (Compare 
Rom 1:24, 26, 28; with 8:31-32) and finds further support for this interpretation in 2 Cor 5:21 and Gal 
3:13. 
73 Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft), 100. The manuscript replaces ekatelites with ōneidesas. This “may have been 
substituted for the usual reading by someone who could not understand how God would have 
forsaken Jesus on the cross” (ibid.). 
74 I have identified the second criterion as the criterion of embarrassment because Moltmann 
implies the “embarrassment” of later writers regarding Jesus’ abandonment. However, his very short 
treatment of this also suggests the principle of textual criticism that where two manuscripts differ, the 
more difficult reading should be given precedence. Because my focus here is on Moltmann’s 
appropriation of historical Jesus methodology, which nonetheless overlaps in places with textual 
criticism, and because Moltmann is not just comparing Markan manuscripts but Mark with other New 
Testament sources, I will engage with his conclusion to the extent that he relies on something 
resembling what is now commonly identified as the criterion of embarrassment. 
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include them. There have been too many books and articles written since CG on the 
historicity of the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ death to attempt even a short assessment 
and comparison here. Rather, I will assess to what extent Moltmann’s implicit use of 
criteria of authenticity is viable on its own terms. 
In a critical evaluation of the criteria of authenticity, Dale Allison notes the 
seeming paradox of employing the criterion of multiple attestation. If a particular 
datum, though ahistorical, is congenial to the tradition, it is likely to be multiply 
attested. Conversely, if a particular datum, though historical, is uncongenial to the 
tradition, it is less likely to be multiply attested.75 In the case of Jesus’ abandonment, 
multiple attestation in Mark, Matthew, Paul’s letters, and Hebrews does not necessarily 
attest a historical precedent in the nature of Jesus’ passion but primarily the popularity 
of this reading among early Christians, regardless of potentially different reasons for 
this popularity. This also means that Jesus’ trust and confidence in his Father presented 
in Luke and John might attest a historical fact that was otherwise uncongenial to the 
theologia crucis that Moltmann sees in other New Testament texts. Obviously that is a 
speculative conclusion. However, Allison’s critique demonstrates the ambiguous 
utility of this criterion because it cannot demonstrate any necessary connection 
between historical reality and multiple attestation. 
Allison’s scrutiny of the criterion of embarrassment yields similar results. He 
writes, “We must face the surprising fact that all of the supposedly embarrassing facts 
or words are found in the Jesus tradition itself.” Thus, “they were not sufficiently 
disconcerting to be expurgated.”76 Moreover, if this is the case, data which modern 
scholars have deemed embarrassing also could have been added to the tradition rather 
than having originated with the historical Jesus. Indeed, it might be the case that the 
cry of dereliction was not only not embarrassing enough to be excluded from Mark and 
Matthew (and Hebrews) but was added to the tradition to develop a particular 
abandonment-christology, for example. Here the criteria of multiple attestation and 
embarrassment seem to be in direct contradiction.77 Possibly the most embarrassing 
                                                        
75 Dale C. Allison, Jr, “How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria of Authenticity,” in Handbook 
for the Study of the Historical Jesus, ed. Tom Holmén and Stanley E. Porter, 1:3-30, 4 vols. (Leiden, the 
Netherlands: Brill, 2011), 7. 
76 Ibid., 5-6. 
77 Mark Goodacre, “Criticizing the Criterion of Multiple Attestation: The Historical Jesus and 
the Question of Sources,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and Anthony 
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feature of early Christianity, the cross, was also one of its most distinctive (1 Cor 
1:18)!78 In relying upon these criteria, Moltmann only considers the theological 
motives of some authors or communities such as Luke and John but he does not apply 
this critical lens consistently. 
In the context of Mark’s Gospel, Jesus’ abandonment is indeed congenial to 
Mark’s theological concerns.79 For example, although theological significance and 
historical reality are not mutually exclusive, for Mark Jesus’ cry may serve to 
underscore his identification with the godforsaken. Cyril of Alexandria and Thomas 
Aquinas could both say that Jesus cried not on his own behalf but on behalf of 
humanity, forsaken by God because of their sin.80 Even some modern exegetes have 
argued that Jesus is not the primary object of his cry. Thomas Schmidt has noted the 
theme of the judgement of the Jews in Mark’s Gospel, suggesting that Jesus cries not 
only for his own suffering but on behalf of Israel.81 So, too, Bauckham observes that 
Jesus cries not for himself but for the godforsaken with whom he identifies. It would 
be odd if Jesus were asking the question for himself as he “not only knows that it is 
God’s will that he die (8:31; 9:31; 10:34, 38), but also why this must be (Mark 10:45; 
14:24).”82 Such proposals highlight the possible ways in which Jesus’ abandonment 
might have functioned theologically for Mark.83 Regardless of the historicity of the cry 
                                                        
Le Donne, 152-172 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2012), 166, writes, “It is a strange state of affairs that 
scholars will simultaneously claim both that a given tradition was ‘embarrassing’ to the early church 
and that they repeated it on ‘multiple’ occasions.” 
78 This is noted by Rafael Rodríguez, “The Embarrassing Truth about Jesus: The Criterion of 
Embarrassment and the Failure of Historical Authenticity,” in Keith and Le Donne, Demise of 
Authenticity, 132-151 (147). 
79 Mark here and throughout this chapter refers to the author responsible for presenting the 
bulk of material, excluding the two later endings, in what is called today the Gospel according to Mark, 
regardless of whether or not that person was actually a Mark. 
80 See Bruce D. Marshall, “The Dereliction of Christ and the Impassibility of God,” in Divine 
Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, ed. James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White, O.P., 
246-298 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009); and Thomas McCall, The Trinity and the Cross, and Why 
It Matters (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2012), 22-25. 
81 Thomas E. Schmidt, “Cry of Dereliction or Cry of Judgment? Mark 15:34 in Context,” Bulletin 
for Biblical Research 4 (1994): 145-153 (especially, 151-152). 
82 Richard Bauckham, “God’s Self-Identification with the Godforsaken in the Gospel of Mark,” 
in Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of 
Divine Identity, 254-268 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 261. 




of dereliction, then, it is clear that Mark’s inclusion of the cry would have been 
inseparable from its theological implications. 
After outlining some of the difficulties with specific criteria, Allison goes on to 
critique the use of the criteria in general. Two of these critiques apply to Moltmann’s 
argument. First, “That something happened does not entail our ability to show it 
happened, and that something did not happen does not entail our ability to show that 
it did not happen.”84 Moltmann’s confidence in his historical method leads to the 
concerning implication that Mark is of primary historical value and Luke and John of 
secondary value in witnessing to Jesus’ death, to which I will return shortly.85 Second, 
Allison points out that the use of criteria more often confirms the scholar’s 
expectations or presuppositions than it does filter truth from untruth in their attempt 
to reconstruct a historical Jesus. “The criteria then become justification ex post facto.”86 
Moltmann himself claims that christologies “correspond so much to the needs of their 
age, place of origin and intended purpose that one cannot avoid the suspicion that they 
are illusory and artificial” (CG, 83). This is certainly reductionist, but Moltmann’s 
theologia crucis requires that such a statement applies to his own theology as well. In 
addition to his personal convictions, Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity bears the 
marks of post-WII Germany, for example, as can be seen in related proposals of 
Eberhard Jüngel and Hans Urs von Balthasar.87 In this sense, the criteria only obfuscate 
historical Jesus research by legitimating theological or ideological presuppositions in 
the form of a supposedly scientific portrait of the historical Jesus. It is suspiciously 
convenient that Moltmann discovers that the signs of Jesus’ abandonment near death, 
a central theme of CG, are a historical reality. 
                                                        
84 Allison, “How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria,” 10. 
85 The historicity of John has often been seen as secondary to the synoptic gospels by 
historical Jesus scholars. This demotion is perhaps due to the differences between John and the 
synoptics, noted as early as Clement of Alexandria, who referred to John as “the spiritual gospel.” 
However, not all scholars have followed accordingly. For an outline of some of the major issues and an 
argument for John’s general historicity, see Craig L. Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of John’s Gospel: 
Issues and Commentary (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001). 
86 Allison, “How to Marginalize the Traditional Criteria,” 18. 
87 E.g., Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the Theology of 
the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism, trans. by Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2014); Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. by 
Aidan Nichols, O.P. (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2000). I will discuss a passage from one of Balthasar’s 
later works in chapter six of this thesis. 
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3.3.3. John 16:32 and the Question of Canon 
Moltmann does not explicitly reject the theological value of Luke and John. However, 
the biblical sources he draws upon for his theology of the crucified God in CG are chiefly 
Markan and Pauline. Because Moltmann advocates an intimate relationship between 
theology and history, his historical assessment of Jesus’ abandonment goes hand in 
hand with his privileging of particular New Testament sources to develop his doctrine 
of the Trinity. The cross determines the shape of the doctrine of the Trinity and if Luke 
and John are of secondary historical value then they are also of secondary theological 
value. Such a move cannot be made without addressing questions of canon.88 
Some scholars have appealed to John 16:32, “I am not alone because the Father 
is with me” to keep in check the exegesis of Mark 15:34 by Moltmann and others.89 
Mark 15:34 could not then refer to an abandonment of Jesus in the sense of withdrawal 
of the Father’s presence. But from the perspective of historical or narrative criticism, 
such an appeal makes the same mistake as Moltmann, only in a different direction. It 
requires that one evangelist’s unique christological perspective accord completely 
with another’s: 
As redaction criticism and (more recently) narrative criticism have helped us 
to see, we have to speak of ‘the Jesus of Matthew’, ‘the Jesus of Mark’, and so on. 
Harmonisation…, at least at the level of what the gospels actually say, is not 
possible.90 
Harmonisation here would be particularly misleading if, as Raymond Brown 
speculates, John included the verse as “a dissenting comment on the theme that Jesus 
                                                        
88 This is noted in the year of CG’s publication by Christian Duquoc, Christologie. Essai 
dogmatique, vol. 2 (Paris: Cerf, 1972), 44, cited in Gérard Rossé, The Cry of Jesus on the Cross: A Biblical 
and Theological Study, trans. by Stephen Wentworth Arndt (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1987), 110:  
It would also be a mistake to privilege the point of view of one or two evangelists in an 
absolute way. The theology of the abandonment of Christ on the cross will thus be unable to 
omit the Lukan perspective in which the hope of Jesus in God, his Father, is placed in relief. 
While it is not clear from this citation whether Duquoc is referring to Moltmann, his observation is 
certainly a potential problem for Moltmann’s theology. 
89 E.g., Marshall, “Dereliction of Christ,” 274; McCall, The Trinity and the Cross, 28, 88. 
90 Stephen C. Barton, “Many Gospels, One Jesus?,” in The Cambridge Companion to Jesus, ed. 
Markus Bockmuehl, 170-183 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 177, emphasis added. 
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could feel forsaken by God.”91 That is, while it is necessary to consult the entire biblical 
witness in doing trinitarian theology, it also distorts the authorial intentions of Mark 
and John if either of them are expected to align perfectly with the other on every 
theological point. 
Nonetheless, canonical criticism and redaction or narrative criticism need not 
be mutually exclusive. Both Mark and John witness to the one gospel which is Christ. 
Their coherence is in this unity but it is such a unity that consists in the “many things” 
of Christ so that even “if every one of them were written down, I suppose that the world 
itself could not contain the books that would be written” (John 21:25). An early witness 
to and the earliest known defence of the fourfold gospel is provided by Irenaeus in his 
Adversus Haereses. He argues not only that the four Gospels have apostolic origins but 
that they agree in fundamentals: “They have all declared to us that there is one God, 
Creator of heaven and earth, announced by the law and the prophets; and one Christ, 
the Son of God.”92 If such is the case, then it would be expected that Mark and John 
agree on the relationship of Jesus to his Father, which is certainly a fundamental! But 
this cannot be confirmed without first investigating the meaning of Mark 15:34 in 
context. This will also reveal to what extent Moltmann’s proposal can be justified 
exegetically. 
3.3.4. Mark’s Citation of Ps 22:1: Atomistic or Contextual? 
Mark gives Jesus the words of Ps 22:1 in his cry of dereliction. For Moltmann, however, 
“it is not right to interpret the cry of Jesus in the sense of Ps. 22, but more proper to 
interpret the words of the psalm here in the sense of the situation of Jesus” (CG, 150). 
Ps 22:1 in this context must be interpreted christologically. Otherwise it is no different 
from any other cry of lament in the psalms. Jesus enjoys a unique relationship with God 
as his own Father, which goes beyond the covenant-relationship which God had with 
Israel. As such, like the psalmist, Jesus pleads with God to vindicate him. But Moltmann 
is concerned that the interpretation of Ps 22 on Jesus’ lips as a prayer of confidence is 
                                                        
91 Raymond E. Brown, S.S., The Death of the Messiah: From Gethsemane to the Grave: A 
Commentary on the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 
2:1085. Without further support this remains speculation. 
92 Adversus Haereses, 3.1.1-2, cited in Ronald A. Piper, “The One, the Four and the Many,” in 
The Written Gospel, ed. Markus Bockmuehl and Donald A. Hagner, 254-273 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 268. 
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irrelevant. It obscures the trinitarian nature of the abandonment: “the issue in his 
death is not the general paradox of confidence in God in abandonment by God, but 
above all that of the deity of his God and his Father.” Thus the abandonment must be 
understood “as something which took place between God and God” (CG, 151). 
In a recent monograph on Mark 15:34, Holly Carey differentiates between 
contextual and atomistic citations of Scripture in the New Testament.93 An author 
citing Scripture contextually intends for it to be heard in light of its original context, 
whereas in atomistic citations the context of the citation, in this case the whole of Ps 
22, is less relevant. While a number of scholars have contended that Mark cites Ps 22:1 
atomistically,94 Carey contends that he cites the verse contextually. For example, the 
centurion’s confession (Mark 15:39), alludes to the nations acknowledging the Lord at 
the end of Ps 22 (vv.27-28). Moreover, three major features of Mark’s Gospel suggest 
that he cites Ps 22:1 contextually. First, Mark draws upon the motif of the “righteous 
sufferer,” a righteous figure who suffers but is ultimately vindicated by God.95 Second, 
Mark prepares his audience for Jesus’ vindication in his resurrection. Throughout 
Mark, Jesus predicts his death together with his resurrection (Mark 8:31; 9:31; 10:33-
34).96 Finally, Mark alludes to Ps 22 not only in his passion narrative but throughout 
his Gospel, suggesting that the cry of dereliction should be understood in relation to 
these other allusions and thus the whole psalm.97 
                                                        
93 Holly J. Carey, Jesus’ Cry from the Cross: Towards a First-Century Understanding of the 
Intertextual Relationship between Psalm 22 and the Narrative of Mark’s Gospel (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 2009), 2-3. 
94 E.g., Rebecca Cerio, “Jesus’ Last Words: A Cry of Dereliction or Triumph?,” Expository Times 
125:7 (2014): 323-327 (325), “if Mark wished to portray Jesus’ cry as one of trust in God, he would 
have quoted one of the more positive verses from Ps. 22… rather than the most desperate and 
agonizing verse.” The strongest case for an atomistic citation is provided by Vernon K. Robbins, "The 
Reversed Contextualization of Psalm 22 in the Markan Crucifixion: A Socio-Rhetorical Analysis," in The 
Four Gospels 1992. Festschrift Frans Neirynck, vol. 2, ed. F. van Segbroeck, et al., 1161-1183 (Leuven, 
Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1992). According to Robbins, Mark reverses the context of Ps 22 so 
that the soldiers divide Jesus’ clothing and cast lots for it (Ps 22:18; Mark 15:24); Jesus is mocked and 
taunted by passersby, the chief priests and scribes, and those crucified with him (Ps 22:6-8; Mark 
15:25-32); and Jesus cries out (Ps 22:2; Mark 15:34); the content of this cry is Ps 22:1. 
95 This motif is employed by other texts relatively contemporary to Mark, a few of which also 
take Ps 22 as a source. See Carey, Jesus’ Cry, chaps. 5-6. 
96 The popular reference to these as “passion predictions” is thus a misnomer. See ibid., 46. 
97 Ibid., chap. 7. Others make similar points in arguing that Mark cites Ps 22:1 contextually. See 
Schmidt, “Cry of Dereliction,” 149-150; Rikk E. Watts, “Mark,” in Commentary on the New Testament 




Nonetheless, Mark’s contextual use of Ps 22:1 would be misunderstood if it was 
taken to erase the extent of Jesus’ suffering on the cross. It follows that “the vindication 
that comes at the end of this torment does not negate the suffering that preceded it.”98 
As the theologian Alan Lewis notes, the gospel is a witness to a historical event in 
narrative form. One part, the resurrection, cannot be taken for the whole. When the 
story is recounted properly, i.e., as a sequence of events, “Death is given time and space 
to be itself, to be termination, unabbreviated in its malignancy.”99 Mark’s use of Ps 22:1, 
while invoking the whole psalm, also concentrates his audience on this particular 
moment in the psalm to bring attention to this particular moment in the passion 
narrative. 
Carey’s conclusion is pertinent here because it illustrates the importance of the 
whole psalm in providing a background for understanding the nature of Jesus’ 
abandonment. While this does not require that the christological implications of Ps 
22:1 on Jesus’ lips be put aside (Mark’s passion narrative is a witness to Christ’s death, 
not a leisurely exegesis of Ps 22!), it does provide a framework in which Mark intends 
his audience to understand Jesus’ abandonment. 
3.3.5. Mark 15:34 in Its Narrative Context 
The nature of the abandonment expressed by the psalmist therefore illuminates Mark’s 
portrayal of Jesus’ abandonment. Following the opening cry, Ps 22 goes on to define 
God’s abandonment in terms of his lack of intervention in the psalmist’s suffering. 
Thus, “I cry by day, but you do not answer” (v.2). God has forsaken the psalmist in that 
he has not yet heeded his cry. As Bauckham notes, God’s abandonment in the Psalms 
always corresponds to “concrete situations of distress.”100 It would thus be misleading 
to characterise this abandonment as strictly subjective. Here that concrete situation is 
God’s failure to intervene in both the derision the psalmist suffers at the hands of 
others (vv.6-8) and the psalmist’s nearness to death (vv.11-18). Jesus, too, faces 
derision (Mark 15:16-20, 29-32) and death. He pleads God to remove his suffering and 
yet yields to his will (14:36). God does not remove the suffering. In the framework of 
                                                        
98 Carey, Jesus’ Cry, 5. 
99 Alan E. Lewis, “The Burial of God: Rupture and Resumption as the Story of Salvation,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 40:3 (1987): 335-362. 
100 Bauckham, “God’s Self-Identification,” 257. 
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Ps 22, then, Jesus laments “the non-intervention of the Father.”101 Moreover, such an 
interpretation would preclude the withdrawal of God’s presence in Jesus’ 
abandonment (so John 16:32). The psalmist looks to a time when he can proclaim that 
God “did not hide his face from me, but heard when I cried to him” (v.24). Whereas 
“generally in psalms, and Israel's faith until almost Maccabean times, death is held to 
end contact with God (cf. Ps. 6:5, 88:10-12),” here the psalmist at least anticipates some 
kind of “life after death,” if not the general resurrection.102 In Mark, Carey notes that 
the tearing of the curtain in the temple (15:38), the centurion’s confession (15:39), and, 
ultimately, the resurrection are signs that Mark’s Jesus “has not been abandoned by 
God in the sense that the presence of God has left him altogether.”103  
If the investigation were to end here, there would be no reason to endorse the 
trinitarian implications which Moltmann draws from the text. Like the psalmist, Jesus 
does not lose his God but laments his lack of involvement, only for it to be shown that 
God does indeed intervene. Yet there are some indications in Ps 22 and Mark’s 
narrative context which lend support to Moltmann’s conclusions. Though the psalmist 
looks forward to a time of deliverance, presently God has indeed forsaken him and thus 
hidden his face from him (cf. Pss 44:24; 88:14). The tearing of the curtain and the 
centurion’s confession take place after Jesus dies. They do not evidence God’s presence 
to Jesus so much as his presence to those who are being welcomed into the kingdom. 
Thus the Spirit goes out from Jesus (15:37),104 the temple is open, and the Gentiles 
proclaim God’s Son. So, too, while the resurrection indicates God’s faithfulness, from 
the temporal standpoint of Jesus’ abandonment it has not yet occurred. 
                                                        
101 John Yocum, “A Cry of Dereliction? Reconsidering a Recent Theological Commonplace,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 7:1 (2005): 72-80 (79). This was noted by Thomas 
Aquinas: “God the Father hands Christ over to his passion… by not protecting him from the passion, 
but instead exposing him to his persecutors. For this reason, Christ, hanging on the cross, said ‘My God, 
why have you forsaken me?’” See Summa Theologiae III, q. 47, a. 3, c, cited in Marshall, “Dereliction of 
Christ,” 270. 
102 John H. Reumann, “Psalm 22 at the Cross: Lament and Thanksgiving for Jesus Christ,” 
Interpretation 28:1 (1994): 39-58 (46-47). 
103 Carey, Jesus’ Cry, 163. 
104 R. T. France, The Gospel of Mark (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 666, sees no 
reference to the Spirit in ekpneō, “breathed his last,” which is “a natural euphemism for dying, used 
especially in more poetic or solemn contexts.” However, these two should not be seen as mutually 
exclusive, especially considering the parallelism between Jesus’ death and baptism in Mark. See Mark 
1:8 and Carey, Jesus’ Cry, 65-66. 
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Jesus’ abandonment is also especially harsh. Bauckham notes that in Ps 22:1, 
the Hebrew ‘āzab, “forsaken,” and its parallels, are most often used by psalmists to 
plead that God will not forsake them or to express their assurance “that God has not 
forsaken or will not forsake them.” But, “Much more rarely do they speak of having 
been abandoned by God.”105 Mark therefore makes use of one of the starkest 
expressions of abandonment in the Psalms to interpret Jesus’ death.106 Moreover, 
according to the psalmist, God is the “direct cause” of his suffering.107 The psalmist’s 
description of his suffering culminates in the charge against God: “you lay me in the 
dust of death” (v.16). As Ellen Davis observes, “God’s culpable negligence here deepens 
into an accusation that names the root cause of the suffering.” The psalmist laments 
God’s “active enmity.”108 
Mark confirms this theme in the narrative context of his Gospel. God plays an 
active role in Jesus’ death. This is especially evident in 14:27 where Jesus cites 
Zechariah to interpret his death: “It is written, ‘I will strike the shepherd and the sheep 
will be scattered.’”109 God also plays an active role in Jesus’ first passion prediction: 
“Then he began to teach them that the Son of Man must (dei) undergo great suffering, 
and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after 
three days rise again” (Mark 8:31). Here Mark’s use of dei indicates that Jesus’ 
suffering, rejection, death, and resurrection will necessarily take place in accordance 
with God’s will.110 Other examples, such as the Father’s declaration at baptism and the 
                                                        
105 Bauckham, “God’s Self-Identification,” 257. Bauckham notes that this usage of ‘āzab in 
Psalms and Lamentations only occurs in Pss 22:1; 71:11; 88:5; Lam 5:20. 
106 That is, excluding Pss 39 and 88, which, unlike Ps 22 and other psalms of lament, do not 
resolve. 
107 Matthew S. Rindge, “Reconfiguring the Akedah and Recasting God: Lament and Divine 
Abandonment in Mark,” Journal of Biblical Literature 130:1 (2011): 755-774 (771). 
108 Ellen F. Davis, “Exploding the Limits: Form and Function in Psalm 22,” Journal for the Study 
of the Old Testament 17:53 (1992): 93-105 (98). 
109 Mark’s citation differs slightly from the original: “’Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, 
against the man who is my associate,’ says the Lord of hosts. Strike the shepherd, that the sheep may 
be scattered” (Zech 13:7). Mark changes patassō, “strike,” to an indicative. In Zechariah it is an 
imperative. This is because Mark is citing the verse only in part so that the indicative in this context 
conveys the same sense as the original imperative without Mark having to cite the whole passage. In 
both texts, Yahweh is the subject who strikes the shepherd, albeit an indirect subject in Zechariah. See 
France, Gospel of Mark, 575 n.73. In the same place, France notes that although Mark does not 
explicitly identify the subject as Zechariah does, those in Mark’s audience who were familiar with 
Zechariah would have understood it to be God. 
110 Although Mark does not explicitly refer to the fulfilment of Scripture in this context, France, 
Gospel of Mark, 334, proposes that his use of dei here should be understood against this background.  
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Spirit’s leading Jesus into the wilderness, are also notable.111 It is in Jesus’ 
abandonment that God’s role in his death culminates. In chaps. 14-15, Jesus is rejected 
by the chief priests, scribes, crowd, Sanhedrin, Pilate, soldiers, criminals, and disciples. 
“God becomes the final, and perhaps the most significant, character to reject Jesus.”112 
It is important to follow Mark here in distinguishing God from human beings. 
This is Carey’s reservation over drawing any connection between the abandonment of 
Jesus at the hands of others and his abandonment by his Father. Those who reject Jesus 
misunderstand him. Thus follows the problematic implication that either God “doesn’t 
‘get it’,” or the other characters are validated in their rejection of Jesus.113 Yet these 
implications do not necessarily follow from this. As shown above, both Ps 22 and Mark 
emphasise God’s agency in Jesus’ death. The last words of Mark’s Jesus do not express 
the pain of his rejection at the hands of others but his pain at God’s abandonment of 
him, an abandonment which was decreed by God in Scripture according to his 
purposes. Moreover, Mark explicitly distinguishes God from sinners: “For the Son of 
Man goes as it is written of him, but woe to that one by whom the Son of Man is 
                                                        
God’s plan that the Messiah die is attested in Scripture (Mark 9:12; 14:21, 49). Indeed, dei occurs six 
times in Mark’s Gospel, each time suggesting God’s eschatological fulfilment of Scripture. Thus Elijah 
must come before the resurrection (9:11; Mal 4:5-6), wars must take place (13:7; Dan 9:26), and the 
gospel must be preached to all the nations before Jesus’ return (13:10; Dan 11:33; and kērussō, 
“proclaim,” in Joel 3:9 and Zech 9:9 [LXX]). Peter vows not to deny Jesus, “Even though I must die with 
you” (14:31). Elsewhere in the Gospel the death of the disciples is connected with eschatological 
events (e.g., 8:34-38; 10:35-40; 13:9-13; Dan 11:33-35 with 12:3). Mark 13:14 is a possible exception 
to the other occurrences of dei because it is used negatively: “But when you see the desolating 
sacrilege set up where it ought not to be (let the reader understand), then those in Judea must flee to 
the mountains.” Nonetheless, according to Daniel, the predominant background for this prophecy, 
“Desolations are decreed” (Dan 9:26). See Watts, “Mark,” 223-225. Mark’s first use of dei in 8:31 places 
Jesus’ death in this context. Jesus must die in fulfilment of Scripture. 
111 As well as the examples discussed above, there are a number of other ways which Mark 
alludes to God’s agency in Jesus’ death. For example, the Father’s baptismal declaration alludes to the 
Akedah, a theme which is continued throughout the Gospel. See Rindge, “Reconfiguring the Akedah,” 
passim. Sharyn Dowd and Elizabeth Struthers Malbon, “The Significance of Jesus' Death in Mark: 
Narrative Context and Authorial Audience,” Journal of Biblical Literature 125:2 (2006): 271-297 (274-
275), note that the Spirit leading Jesus into the wilderness to face temptation and the wild animals, 
foreshadowing his passion (1:12), and the passive verb in “The days will come when the bridegroom is 
taken away (apairō) from them” (2:20), also highlight God’s agency in Jesus’ death. This last point has 
been found wanting by Beniamin Pascut, “The So-Called Passivum Divinum in Mark’s Gospel,” Novum 
Testamentum 54:4 (2012): 313-333 (especially 316-317), who contends that Markan scholars too 
often uncritically assume that passive verbs refer to divine action where Mark intends other agents, 
such as Judas, the chief priests, and Pilate in Jesus’ being handed over for crucifixion. However, 
regardless of the implied subject in Mark’s passive verbs, Mark clearly conceives of God as an agent in 
the crucifixion, as I show in this chapter. 
112 Rindge, “Reconfiguring the Akedah,” 761 (cf. n.42). 
113 Carey, Jesus’ Cry, 158. 
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betrayed! It would have been better for that one not to have been born” (14:21). While 
not providing a detailed reflection on the relationship between divine and human 
agency, Mark both locates the climax of Jesus’ rejection in divine abandonment and 
distinguishes the will of God from that of sinners. 
Nonetheless, Jesus also embraces his death, which “will not come as the triumph 
of the opposition but as the fulfilment of the divine purpose, to be welcomed rather 
than bewailed.”114 In contrast to James and John’s request to sit either side of him in 
his coming glory, Jesus proclaims that “the Son of Man came not to be served but to 
serve, and to give his life a ransom for many” (10:45).115 Like Jesus, his disciples are to 
follow him in actively serving and giving themselves for him, even to death (8:34-35). 
During the Last Supper, it is Jesus who gives his disciples his body and his blood (14:22-
24). In Gethsemane, too, though not without pain, he willingly assents to the Father’s 
will for his death (14:36). After prayer, Jesus arises to meet Judas and the crowd who 
have come to arrest him, welcoming his imminent trial (14:42).116 Finally, in citing Ps 
22:1 in the cry of dereliction Jesus participates in Israel’s tradition of lament which 
situates pain in faith and directs it towards God. Lament expresses “the confidence that 
God is faithful and will not abandon his servants, but will be moved to perform a new 
action that will bring deliverance and salvation to them.”117 The faith of the righteous 
extends to confronting God for their suffering. As such, Ps 22:1 is a cry of faith, looking 
forward to the psalmist’s vindication (vv.22b-32). This is also evident in the address to 
“my God,” which expresses faith that God will hear the psalmist’s cry.118 For Mark, Jesus 
                                                        
114 France, Gospel of Mark, 333. 
115 This differs from the Pauline paradidōmi, “deliver up,” which Moltmann cites (e.g. Gal 2:20), 
and which Paul uses interchangeably with didōmi, “give.” In Mark, Judas (3:19), the chief priests, 
elders, scribes, and counsel (15:11), Pilate (15:15), and possibly God (9:31; 14:41) are subjects of 
paradidōmi, but Jesus is only the subject of didōmi. See Cilliers Breytenbach, “Narrating the Death of 
Jesus in Mark: Utterances of the Main Character, Jesus,” Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche 
Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 105:2 (2014): 153-168 (161-162). 
116 So France, Gospel of Mark, 590, clarifies that in keeping with Jesus’ active acceptance of his 
death, “This is a call to advance rather than retreat.” 
117 Henry L. Novello, “Jesus’ Cry of Lament: Towards a True Apophaticism,” Irish Theological 
Quarterly 78:1 (2012): 38-60 (42). 
118 Bauckham, “God’s Self-Identification,” 258. Bauckham denies that Jesus’ lapse from his 
habitual address to God as Father in prayer (the only lapse in the New Testament) represents any kind 
of distance between him and God. It is perhaps significant that in the words of Ps 31:5 which Luke 
(23:46) gives to Jesus on the cross he adjusts the citation to accord with this trend. However, this does 
not require that Mark wanted to portray something else by leaving the citation unaltered. When not 
addressing him in prayer, Jesus refers to his Father as God elsewhere in Mark. Especially notable are 
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cries out in simultaneous protest to the one who wills his death and faith to the one 
who has been with him from his baptism, throughout his ministry, and will deliver him 
from death. 
3.3.6. Assessment: Moltmann and Mark on Jesus’ Abandonment 
There are some interesting convergences and subtle tensions with the cry of 
dereliction in Mark’s narrative context and Moltmann’s theological interpretation 
thereof. Like Mark, Moltmann emphasises the simultaneous will of Jesus to go to the 
cross and his pain in being abandoned by his Father. Moltmann, too, stresses the 
inseparability of crucifixion and resurrection throughout CG. However, the trinitarian 
conclusions Moltmann draws from Mark 15:34 (and Paul, etc.) are not met with either 
support or opposition from Mark. As Thomas McCall writes, 
Is there anything here that says—or even implies—that the eternal communion 
between the Father and the Son was ruptured? Does the text actually say that 
the Trinity was broken? The answers to these questions are surprisingly clear: 
Neither the Matthean nor the Markan account says any of these things.119 
There is a sense in which Mark reads Ps 22:1 christologically. For Mark, Jesus’ 
abandonment certainly has its own significance, which cannot be reduced to the 
context of Ps 22. Whereas the psalmist looks to his vindication, he has to die one day. 
Jesus, too, will die, but his deliverance is from death itself into resurrection. Neither 
does the psalmist give his life as a ransom for many, as Jesus does. Finally, as Moltmann 
observes, Mark presents Jesus’ unique relationship to the Father. He is God’s beloved 
Son and he addresses God as Father. He receives God’s Spirit, forgives sin, casts out 
demons, and heals infirmities. But unlike Moltmann, Mark writes before Nicaea and 
Chalcedon. He does witness to Jesus’ abandonment by the Father and underscores the 
extent of this abandonment, providing the harsh statements of Ps 22 as a background, 
emphasising the Father’s active role in the crucifixion, and presenting Jesus’ divine 
abandonment as the climax of his abandonment by others. It may even be suggested, 
with care, that there is something like enmity between Father and Son here.120 
                                                        
his citations of Scripture (e.g., 10:6; 12:26), which suggests that Mark only saw the need to substitute 
theos for patēr when Jesus was not citing Scripture. 
119 McCall, The Trinity and the Cross, 30. 




However, whereas in the tradition this is interpreted through Chalcedon and 
Constantinople III, so that the harshness of Jesus’ abandonment does not extend to the 
intra-trinitarian relationships but to the Son’s mode of existence as a human being, 
Moltmann bypasses some of these to interpret Mark according to his own 
christological and trinitarian categories. I will continue the discussion of Moltmann’s 
theological proposals in the following chapters. Here it is enough to state that neither 
traditional christology and trinitarian theology nor Moltmann’s innovations can be 
reached on the basis of the Gospel of Mark alone. 
Nonetheless, Mark’s disinterest in the line which Moltmann takes suggests at 
least one difficulty with Moltmann’s approach: speculation. Indeed, many have charged 
Moltmann with this. When Moltmann attributes suffering in the crucifixion not only to 
Christ but the Father, which is never explicitly stated in Scripture,121 Bauckham 
suggests that this “lay[s] Moltmann open to the charge of speaking mythologically 
about the divine experience.” Moreover, “If we could speak as literally about the 
Father’s experience as we can about the human experience of the incarnate Son, 
incarnation would not be necessary.”122 John Webster also notes this problem and 
situates it in Moltmann’s panentheism: “Because God is defined by reference to 
historical events of the utmost finitude, [Moltmann] tends to assume that language 
about God is in the end relatively easy to devise.”123 
Moltmann does not address this issue in CG or TKG. However, in his ExpTh, he 
attends to those who “counsel me to more silence before the unfathomable, nameless 
Mystery, and to more negative theology.” He responds, 
I am enough of a mystic to understand what they mean. But just because the 
disclosed mystery of God’s name is unfathomable, one can’t get enough of 
                                                        
121 Though see the allusion to Amos 8:9-10 in Mark 15:33 that Moltmann notes in TKG, 80. 
122 Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 66. Cf. Klass Runia, The Present-Day Christological 
Debate (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity, 1984), 44:  
Paul, who summarizes his whole message in the expression, ‘the word of the cross’ (1 Cor. 
1:18; cf. 2:2), never speaks of God as the One who suffered with Jesus on the cross, but again 
and again as the God who raised Jesus from the dead. 
Castelo, “Moltmann’s Dismissal,” 403, writes that Moltmann’s proposal here “sound[s] like the kind of 
trinitarian reflection Moltmann decries (i.e. one that delves into the mysteries of the godhead rather 
than maintaining itself within the economy of divine revelation).” 
123 John Webster, “Jürgen Moltmann: Trinity and Suffering,” Evangel 3:2 (1985): 4-6 (6). 
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wanting to know more about it. The Spirit searches everything, even the depths 
of God… (ExpTh, xxi, ellipsis original). 
This is a bold claim. Moltmann perhaps misses the role of other safeguards, such as 
ecumenical councils, which limit what can be said about God. Conversely, he is reading 
Scripture in light of the horrors of the twentieth century, where Jesus’ cry of dereliction 
resonates with him and others in their sufferings. That is, as other theological 
proposals have functioned in their respective ages to restore hope, faith, and love to 
human beings, perhaps Moltmann’s proposals can function in the same way in his own 
time.124 I will address the potential theodical import of these proposals in the next 
chapter. Nonetheless, aside from that caveat, without any extended discussion of the 
role of theological language in his project, Moltmann certainly runs the risk of 
descending into mythology. 
3.3.7. Canon Revisited: Theologia Crucis 
Before moving on, Mark 15:34 in its canonical context again requires attention. 
Whereas the other evangelists emphasise Jesus’ lament in his passion,125 John situates 
this earlier in Lazarus’ death (11:17-44).126 Nonetheless, John’s account of Jesus’ last 
words may be closer to Mark’s than is evident on the surface. Rebekah Eklund points 
out that John’s “I am thirsty” (19:28), an allusion to Ps 69:21, is a theme in the psalms 
which can indicate God’s absence as Mark does, “though admittedly in a much more 
subtle way.”127 Further support for this is found in John’s citation of Ps 22:18 in 19:24. 
And though only a flimsy case for this can be made, his “It is finished (tetelestai)” (John 
19:30) possibly alludes to the superscription of LXX Ps 21:1, “For the end (telos), 
concerning the support of the morning,” or the Hebrew of v.31, “he has done it.”128 John, 
                                                        
124 Cf. Moltmann’s reflections on TH and CG in HTG, 173-174, 
I did not attempt to write these books as theological textbooks, informative on all sides, 
balanced in judgment and reassuring in wisdom. In them I wanted to say something specific in 
a particular cultural, theological and political situation, and took sides. They were written 
from the time for the time, and are thus to be understood as contextual theology, set within 
the conflict of contemporary life. 
125 Although cf. Matt 23:37 and Luke 13:34. 
126 Rebekah Eklund, Jesus Wept: The Significance of Jesus’ Laments in the New Testament 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2015), 38-39. 
127 Ibid., 48. Cf. Pss 22:15; 42:1-3; 63:1; 69:3. 
128 Eklund, Jesus Wept, 49. 
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then, may still conceive of the absence of God in the sense of his non-intervention, 
despite not underscoring this as emphatically as Mark.129 
But Moltmann takes Mark 15:34 further than John, in such a way that surely 
contradicts John 16:32. He attempts to do so with historical Jesus methodology, 
something that I have argued he undertakes unsuccessfully. If historical Jesus 
methodology provides the only justification for this then he has failed. 
However, in the context of both CG and the nature of Scripture, such a 
contradiction might find support. Moltmann’s theologia crucis confronts not only 
human theologies but its critique extends to God himself. It is thus irrelevant whether 
a commitment to canon conflicts with a priori christological or trinitarian 
commitments because it is the cross which conflicts with all of these. In centring the 
divine abandonment which he sees in Mark and Paul’s letters, Moltmann seeks to 
decentre all traditional and modern theologies of glory which do not take this 
abandonment with the full seriousness that the cross requires.130 Indeed, he focusses 
on Mark because Mark’s account of Jesus’ abandonment has often been read in the 
context of wider trinitarian concerns, in part consolidated by the rest of the New 
Testament, which impede a proper understanding of what Mark intended to convey. 
While this proper understanding is probably not as far from Luke and John as he seems 
to imply, Moltmann still manages to bring something of Mark’s unique perspective to 
                                                        
129 A similar, though less technical, case can be made for Luke’s account of Jesus’ last words. 
Anne Hunt, “The Trinity through Pascal Eyes,” in Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions 
and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology, ed. Giulio Maspero and Robert J. Woźniak, 472-490 
(London: T. & T. Clark, 2012), writes,  
Unlike the other Synoptic accounts, Luke’s account of the passion and death makes two 
references to the Father in the passion narrative (Lk. 23.34, 23.46)… Jesus cries out, ‘Father, 
into your hands I commend my spirit’ (Lk. 23.46). Having said this, Jesus then breathed His 
last. In Luke’s account, death is precisely the moment par excellence for saying ‘Father’… 
Jesus’ death discloses that Jesus’ Sonship moves towards and culminates in a pure invocation 
of the Father, the symbol of which is death to absolutely any and every other reality (emphasis 
original). 
Cf. Eklund, Jesus Wept, 45-47. 
130 However, see Marshall, “Dereliction of Christ,” 246, who argues that the cry of dereliction 
has indeed had a central place in the tradition: 
Along with its companions from Luke and John, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ 
belongs among the traditional seven last words of Jesus, and as such has been the subject of 
countless Lenten meditations. Hymns both Catholic and Protestant allude to this cry, and it 
has elicited reflection from theologians, spiritual writers, and exegetes since the early church. 
67 
 
the forefront.131 A theologia crucis approach to the canon, then, means reading 
Scripture dialectically so that each aspect has its expression in its due place, 
acknowledging where the whole can sometimes mute the part. Moreover, although 
Moltmann interprets the historical Jesus data in accordance with a priori theological 
commitments, his own theology is avowedly fragmented or one-sided. Moltmann 
acknowledges the cultural location of all theology but, rather than assuming that his 
theology has the ability to transcend this, he proceeds to offer his critical theology on 
the basis of the cross, knowing that it can serve its purpose in his time.132 It is quite 
possible that in their contributions to the conversation future critical theologies could 
centre Luke or John, seeking to decentre Markan or Pauline theologies of the cross (and 
Moltmannian readings thereof) which function in some sense as covert theologies of 
glory in ways not yet seen. The unity of the canon would then be eschatological, the 
crucified Christ being present in different configurations of the canon throughout 
history, where parts of the biblical witness are always inevitably excluded or 
harmonised, until God brings his kingdom to completion and each piece in the canon 
is seen for its individual and unique witness to Christ in its own time and place. 
Admittedly, this reasoning is missing from CG. Nonetheless, I present it here to show 
that in the wider context of Moltmann’s theology his apparently opportunistic 
exclusion of John 16:32 can accord with a deep commitment to the crucified Christ. 
 
 
                                                        
131 Contrast Moltmann’s reading of the passion narratives with that of David Bentley Hart, “No 
Shadow of Turning: On Divine Impassibility,” Pro Ecclesia 11:2 (2002): 184-206 (205), who prioritises 
Mark’s canonical context: 
[T]he terrible distance of Christ's cry of human dereliction, despair, and utter 
godforsakenness—‘My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?’—is enfolded within and 
overcome by the ever greater distance and always indissoluble unity of God's triune love: 
‘Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit.’ 
Support for this claim might even be provided by Mark’s Gospel itself, in the inseparability of the 
crucifixion from the resurrection, as shown above. But what Moltmann is attempting to do is to 
maintain this broader context of resurrection, love, and victory, while at the same time directing his 
readers to the horror of the cross. It is in Mark’s Gospel especially that he finds this brought to the 
centre. 
132 This is not to say that other serious theologians make the mistake of confusing their 
context with theological truth. It is to say, however, that God uses their proposals in specific times and 
places but new times and places call for new proposals and, where necessary, recognition of how 




I began this chapter looking at Moltmann’s methodology in CG. In CG Moltmann 
understands theology to be both christocentric and crucicentric. On this basis he 
attempts to undertake his project critically, dialectically, and to soteriological ends. 
The criticism that he attempts to derive theology singularly from the cross overlooks 
the role the resurrection has to play in Moltmann’s methodology in CG. Moreover, two 
other methodological commitments not derived directly from the cross, the 
eschatological openness of theology to the future and trinitarian shape of all theology, 
also guide Moltmann’s theology in CG. 
In TKG, Moltmann incorporates human experience into his theological method. 
He also contends that theology should be undertaken dialogically. As such, it should 
not seek to be complete in its conclusions and it should strive to include voices that are 
otherwise excluded from the conversation. In his own theology Moltmann does not 
attempt to construct a system but offers proposals intended to stimulate further 
theological dialogue. 
I also looked at the role Mark 15:34 played in CG as a case study for Moltmann’s 
use of Scripture. Whereas in his later theology he tends to downplay the authority of 
Scripture, this is not so much the case in CG and TKG. However, his adoption of 
historical Jesus methodology clouds this commitment to biblical authority. Specifically, 
in arguing for the historicity of Jesus’ abandonment as attested in Mark, Moltmann 
marginalises the passion accounts of Luke and John. He omits to note that the cry of 
dereliction plays not only a historical but a theological role in Mark’s Gospel, and his 
employment of historical Jesus methodology allows him to arrive at a suspiciously 
convenient conclusion. I then compared Mark 15:34 in Moltmann’s theology with some 
contemporary Markan scholarship. The context of Ps 22, Mark’s passion narrative, and 
the rest of Mark’s Gospel all point to the harshness of Jesus’ abandonment by his 
Father. However, Mark’s pre-conciliar setting means that he does not explicitly draw 
out the implications of this for the Father-Son relationship. Moltmann, then, runs into 
a language problem, offering a speculative proposal which has a flimsy basis in Mark. 
Nonetheless, his marginalisation of Luke and John is in keeping with his theologia 
crucis method. All theologies will inevitably marginalise aspects of the canon. And 
Moltmann’s concentration on particular aspects of the canon offer a contribution to 
theology unique to the concerns of his generation.  
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4. A Pathetic God? Moltmann and Divine Suffering 
 
Moltmann was not the first modern theologian to advocate a suffering God. Yet he 
contributed hugely to the popularity of divine passibility following the release of CG. 
Many followed him in likewise affirming not only the possibility of divine suffering but 
its necessity for a properly Christian understanding of God. Such was the case that in 
1986 Ronald Goetz famously named divine passibility the “new orthodoxy.”133 
However, while this new trend has been received enthusiastically by some, others have 
pushed back on it, questioning whether the passibilists’ proposals make good biblical, 
theological, and even historical sense. 
4.1. Defining Impassibility and Passibility 
Moltmann rejects the traditional doctrine of divine impassibility, taking up a form of 
divine passibility. The exact meaning in modern theology of this doctrine which 
Moltmann rejects, a literal translation into Latin (impassibilitas) from the Greek 
apatheia,134 is not completely clear. Many, Moltmann included, have employed the 
term without first clarifying what they mean by it, which has brought about some 
confusion.  
Marcel Sarot notes that impassibility was originally employed to mean 
“incapable of being acted upon by an outside force,” a definition which was later easily 
extended to include inside forces as well. In this original sense it can be used 
interchangeably with immutability.135 To distinguish impassibility from immutability, 
                                                        
133 Ronald Goetz, “The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy,” Christian Century 103:13 
(1986): 385-389. 
134 Marcel Sarot, “Patripassianism, Theopaschitism and the Suffering of God. Some Historical 
and Systematic Considerations,” Religious Studies 26:3 (1990): 363-375 (365). 
135 Sarot, “Patripassianism,” 365. Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in 
Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3-9, identifies eight definitions 
of divine impassibility in the literature he surveys. These are as follows: 
I1 ‘lacking all emotions’ (bliss not an emotion) 
I2 ‘in a state of mind that is imperturbable’ 
I3 ‘insusceptible to distraction from resolve’ 
I4 ‘having a will determined entirely by oneself’ 
I5 ‘cannot be affected by an outside force’ 
I6 ‘cannot be prevented from achieving one’s purpose’ 
I7 ‘has not susceptibility to negative emotions’ 
I8 ‘cannot be affected by an outside force or changed by oneself’ (9). 
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then, Sarot defines it as “immutability with regard to one's feelings, or the quality of 
one's inner life,” which includes “emotions, suffering, (un)happiness, affections and the 
like.”136 This is similar to the definition provided by Kevin Vanhoozer: “That which is 
not subject to change is immutable; that which is not subject to suffering is 
impassible.”137 Impassibility remains a substratum of immutability, the latter which 
also concerns God’s nature, will, and knowledge. 
Moltmann’s proposal for divine suffering certainly goes beyond divine feelings. 
He proclaims a radical alternative to traditional accounts of immutability in that God’s 
feelings are not merely perturbed but the trinitarian persons are constituted in the 
death of Christ. Father and Son become Sonless and Fatherless. Conversely, this 
constitution in nothingness is a historical feature of God’s being, overcome 
eschatologically. Father and Son negate their negation in the resurrection, completing 
this negation of the negation when creation is brought into full trinitarian fellowship 
in the coming kingdom. That is, although Moltmann strives to express the extent of 
God’s suffering such that God undergoes a change in his nature, like other Christian 
passibilists he is reluctant to posit anything that would compete with God’s being. God 
undergoes suffering and change but it never can overcome him. The negation is limited 
by a stronger counter-negation which Moltmann sees in the resurrection. Moltmann’s 
commitment to the immutability of divine nature on this fundamental level is further 
evident in his claim that God actively allows himself to be changed and actively suffers 
with his creation, rather than what he understands to be the false dichotomy of 
undergoing change or suffering either unwillingly or not at all. He thus holds to a form 
                                                        
He settles with the definition he sees most consistently represented: “that which is impassible is that 
which cannot be affected by an outside force. Hence, impassibility is imperviousness to causal 
influence” (11). This differs from immutability, which concerns both outside and inside forces. Creel 
then suggests sixteen possible variations on impassibility, depending on the combination in which a 
theologian ascribes impassibility to God’s nature, will, knowledge, and feeling. For example, someone 
might claim that God is impassible in nature and will but not in knowledge and feeling, or vice versa. 
Creel explores these various areas throughout the rest of his book. However, this definition runs into 
difficulties. First, it does not adequately distinguish between kinds of outside forces. Creel conflates 
any external force that might influence its object with causal forces, the influence of which cannot be 
countered (Sarot, “Patripassianism,” 366, makes this point). Second, although impassibility might be 
applied to God’s nature, will, knowledge, or feelings, these are not symmetrical aspects of God. There 
are certainly fewer than sixteen combinations. Creel himself devotes only two pages to the 
impassibility of God’s nature, which it seems no Christian passibilist has any desire to dispute (Creel, 
Divine Impassibility, 13-14). It would be difficult, for example, for anyone to coherently claim that God 
is passible in nature, will, and knowledge, and yet not in feelings. 
136 Sarot, “Patripassianism,” 368. 
137 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 397. 
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of divine impassibility, though a divine impassibility with much broader parameters 
than the tradition. 
Divine passibility in general is not to be confused with specific forms of divine 
passibility, such as patripassianism or theopaschitism.138 Patripassianism refers to a 
version of modalism in which the Father suffers on the cross because he is indistinct 
from the Son. Although Moltmann affirms the suffering of the Father, he does not 
modalistically equate the Father with the Son. The Son experiences dying whereas the 
Father experiences death, i.e., the death of his Son (CG, 243). In light of this, Paul 
Molnar’s attribution of modalism to Moltmann is untenable.139 Theopaschitism is an 
orthodox belief that God the Son suffered in the flesh. It was affirmed at the fifth 
ecumenical council. Theos here, as in the term theotokos, refers to the person of the Son 
rather than God in genere. But Moltmann takes the term to mean the latter and thus 
disavows it, perhaps for its association with passibilists prior to him and the erroneous 
way in which they employed the term.140 Nonetheless, because Moltmann rejects the 
distinction between Christ’s divine and human natures that orthodox theopaschitism 
presupposes, theopaschite is an inexact descriptor of his theology. 
 
                                                        
138 For these definitions and distinctions see Sarot, “Patripassianism,” 363-375. 
139 Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with 
Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology (London: T. & T. Clark, 2002), 222, takes one of Moltmann’s 
comments to be modalistic: “What Christ, the incarnate God, did in time, God, the heavenly Father, 
does and must do in eternity” (TKG, 31). He goes on to equate any attribution of suffering to the Father 
with modalism. Molnar also makes the seemingly contradictory claim that Moltmann’s theology is 
tritheistic, a claim which I will not be assessing here but one which is more frequently made in the 
literature and seems to have some basis in his theology (ibid., 227-233). Indeed, Moltmann outrightly 
embraces tritheism because he does not find it problematic (e.g., TKG, 243 n.43). Kärkkäinen, “Jürgen 
Moltmann,” 121, follows Molnar in attributing modalism to Moltmann. There are two problems with 
this. First, in the passage Molnar cites from TKG, Moltmann is expounding not his own position but that 
of C. E. Rolt. In Moltmann’s own theology, he presents a much stronger distinction between the 
trinitarian persons, so strong that Molnar and others charge him with tritheism. Second, though there 
may be other objections to raise regarding Moltmann’s attribution of suffering to the Father, modalism 
is not one of them. This accusation only serves a polemical function and it does little to illuminate the 
limitations of Moltmann’s claims. Moltmann is clear that the pain of the cross touches the Father on 
account of his Son’s death but the Father does not undergo death as the Son. The latter is the claim 
which patripassianism makes. Elsewhere, to differentiate his theology more decisively from 
patripassianism, Moltmann coins the term “patricompassianism.” See Jürgen Moltmann, 
“Gesichtspunkte der Kreuzestheologie heute,” Evangelische Theologie XXXIII (1973), 359, cited in 
Sarot, “Patripassianism,” 372 n.47. 
140 “Nor can the death of Jesus be understood in theopaschite terms as the ‘death of God’. To 
understand what happened between Jesus and his God and Father on the cross, it is necessary to talk 
in trinitarian terms” (CG, 243). 
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4.2. Is Divine Impassibility a Pagan or a Christian Doctrine?  
Towards the end of CG, Moltmann provides a positive assessment of the origins of 
divine impassibility in Plato, Aristotle, and Stoic philosophy. The fathers found that the 
doctrine could be suitably integrated into and even provide support for the central 
Christian concept of agape. In contrast to the rest of the book, Moltmann’s only 
reservation here is with “the framework of the presupposed negation of the negative,” 
i.e., that divine impassibility is just an anthropological negation of human suffering 
projected onto God (CG, 270). Yet in contrast to this positive assessment, throughout 
CG and TKG Moltmann juxtaposes what he understands to be an essentially Greek or 
pagan philosophical concept of God with the trinitarian God he sees at work in the 
cross. As Daniel Castelo observes, he neglects “to engage the fathers in their own 
setting and to analyse their usage and the negotiations which they made with their 
philosophical and cultural context at large.”141 Moltmann has maintained this rhetoric 
throughout his career.142 
Moltmann is not alone in attributing the prominence of divine impassibility in 
the tradition to the undue influence of Greek philosophy.143 Indeed, this attribution has 
been so popular that Paul Gavrilyuk gives it its own name: “The Theory of Theology’s 
                                                        
141 Castelo, “Moltmann’s Dismissal,” 400. 
142 In 2014, Moltmann writes, 
The Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics of substance has its origins in the religious 
enlightenment of ancient Greece. It does not affect the God of Israel. Why did Aristotle call God 
‘apathes’? To exclude the moods and affairs of the Homeric gods. The God of Israel is not 
subject to such moods, but he is full of compassion for his people. This is why Abraham 
Heschel interpreted God’s love and ability to suffer by way of his pathos. The history of Israel 
with God, according to Hosea, is a love story. From Jesus’ history with God, the early Christians 
deduced the unconditional love of God. God not merely loves—‘God is love’ (1 John 4:16). The 
story of Christ is the story of the Passion of God in the double sense of passion and suffering. 
See Jürgen Moltmann, “The Passibility or Impassibility of God: Answers to J. K. Mozley’s ‘Six Necessary 
Questions’,” in Within the Love of God: Essays on the Doctrine of God in Honour of Paul S. Fiddes, ed. 
Anthony Clarke and Anthony Moore, 108-119 (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 116. 
143 E.g., T. E. Pollard, “The Impassibility of God,” Scottish Journal of Theology 8:4 (1955): 353-
364: “Nowhere is this bad influence of Greek philosophical presuppositions on Christian thinking 
about God more clearly to be seen than in what are commonly known as the traditional attributes of 
God, and in particular in the attribute of impassibility” (354, emphasis original). Richard Bauckham, 
“’Only the Suffering God Can Help’: Divine Passibility in Modern Theology,” Themelios 9:3 (1984): 6-12: 
“The idea of divine impassibility (apatheia) was a Greek philosophical inheritance in early Christian 
theology” (7). For some further examples, see Thomas Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap., Does God Suffer? 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2000), 18-25. 
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Fall into Hellenistic Philosophy” (henceforth, TTFHT).144 The TTFHT has its beginnings 
in nineteenth century Germany. It was later popularised by Adolf von Harnack.145 Yet, 
despite its popularity, it often rests on an oversimplified narrative. In response to this 
it must be said: “Impassibility was not baptized without conversion.”146 “Perhaps the 
greatest irony in the [modern] divine (im)passibility debates is that [historically] both 
orthodox and heretic alike assumed impassibility to be viable within theological 
discourse.”147 
4.2.1. In Defence of the Patristic Adoption of the Doctrine of Divine 
Impassibility 
Gavrilyuk identifies some major problems with the TTFHT, some of which apply to 
Moltmann.148 First, the Greek philosophical milieu of the fathers did not provide a 
single form of divine impassibility but was home to diverse approaches, both between 
and within various schools of Epicurean, Stoic, and Middle Platonist philosophy. 
Indeed, divine suffering was actually a feature of some Hellenistic mystery cults. As 
Gavrilyuk concludes, “Hellenistic religions too had their passion narratives.”149 
Second, the TTFHT often misconstrues the role Hebrew sources played in 
patristic notions of divine impassibility. Indeed, the fathers received a complex picture 
of the God of Israel: 
God in the Bible is said to repent… and to be incapable of repenting…; he is said 
to change his mind and to be unchangeable…; he is said to walk in the garden of 
Eden… and to dwell in ‘thick darkness’… and in ‘unapproachable light’... It is 
important to note that the tensions created by these conflicting descriptions of 
                                                        
144 Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought 
(Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1. 
145 Gerald Bray, “Has the Christian Doctrine of God Been Corrupted by Greek Philosophy?,” in 
God under Fire, ed. Douglas S. Huffman and Eric L. Johnson, 105-118 (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
2002), 108. Specifically, Bray locates its beginnings in Ferdinand Christian Baur, August Neander, and 
Albrecht Ritschl. Cf. the literature Moltmann cites in support of this (CG, 289 n.148). 
146 Gavrilyuk, Impassible God, 15. For an earlier critical assessment of the TTFHT, see Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, “The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of God as a Dogmatic Problem of Early 
Christian Theology,” in Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 2, trans. by George H. Kehm, 119-183 (London: 
SCM, 1971). 
147 Castelo, “Moltmann's Dismissal,” 398. 
148 Gavrilyuk, Impassible God, 178, observes, “Moltmann's position is not easily classifiable, 
since he rightly recognizes that apatheia for the Greek authors denoted God's freedom and self‐
sufficiency, rather than apathy and indifference.” 
149 Ibid., 36. 
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God arise within the biblical narrative itself. They are not tensions between the 
Greek and the Hebrew ways of thought.150 
Moreover, the Bible predominantly consulted by the fathers, the Septuagint, often 
(though not always) downplayed or even omitted anthropomorphisms and 
anthropopathisms151 when translating from the original Hebrew. For example, the 
Hebrew text of Exod 32:14 in English reads, “Yahweh repented of the evil that he 
planned to bring on his people.” The same text translated from the Septuagint reads, 
“the Lord was moved with compassion.”152 Nor was this development restricted to 
translating the Hebrew Bible. Following Martin Hengel, James Keating and Thomas 
White note that, because of the Hellenistic concepts Judaism had inherited, “These 
notions not only permeated pre-Christian Jewish literature such as the Septuagint 
translation, Ben Sirach, or the book of Wisdom, but, most significantly, colored the 
Jewish thought-world of Jesus and the evangelists.”153 Too sharp a distinction between 
the concepts which the biblical authors employed to understand the God of Israel and 
those developed by Plato and Aristotle is simply unhistorical. 
Finally, the TTFHT often overlooks the positive role that the doctrine of divine 
impassibility played in patristic theology. It distinguished God from the pagan deities 
who were subject to human passions, like hate and lust. The Christian God was 
impassible and thus above these. Although some of the fathers spoke of God’s 
emotional life, they consistently underscored the difference between divine and 
human emotion. For the fathers, “divine impassibility entails freedom from and control 
over those emotional states that humans cannot manage easily.” Thus, “God is 
impassible in the sense of being immune to the negative consequences typically 
associated with human emotions.”154 Thomas Weinandy makes a similar point, 
situating divine impassibility in its wider theological context. Most of the fathers 
subscribed to an absolute distinction between God and creation, a distinction they 
                                                        
150 Ibid., 38. 
151 That is, attributions of human emotion to God. 
152 Ibid., 39. 
153 James F. Keating and Thomas Joseph White, O.P., “Introduction: Divine Passibility in 
Contemporary Theology,” in idem, Divine Impassibility, 5. 
154 Ibid., 59. 
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drew from the Bible. In the context of Gnostic, Platonic, and Aristotelian thought this 
was especially unique: 
[God] did not just relatively transcend all else in that he was the pinnacle of a 
contiguous chain of being, but rather he transcended creation in that he 
constituted a distinct ontological order all his own, and so was not one of the 
things made.155 
It was this biblically derived presupposition that provided a basis for the development 
of negative divine attributes in patristic theology, such as impassibility. The attributes 
of created things are simply not the attributes of God. Moreover, the development of 
such negative attributes “equally gave more noetic content to the positive 
attributes.”156 Because God is free of the same oppressive or sinful passions 
experienced by human beings that would otherwise threaten his love, this love is all 
the more constant. 
4.2.2. Assessment: Moltmann on the Pagan Origin of Divine Impassibility 
It is difficult to offer an assessment of Moltmann here. He certainly affirms the positive 
role of the doctrine of divine impassibility in patristic theology and the later Christian 
tradition (CG, 267-270; TKG, 23). In this passage from CG, too, he avoids 
oversimplifying Greek philosophy, noting that Christian theology was influenced by 
particular aspects and adapted these according to the biblical witness to God. 
Moltmann’s only potential fault here would be the generalisation implied in his use of 
the shorthand “Greek.”157 He does not explicitly address biblical support for divine 
impassibility in CG or TKG. Following Abraham Heschel, Moltmann presupposes that 
Scripture attests a divine pathos, unlike the capricious and irrational pathē of human 
beings and pagan gods, and yet unlike the Hellenistic concept of God that Jewish 
philosophy of religion (and, implicitly, Christian tradition) had inherited (CG, 270-274; 
TKG, 25-30). He also follows Heschel in affirming the varying portraits of God in the 
Hebrew Bible, immanent and transcendent, consummated in the person of Christ, 
                                                        
155 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 109. 
156 Ibid.  
157 E.g., TKG, 21,  
If, in the manner of Greek philosophy, we ask what characteristics are ‘appropriate’ to the 
deity, then we have to exclude difference, diversity, movement and suffering from the divine 
nature. The divine substance is incapable of suffering; otherwise it would not be divine. 
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crucified and risen. In contrast to human suffering, God suffers freely. Creation can only 
affect God because he allows it to do so. Moltmann, then, is certainly conscious of the 
tensions which Gavrilyuk highlights and in this he avoids going the way of non-
Christian accounts of divine passibility such as process theology (CG, 255-256).158 
However, elsewhere Moltmann can assert that “Aristotle’s God,” which the 
Christian tradition has inherited, “cannot love; he can only be loved by all non-divine 
beings by virtue of his perfection and beauty.” This God is a “Narcissus in a 
metaphysical degree: Deus incurvatus in se” (CG, 222). In TKG, Moltmann refers 
polemically to Christ’s passion as a merely “human tragedy” when read through a 
Chalcedonian lens. As such, “God is inevitably bound to become the cold, silent and 
unloved heavenly power” (TKG, 22). Despite affirming that the tradition understood 
that God’s impassibility and love were inseparable (CG, 269-270), Moltmann’s 
contention here seems to be that the doctrine could never deliver on this, a point to 
which I will return below.159 Thus, while Moltmann provides a sympathetic assessment 
in one place, elsewhere he reverts to polemical language, denouncing a significant 
aspect of the tradition as essentially un-Christian. His characterisation of traditional 
theology as “theism” (and, in TKG, his rejection of “monotheism”), implying the 
substitution of a theology which is consistently christocentric and crucicentric for a 
non-trinitarian, theocentric, and thus ultimately pagan, philosophy, is especially 
problematic in this respect because it overlooks the theological considerations the 
tradition made in coming to its conclusions. As Gavrilyuk and Weinandy note, such a 
characterisation ignores both the biblical support for traditional aspects of the 
doctrine of God and the constructive role these aspects play in that theology. 
Nonetheless, on this basis Moltmann could only be faulted for bad reading. Only after 
the presuppositions underlying his theology of divine passibility are compared with 
some of those underlying traditional divine impassibility can a fuller assessment of his 
                                                        
158 For more on the differences between Moltmann’s trinitarian panentheism and process 
theology see Oksu Shin, “The Panentheistic Vision in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann” (Ph.D. diss., 
Fuller Theological Seminary, 2002), 8-13. Shin outlines how Moltmann distances his own theology 
from process theology. She also highlights some of the distinctives of Moltmann’s theology that 
differentiate his panentheism from process theology, which she treats in greater detail over the course 
of her dissertation. 
159 See subsection 4.4.2. 
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claims be offered. Before doing this, it is necessary to clarify Moltmann’s rejection of 
Chalcedonian christology. 
4.3. Impassibility and Chalcedonian Christology 
The fourth ecumenical council, the Council of Chalcedon, is accepted by the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church, and by many Protestant churches 
as an authoritative reading of Scripture. It produced the Chalcedonian Definition, 
which provides a norm for christology, emphasising the one person of Christ while 
distinguishing between his divine and human natures. However, Moltmann rejects this 
distinction because he claims that it derived from theism rather than the cross, and 
was included in the Definition to guard God’s being from Jesus’ passion. For him, “In 
contrast to the traditional doctrine of the two natures in the person of Christ, 
[contemporary christology] must begin from the totality of the person of Christ” (CG, 
205-206). This is achieved when God as Trinity is the focus.160 Moltmann affirms 
Luther’s statement regarding the communicatio idiomatum that “This human being 
[iste homo] created the world and this God [Deus iste] suffered, died, and was 
buried,”161 but seeks a more radical statement, claiming that Luther “divides the 
person of Christ with this phrase ‘iste Deus’ and ‘iste homo’” (CG, 233). 
4.3.1. The Role of the Doctrine of Divine Impassibility in the Formation of 
Chalcedonian Orthodoxy 
The fifth century christological controversies between the Alexandrians and the 
Antiochenes provide some background to the Council. While “textbook” 
interpretations of the controversies often cite the humanity of Jesus as the major issue 
of debate, John O’Keefe argues that it was instead the impassibility of God which was 
at stake.162 Indeed, impassibility had always played a major role in patristic theology. 
                                                        
160 In the context of the Trinity, “the person of Jesus comes to the fore in its totality as the Son, 
and the relationship of the Godhead and the manhood in his person fall into the background” (CG, 
207). Cf. Moltmann’s references throughout CG to the “human God” (e.g., CG, 195-196, 227, 231, 252). 
Moltmann does not employ “God-man” in the context of his own theology but uses it to refer to other 
christologies (e.g., CG, 93, 212). 
161 “Iste homo creavit mundum et Deus iste est passus, mortuus, sepultus, etc.” Weimar Ausgabe 
39, II, 93ff, cited in CG, 233. 
162 John J. O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering? Divine Passion and Fifth-Century Christology,” 
Theological Studies 58:1 (1997): 39-60 (57). Cf. Gavrilyuk, Impassible God, chap. 6. Gavrilyuk argues,  
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In the fourth century, for example, the anti-Nicenes had rejected the term homoousion 
because of its potential to import Christ’s human sufferings into the Godhead.163 
However, once the Nicene Creed had been formulated and accepted, a new question 
emerged: “If Jesus Christ is God, as Nicaea declared, and if Jesus Christ suffered, as 
Scripture asserted, does this not imply that God suffered in some way?”164 
This question took on especial importance in the exchanges between Nestorius 
and Cyril of Alexandria. Nestorius, whose views were later condemned as heresy, 
claimed that it was necessary to make a strong distinction between two persons in 
Christ, the divine and the human. He was concerned that attributing human attributes 
and actions to the Son, who was homoousion with the Father, compromised divine 
impassibility. By positing the divine and human in Christ as two different persons he 
could safeguard divine impassibility. Conversely, Cyril of Alexandria, “first and 
foremost an exegete,” rejected this strong distinction on biblical grounds: “if the 
biblical narrative suggested that God the Word had suffered, then Cyril was willing to 
affirm it, even if doing so made the concept of an impassible godhead strain and 
buckle.”165 Scripture attested one, not two persons of Christ. O’Keefe goes so far as to 
say that for Cyril the distinction between the Word suffering according to his person 
or according to his divine or human natures, “fade[s] to insignificance after the 
Incarnation.”166 In Cyril’s own words, it is necessary to make the distinction but “only 
at a theoretical level.” That is, “we accept the distinction only in our mental 
intuitions.”167 Nonetheless, like Nestorius, Cyril upheld the doctrine of divine 
impassibility. The theoretical distinction between the two natures meant the one 
person of Christ suffered but he suffered according to his human nature, not his divine 
nature. Cyril writes, “we do not deny that he can be said to suffer… but this does not 
                                                        
Theodore and Nestorius were dominantly theists who, above all else, sought to protect 
absolute divine impassibility from being compromised by any involvement in the turbulent 
affairs of human life. It is in the light of this central concern that they developed their two‐
subjects account of the incarnation. For Cyril, in contrast, the starting point was the voluntary 
self‐emptying of a single divine subject who accepted the limitations of human life (141). 
163 O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering?,” 40. Cf. Gavrilyuk, Impassible God, chap. 5. 
164 O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering?,” 40-41.  
165 Ibid., 45-46. 
166 Ibid., 50. 
167 Cyril of Alexandria, “Second Letter to Succensus,” Cyril of Alexandria: Select Letters, ed. 




mean that we say that the things pertaining to the flesh transpired in his divine and 
transcendent nature.”168 Such a distinction, which would be clarified later at 
Chalcedon, resists straightforward definition. Yet, however difficult it was to maintain, 
Cyril saw its importance in preserving the notion of divine impassibility because it 
avoided predicating suffering of the divine nature. 
The Council of Chalcedon was convened in 451, not long after both Cyril and 
Nestorius had passed away. Initially, assent to the Chalcedonian Definition in 
contemporary theology appears not to require any commitment to divine 
impassibility. For example, Sarah Coakley suggests that the word Definition here 
should be treated with care. While it is often called Definition in English, in Greek it is 
called horos, i.e., horizon or boundary. Definition connotes “semantic clarity, linguistic 
precision, or careful circumspection,” whereas “Chalcedon apparently fails to deliver 
all of these.”169 Key words such as person (hypostasis) and nature (physis) are left 
“relatively undefined.” Indeed, “these terms had a pre-history, but it was an ambiguous 
one and the ‘Definition’ does not clear up the ambiguity.”170 Rather, as a boundary, the 
Definition functions apophatically, identifying what is not orthodox christology as 
opposed to prescribing positive content for christology. It is “dogmatic minimalism.”171 
Specifically, Coakley asserts that the Definition rules out Apollinarian, Eutychian, and 
Nestorian christologies; provides the terms physis and hypostasis to distinguish 
between duality and unity in Christ; and offers negative qualifiers (Christ’s natures are 
                                                        
168 Cyril of Alexandria, On the Unity of Christ, trans. by J. A. McGuckin (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir's Seminary, 1995), SC 97.776A, cited in O’Keefe, “Impassible Suffering?,” 51. 
169 Sarah Coakley, “What Does Chalcedon Solve and What Does It Not? Some Reflections on the 
Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian ‘Definition’,” in The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God, ed. Stephen T. Davis, David Kendall S.J., and Gerald 
O’Collins, S.J., 143-163 (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 160. 
170 Ibid., 148, emphasis original. Coakley writes that Chalcedon “does not tell us that the 
hypostasis is identical with the pre‐existent Logos” and “it does not tell us whether the meaning of 
hypostasis in this christological context is different, or the same, from the meaning in the trinitarian 
context” (162-163). Similarly, Michael Slusser, “The Issues in the ‘Definition’ of the Council of 
Chalcedon,” Toronto Journal of Theology 6 (1990): 63-69, notes, “hypostasis... is a supplementary word, 
non-technical in character, and does not necessarily represent the same nuance of meaning as ‘person’ 
[prosōpon]” (68). 
171 Oliver D. Crisp, “Desiderata for Models of the Hypostatic Union,” in Christology: Ancient and 
Modern: Explorations in Constructive Dogmatics, ed. Oliver D. Crisp and Fred Sanders, 19-41 (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2013), 27. 
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united “without confusion, without change, without division, without separation”).172 
These qualifiers motion to an even greater mystery, the hypostatic union, which 
escapes definition. 
However, in the context of the Council, the inseparability of the Definition’s two 
natures framework from divine impassibility becomes clear. As an apophatic text, 
Coakley argues that there are a number of christological issues that Chalcedon does 
not clarify. Yet, while “Chalcedon does not tell us in what the divine and human 
‘natures’ consist,”173 the text preceding the Definition suggests that divine passibility 
is the very problem that results if the two natures are not properly distinguished. 
According to the text, some heretics confuse or mix the natures, “mindlessly imagining 
that there is a single nature of the flesh and the divinity, and fantastically supposing 
that in the confusion the divine nature of the Only-begotten is passible.”174 The Council 
thus “expels from the assembly of the priests those who dare to say that the divinity of 
the Only-begotten is passible.”175 The theology of Chalcedon may be predominantly 
apophatic, but this is an apophaticism that also precludes any claim that the divine 
nature is passible either before or, especially, after the hypostatic union. 
This short account of Cyril and Chalcedon confirms Moltmann’s contention that 
the “two natures framework” was developed out of a need to guard the divine nature 
from suffering. Other factors were certainly at play, such as the need to affirm 
Scripture’s witness to the full divinity and humanity of the one person of Christ, but 
divine impassibility played a central role in arriving at the Chalcedonian Definition. As 
long as this framework is upheld, theologians cannot speak of divine suffering in the 
same sense as Moltmann does. Any theology advancing within the bounds of this 
framework that Jesus suffers in his divine nature makes the framework redundant. It 
is for this reason that Moltmann sees the need to dismiss it altogether. 
                                                        
172 This is the translation Coakley provides at the beginning of her chapter (“What Does 
Chalcedon Solve?,” 143). 
173 Ibid., 162. 
174 “The Fourth Ecumenical Council: The Council of Chalcedon, 451,” in Creeds and Confessions 
of Faith in the Christian Tradition, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss, vol. 1, Early, Eastern, and 
Medieval, 172-181 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 177. 
175 Ibid., 179. 
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4.3.2. Assessment: The Theological Implications of Moltmann’s Rejection of 
Chalcedon 
It is useful here to note Wolfhart Pannenberg’s rejection of Chalcedonian christology 
in his Jesus— God and Man.176 Moltmann had certainly read this popular work, written 
four years before CG. The alternative to Chalcedon which Pannenberg presents is 
similar in some ways to Moltmann’s christology in CG, though, as I will suggest, 
Moltmann’s christology is less clear in this respect. For Pannenberg, despite the limits 
of Chalcedon, “Vere deus, vere homo is an indispensable statement of Christian 
theology.”177 It is this pre-Chalcedonian motif that Pannenberg observes is clearly 
present in the New Testament. Specifically, Pannenberg suggests that it is the 
resurrection by which the writers of the New Testament confessed Christ as vere deus, 
vere homo. Modern christology must redirect its sights from Chalcedon, which 
developed its construal of the hypostatic union on the basis of the incarnation rather 
than the resurrection. For Pannenberg, then, “Jesus’ unity with God—and thus the truth 
of the incarnation—is also decided only retroactively from the perspective of Jesus’ 
resurrection for the whole of Jesus’ human existence… and thus also for God’s 
eternity.”178 
Moltmann’s affinity with Pannenberg can be seen earlier in CG where he 
explicitly addresses the questions “Is Jesus true God?” and “Is Jesus true man?” (CG, 87-
98). However, Moltmann does not provide a direct reply to these questions. He only 
suggests that past efforts to answer them have failed by effectively excluding Jesus’ 
crucifixion, which is irreducible to either of these questions.179 That is, the cross cannot 
be contained in the mutually exclusive concepts of divinity or humanity because it 
                                                        
176 Pannenberg gives a number of reasons for rejecting Chalcedon: it inadvertently centres the 
contradiction between divine and human natures in christology, diminishing the centrality of the one 
person of Christ; in the term physis it implies a symmetry between divine and human natures; and it 
cannot satisfactorily mediate between Nestorian and monophysite alternatives. See Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, trans. by Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminster John Knox, 1968), 283-323. 
177 Ibid., 285. 
178 Ibid., 321. 
179 Thus, in response to the first question Moltmann replies, “The more [patristic christology] 
emphasized the divinity of Christ…, the more difficult it became to demonstrate that the Son of God 
who was of one substance with God was Jesus of Nazareth, crucified under Pontius Pilate” (CG, 89). In 
response to the second he writes, “Christ… in his own way is outside history, outside society and 
outside the question of the humanity of living men. The transcendence of the crucified Christ is not 
metaphysical but the transcendence of concrete rejection” (CG, 98). 
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stands beyond both of them. It is not until the fulfilment of Christ’s future that this 
irreducibility is overcome (CG, 103-107). This eschatological identity, “the centre of his 
existence” (CG, 106), is given proleptically in the resurrection. Like Pannenberg, 
Moltmann refers the unity of the one person of Christ to eschatology. He also diverts 
attention from the incarnation to the resurrection.180 Nonetheless, in contrast to 
Pannenberg, Moltmann does not seem too concerned with developing a positive 
alternative to Chalcedonian christology: “On the one hand, Moltmann certainly agrees 
with Chalcedon that Jesus is vere Deus and vere homo. On the other hand, the doctrine 
of the two natures does not really play a part in his book [CG].”181 Rather, Moltmann 
attempts to evade Chalcedon altogether, bringing his readers’ attention to the cross 
where the categories of divinity and humanity are confronted and contradicted. But as 
Richard Bauckham suggests, in an otherwise positive review of Moltmann’s later WJC, 
this evasion is unconvincing: 
Eschewing two-natures Christology in favour of Jesus' being-in-relation and 
being-in-history, Moltmann seems to see Jesus as a human being whose 
relationship to the Father in the Spirit makes him the unique Son of God… At 
this point Moltmann's focus on pneumatological Christology evidently enables 
him to sidestep a classic Christological issue; it is less clear that his own 
trinitarian theology ought to allow him to evade it.182 
Moltmann’s christology is certainly not Nestorian, i.e., tending towards the 
disunity of the Logos and the man from Nazareth, as his continual insistence on 
oneness of Christ’s person shows. Nor is it monophysite in the sense that the human 
Jesus is swallowed up in the divine Christ. Moltmann asserts Jesus’ full humanity in the 
tradition of Gregory Nazianzen’s dictum, “What is not assumed is not healed.”183 
                                                        
180 E.g., “His [Christ’s] office is upheld not by the incarnation of the eternal Son of God nor by 
the archetype of true humanity, but by the future of the kingdom which is inaugurated in and around 
him” (CG, 98). “[T]he resurrection of the crucified Jesus into the coming glory of God contains within 
itself the process of the incarnation of the coming God and his glory in the crucified Jesus” (CG, 169). 
181 Runia, Christological Debate, 45. 
182 Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 208; cf. Macleod, “Christology of Moltmann,” 35, “In The 
Way of Jesus Christ Moltmann achieves the extraordinary feat of writing over 300 pages on Christology 
without once mentioning Chalcedon.” Not that it makes much difference, but, pace Macleod, Moltmann 
mentions Chalcedon once (WJC, 47). 
183 CG, 276,  
When God becomes man in Jesus of Nazareth, he not only enters into the finitude of man, but 
in his death on the cross also enters into the situation of man’s godforsakenness. In Jesus he 
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Conversely, he also asserts that it is certainly God who undergoes crucifixion.184 He 
brings the two together in the unity of Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection. Without 
the historical crucifixion, Christ becomes an irrelevant myth. Without the resurrection, 
the death he undergoes does not differ greatly from those who underwent comparable 
deaths. Moltmann’s rejection of Chalcedon, then, does not seem to be due to the duality 
in unity that it commends, despite his comment that even Luther “divides the person 
of Christ” (CG, 233, cited above). Ironically, it is difficult to see how Moltmann’s dual 
emphasis on Christ as God and human avoids a similar “division.”185 Rather, Moltmann 
is particularly averse to Chalcedon for the impassibility of the divine nature which it 
presupposes. Similarly, while Moltmann radicalises Luther’s doctrine of the 
communicatio idiomatum to say that it is not only God qua a human being that Christ 
suffers but God qua God, the Chalcedonian exclusion of the confusion or mixing of 
natures necessitates a traditional doctrine of the communicatio that Moltmann rejects. 
What is yet unclear is just how Moltmann intends to uphold the full humanity 
and divinity of Christ, as Chalcedon does, without positing a tertium quid, which is 
neither divine nor human. Nonetheless, although this ambiguity remains, Moltmann 
manages to maintain that which is important in this dual affirmation, while making 
some adjustments. God assumes the whole human condition, including human 
godforsakenness, and overcomes its limits in Christ, bringing human beings into 
fellowship with him. But it is in Moltmann’s central claim in CG that he diverges from 
tradition. The crucifixion is not only an external work pro nobis; it is at the same time 
an internal work of God pro se. Indeed, in Moltmann’s panentheistic framework it is 
one work in which both God and creation are included and transformed because to be 
                                                        
does not die the natural death of a finite being, but the violent death of the criminal on the 
cross, the death of complete abandonment by God. 
Moreover, Moltmann asserts that Jesus’ humanity is not just mediatory, a fault he attributes to Calvin’s 
christology, but it has a central place in the consummated kingdom (CG, 256-266). 
184 CG, 192, “God (himself) suffered in Jesus, God himself died in Jesus for us… God became the 
crucified God so that we might become free sons of God.” 
185 Conversely, it might be difficult to see how Moltmann avoids a conflation of the two. 
Despite variously asserting both the divinity and humanity of Christ, Marc Steen, “Jürgen Moltmann’s 
Critical Reception of K. Barth’s Theopaschitism,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 67:4 (1991): 
278-311 (297), claims that Moltmann “ends up in a dubious christology, which neglects the difference 
between the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ.” I would soften this critique, however, and suggest 
that this is an ambiguity in Moltmann’s theology rather than an ignorance of the respective 
significances of Christ’s divinity and humanity. As the foregoing citations demonstrate, Moltmann 
recognises that Christ’s divinity and humanity have different functions in christology. 
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pro se is to be pro nobis, and vice versa. Any problems inherent in this move are avoided 
by the Chalcedonian alternative. Yet Moltmann does not arrive at this on the basis of 
rejecting Chalcedon but he rejects Chalcedon on this basis, i.e., the suffering of God that 
he sees in the cross. There remain some ambiguities in Moltmann’s christology that 
might be clarified with reference to Chalcedon, and his rejection of the council is 
potentially unhelpful for an ecumenical Christianity.186 However, besides these 
reasons, I do not deem this rejection to be of central importance in assessing the 
validity of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. 
4.4. Is Passibility a Possibility? A Critical Assessment of Moltmann’s 
Arguments for Divine Suffering 
Moltmann advocates for divine passibility on the basis of the centrality of the cross to 
the doctrine of the Trinity, the nature of divine love, and theodicy.187 
4.4.1. The Centrality of the Cross 
Earlier I examined the centrality of the cross in Moltmann’s methodology and 
proposed that even in CG Moltmann does not reduce everything to the cross.188 
Especially in light of his whole corpus, it is clear that other aspects of the biblical 
narrative such as eschatology and divine love, which are certainly also informed by the 
cross, guide his theological project. Moreover, Moltmann’s theologia crucis 
methodology requires commitment to a critical theology. Insofar as the doctrine of 
divine impassibility functions in a way contrary to the gospel, as a theologia gloriae, it 
must be rejected. It therefore cannot be separated from his argument from theodicy, 
because for Moltmann it is theism that distances God from suffering on the basis of the 
limitations of finite being. 
                                                        
186 See Mark S. G. Nestlehutt, “Chalcedonian Christology: Modern Criticism and Contemporary 
Ecumenism,” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 35:2 (1998): 175-196. Elsewhere Moltmann demonstrates 
ecumenical spirit, such as in his willingness to provide a mediating perspective on the filioque for East 
and West (TKG, 178-187). Nonetheless, a rejection of Chalcedon may entail an entirely different 
ecumenism, a solidarity with those who have been historically marginalised by Christendom and the 
imperial church (WJC, 53-55). 
187 See subsection 1.5.2. above. This is, at least, what Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 47-53 
claims, and I agree with him. There are other factors which have influenced theology’s turn to the 
suffering God (Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 392-394, provides a short but comprehensive 
account), though it is these three that are most prominent in Moltmann’s theology. 
188 See section 3.1. above. 
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However, the necessity of developing a theology of divine suffering from the 
cross is disputed by Vanhoozer. Theology after Karl Barth has seen a welcome return 
to the basis for the doctrine of God in special revelation, i.e., in the person of Christ. 
Nonetheless, “While a christological concentration is entirely appropriate… a 
christological reduction is not.”189 In making the cross a central feature not only of 
revelation but of the divine nature also, Moltmann risks this kind of christological 
reduction. According to Vanhoozer, there are two major problems with this. First, it 
misunderstands the cross: “What is ‘new’ about the new covenant is its intensity and 
scope: it is more wonderful, and glorious, than Israel had imagined because it includes 
the Gentiles and because it is fulfilled unilaterally (graciously) by God himself.”190 
There is no newness on the divine side, from whom all new things come. Second, 
Vanhoozer claims that a consistent commitment to this starting point requires that 
every feature of the cross be transferred in some way to the divine nature. But this 
makes for questionable results: “Does the incarnate life of Jesus reveal that God is a 
sleeper (because Jesus sleeps)?”191 This second point is distracting though because it 
overlooks the centrality of Jesus’ passion in Scripture. That he also slept and did other 
things was more or less assumed by the writers of the New Testament! Moltmann 
proceeds from the basis that if the cross is central to divine revelation, and on the cross 
we see the suffering Christ, then surely this suffering must reveal something more of 
God than the tradition allows. 
But the major fault of the christological reduction of which Moltmann is 
potentially guilty is that it misses the canonical or biblical-theological context in which 
we encounter the crucified Christ. It stakes everything on this one event, omitting to 
speak of Scripture’s variegated witness to the God of Israel. That is, “Jesus is the center 
of the Scriptures, but we only appreciate the center as a center in light of the broader 
context.”192 Although Moltmann’s main focus in CG is on New Testament texts relating 
to the cross, he certainly situates his proposals within this broader context. His 
eschatological reversal of time, for example, draws upon his early doctrine of God in 
TH, which relies heavily on the eschatology of the Hebrew Bible (TH, sections I and II). 
                                                        
189 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 418, emphasis original. 
190 Ibid., 418-419. 




What Vanhoozer’s critique of christological reduction helpfully points out here, 
however, is that Scripture does not require that the cross be placed at the centre of the 
doctrine of God in such a way that would make the doctrine of divine impassibility 
irrelevant and even heretical. Indeed, as I will show in chapter six, Hans Urs von 
Balthasar provides a possible solution to this problem, situating the cross in the centre 
of the Trinity, as Moltmann does, without compromising the distinction between God 
and creation. 
4.4.2. The Nature of Divine Love 
Moltmann’s second contention, that if God is love then he must suffer because it is in 
love’s nature to suffer, also requires attention.193 Paul Molnar accuses Moltmann of 
substituting the doctrine of the immanent Trinity for a “panentheistic principle of 
suffering love discovered in a relational metaphysics.”194 Yet if this is the case then the 
question might also be asked what philosophical principles traditional Christianity 
draws on to elucidate its doctrine of the immanent Trinity. This counterclaim is 
highlighted well by Bauckham: 
[W]hereas the tradition of metaphysical theism held that purely active 
benevolence was the only kind of human love which has an analogy in God, the 
cross requires us to say that it is human suffering love to which God’s love is 
analogous.195 
That is, the basis for this particular concept of divine love to which Moltmann 
subscribes is in the cross, rather than what he identifies as theism, and certainly not an 
anthropologically derived principle of love apart from the cross. 
                                                        
193 This argument is often made by divine passibilists. See, for example, Paul Fiddes, The 
Creative Suffering of God (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), 16-26: 
[I]f God is not less than personal, and if the claim that ‘God is love’ is to have any recognizable 
continuity with our normal experience of love, the conclusion seems inescapable that a loving 
God must be a sympathetic and therefore suffering God (17). 
See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Suffering Love,” in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. Thomas V. 
Morris, 196-237 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988): 
The fact that the biblical writers speak of God as rejoicing and suffering over the state of the 
creation is not a superficial eliminable feature of their speech… God’s love for the world is a 
rejoicing and suffering love. The picture of God as a Stoic sage, ever blissful and nonsuffering, 
is in deep conflict with the biblical picture (227). 
194 Molnar, Divine Freedom, 215. 
195 Bauckham, Theology of Moltmann, 65. 
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But it is exactly this which is the problem, as Bauckham goes on to write. I cited 
a number of Moltmann’s readers earlier in this thesis who had identified language as 
an issue in his theology. Specifically, John Webster suggested that this results from 
Moltmann’s panentheistic confusion of finite and infinite being.196 Although it is on the 
basis of the cross that Moltmann claims divine love is analogous to human love here, it 
is difficult to see how he intends to distinguish these two loves. A strong distinction is 
provided by the tradition, to which Vanhoozer subscribes. As he writes of divine 
compassion, the feature of love to which he draws our attention, “It is not a 
commiserating but a commanding, effectual compassion that does not share but 
transforms the sufferer’s situation.”197 Compassion is thus “less a passion than a 
power.”198 God really loves human beings on the basis of the love which he is in 
eternity. But this is such a love that can never be perturbed by the sufferings of 
creatures. Rather, it seeks their good by offering them the only possible redemption 
from this suffering in a God who cannot suffer.199 As noted above, Moltmann to an 
extent acknowledges the validity of this position (CG, 269-270). Nonetheless, this only 
provides an alternative way of conceptualising divine love. Moltmann’s claims that the 
centrality of the cross and the nature of divine love require a theology of divine 
passibility must be seen together with his argument from theodicy. 
4.4.3. Theodicy 
Moltmann’s third argument is from theodicy. Theism holds to the doctrine of divine 
impassibility to secure redemption from the limitations of finite being. Yet in so doing 
it offers a vision of redemption which effectively denies the reality of human suffering. 
The trinitarian God of the cross, however, constitutes himself in this suffering and 
protests with human beings against it. Redemption is not simply from suffering but it 
is a redemption that participates in suffering and nonetheless goes beyond it. 
                                                        
196 Webster, “Jürgen Moltmann,” 6. See subsection 3.3.6. above. 
197 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 446. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 160, also makes the point that while human love often passes 
through suffering, “suffering itself is not a constitutive element of love.” That is, we can imagine a love 
which consists in self-giving but occurs in such a context that self-giving does not lead to suffering. 




Engaging with Moltmann’s argument requires making some preliminary 
comments concerning the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity, 
which I will treat in greater depth in the following chapter. 
In a critical article responding to contemporary divine passibilists, David 
Bentley Hart suggests what is at stake in such a position. Following Heidegger, Hart 
contends that divine passibility threatens the distinction between finite and infinite 
being: 
[O]ne is identifying being with a being among beings, one's God is an ontic God, 
who becomes what he is not, possessed of potential, receiving his being from 
elsewhere—from being. And, as a being, he is in some sense finite, divided 
between being and being this, and so cannot be the being of creatures, even 
though he is their cause.200 
For Hart, divine passibility confuses this distinction in that the finite acts upon the 
infinite, even if such action is allowed by the infinite. The infinite is both grounded in 
itself and it is the ground of finite being. If the finite acts upon it then it too is just 
another configuration of finite being, regardless of how much “larger” it may be. This 
results in a number of problems. First, as finite being God cannot be the ground of 
creaturely existence. There would have to be something greater than him which is both 
his ground and the ground of creaturely existence. Moltmann may then be referring to 
something but that something cannot be the God of Scripture, beyond whom there is 
nothing greater. And such a God cannot offer redemption: “if the nature of God's love 
can be in any sense positively shaped by sin, suffering, and death, then sin, suffering, 
and death will always be in some sense features of who he is.” Divine love is contingent 
on creaturely being to realise itself and is thus “inherently deficient, and in itself a 
fundamentally reactive reality.”201 As Karl Rahner once said in an interview, “To put it 
crudely, it does not help me to escape from my mess and mix-up and despair if God is 
in the same predicament.”202 
                                                        
200 Hart, “No Shadow,” 190. 
201 Ibid., 191. 
202 Karl Rahner, Karl Rahner in Dialogue 1965-1982, ed. Paul Imhof and Hubert Biallowons, 
trans. by Harvey D. Egan (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 126-127, cited in HTG, 122. Castelo, 
“Moltmann’s Dismissal,” 403, goes one step further, attributing the lack of soteriological value in 
Moltmann’s proposal to his speculative methodology. Divine passibility (specifically, the suffering of 
the Father) “adds paltry little to notions of redemption and reconciliation which Moltmann all too 
often de-emphasises and puts to the side in his doctrine of God.” However, this critique overlooks the 
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This again raises the question of to what extent post-biblical philosophical 
frameworks can be presupposed in theology. As Paul Fiddes writes, in Barthian 
parlance, “if we object that an infinite God cannot encompass the finite then we are 
simply showing our ‘pagan’ and idolatrous outlook in denying God’s freedom to be 
what he wills to be.”203 Yet if Moltmann and Fiddes adopt alternative presuppositions 
to better follow what they read in Scripture, the counter-question of to what extent 
these presuppositions are coherent must also be asked. 
One distinctive of the tradition which Moltmann maintains is God’s active 
suffering. God never suffers unwillingly but only insofar as he allows it (CG, 229-230). 
However, whereas the tradition ascribes God’s active suffering to God in Christ so that 
he suffers as a human being but not in such a way that would compromise his 
sovereignty, i.e., in involuntary suffering, Moltmann maintains that God suffers actively 
and yet that he does so not just as a human being but as God. He upholds God’s 
omnipotence, unlike process theology.204 But on the middle ground which Moltmann 
seeks to control here it is difficult to see how the strengths of either position can be 
upheld together. As soon as passibilism ranges into the territory of active suffering it 
begins to compromise itself. As Anastasia Scrutton suggests, “it seems to be an integral 
aspect of suffering that we do not have control over our suffering, and that we do not 
choose to suffer.”205 Similarly, Marc Steen ponders, “If God’s ‘suffering’ is as specific 
                                                        
inseparability of soteriology and the doctrine of the Trinity for Moltmann. See subsection 1.5.5. of this 
thesis for comment on the soteriological value of his proposal. 
203 Fiddes, Creative Suffering, 64. 
204 E.g., David Ray Griffin, “Process Theology,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn, 159-166, 2nd ed. (West Sussex: Blackwell, 2010), 
161, summarises Alfred Whitehead’s philosophy: 
Evil can occur in the world because God, while influencing all events, fully determines no 
events. Each event is necessarily influenced by its past world as well as by God, and each 
actual entity is partly self-determining, even vis-à-vis divine agency… [C]reaturely freedom is 
rooted not in a voluntary self-limitation by God but in the very nature of things… This 
naturalistic theism entails that God cannot occasionally violate the normal causal 
relationships. 
205 Anastasia Scrutton, “Living Like the Common People: Emotion, Will, and Divine Passibility,” 
Religious Studies 45:4 (2009): 373-393 (388). Scrutton goes on to dispute this connection, giving 
examples of those who suffer voluntary but who, nonetheless, suffer! For her, voluntary suffering has 
value when it is undertaken with the right motivations. However, this claim misses the fundamental 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary suffering. Although the voluntary sufferer indeed 
suffers and does so for the good of others, they can never experience suffering in the same way as 
those who suffer involuntarily. That is, although their suffering may indeed even be greater, e.g., in 
terms of physical pain, they cannot choose to experience involuntary suffering. This is significant 
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and ‘active’ as Moltmann says, is the term ‘suffering’ still relevant?”206 If God were 
really to take on human suffering in this sense and reign victorious over it in Christ 
then he would have had to have been always subject to suffering. It is impossible to 
freely take on that which is essentially involuntary. Process theology can certainly 
affirm this kind of divine suffering because, unlike Moltmann’s theology, its subject is 
not the God of Jesus Christ. So, too, traditional notions of God’s suffering in the flesh 
avoid this because, as with Vanhoozer cited above, the purpose of divine compassion 
is not to experience human suffering but to overcome it.207 Moltmann could go the way 
of process theology, but then there would be no certain hope for deliverance from 
suffering because such a suffering would threaten the possibility of God’s ultimate 
victory over it. Otherwise Moltmann could go the way of the tradition, but this would 
require that his proposals be radically adjusted. Thus, despite maintaining the reality 
of redemption while rejecting the theistic distinction between infinite and finite being, 
such a commitment is compromised by a logical problem in Moltmann’s alternative 
doctrine of the Trinity. 
The second claim Hart makes is that if suffering is attributed to the ground of 
all existence then it becomes difficult to maintain its contingent character. Rather, all 
sufferings “will turn out to be moments in the identity of God, resonances within the 
event of his being, aspects of the occurrence of his essence: all evil will become 
meaningful.” But, this would be a “monstrous irony… if, in our eagerness to find a way 
of believing in God's love in the age of Auschwitz, we should in fact succeed only in 
describing a God who is the metaphysical ground of Auschwitz.”208 While this is 
certainly a danger for any passibilism, at least in CG Moltmann avoids making suffering 
(and the evil from which many sufferings proceed) necessary simply because he does 
not claim that it is necessary. In his eschatological orientation he avoids making any 
                                                        
because there is some level of unbridgeablity between the being of the sufferer and that of the active 
sufferer. 
206 Steen, “Moltmann’s Critical Reception,” 306. 
207 Heb 4:15 should not be a problem here. In the same place the author explicitly 
differentiates Jesus from other human beings in that he was without sin. If Jesus can be without sin and 
nonetheless face real temptation, then he can also be distinct from other human beings in actively 
suffering because the voluntariness of his suffering is not essential to his overcoming of it. Cf. Kevin 
DeYoung, “Divine Impassibility and the Passion of Christ in the Book of Hebrews,” Westminster 
Theological Journal 68:1 (2006): 41-50 (47-50).  
208 Hart, “No Shadow,” 192. 
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claims about the source of suffering and instead focusses on its abolition in the future 
of God’s kingdom. Suffering afflicts human beings in the present but on the cross the 
coming God and the resurrected Son, for whom there is no suffering and in whom is 
humanity’s only hope to one day overcome all suffering, have come into this present 
and nonetheless subjected themselves to suffering. Moltmann addresses the fact of 
suffering and looks to a time when that fact will be no longer. In CG he does not attempt 
to give this fact meaning or purpose, let alone necessity. 
It is to Moltmann’s claims in TKG, however, that Hart’s critique must be applied. 
Before the creation of the world, the love of the Father for the Son must209 go beyond 
itself to love not just its like but its Other. Yet suffering arises out of the freedom given 
to its Other, a suffering in which God willingly partakes so that creation may have 
redemption in his redemption (TKG, 57-60). The chief problem with this claim is that 
by making creation necessary to divine love and suffering necessary to the freedom 
given to creation it cannot avoid the conclusion that sufferings, such as Auschwitz, 
serve some eschatological purpose in the panentheistic God-world relation. That is, 
creation must take place so that God’s love can be complete, and it will suffer if it is free 
because it is not God and therefore it will misuse its freedom. The eschatological 
kingdom in which creation participates in the trinitarian fellowship cannot be 
consummated apart from these sufferings because finite freedom must run its course 
as finite freedom for it to be finite freedom before God redirects it to its source in him 
and it becomes transformed freedom. If Moltmann had understood the act of creation 
as contingent on God’s free choice rather than necessary, the force of this problem 
would be mitigated.210 Regarding the problem of suffering, the starting point in CG is 
preferable because here Moltmann assumes that the question of the source (and 
                                                        
209 This, however, is a qualified must. See subsection 5.2.3. below. 
210 Moltmann does draw attention to a mysticism of the cross that would eternalise suffering: 
To submerge oneself mystically in the dying torments of the crucified Jesus would mean 
giving these torments eternal validity if the submergence were not bound up with a hidden, 
inner, joyful exaltation of the risen and transfigured Christ. A theology of the cross without the 
resurrection is hell itself (TKG, 41-42). 




therefore possible purpose) of suffering is irrelevant to the sufferer. Their concern is 
not with explanation but liberation.211 
The risk in this, however, is that of evil taking on “a certain independent 
authenticity, a reality with which God must come to grips.”212 This is a problem because 
again God’s absolute transcendence and sovereignty would be compromised. But 
Moltmann affirms the possibility of redemption in an alternative conception of divine 
transcendence. The strength of his position is that he also sees in the cross God’s 
participation in the questioning of or protest against suffering. The extent of the 
victim’s suffering is not brushed aside as something inconsequential to God. God 
himself feels the force of the meaninglessness of suffering. Nonetheless, as suggested 
above, it is difficult to see how Moltmann can maintain this if he also wants to maintain 
that God suffers actively. 
4.5. Enmity between Father and Son? 
A distinctive of Moltmann’s theology in CG is his attribution of “enmity” to the 
relationship between Father and Son in the crucifixion: 
The abandonment on the cross which separates the Son from the Father is 
something which takes place within God himself; it is stasis within God—‘God 
against God’—particularly if we are to maintain that Jesus bore witness to and 
lived out the truth of God. We must not allow ourselves to overlook this ‘enmity’ 
between God and God by failing to take seriously either the rejection of Jesus by 
God, the gospel of God which he lived out, or his last cry to God upon the cross 
(CG, 151-152). 
Moltmann’s intention here is clearly poetic and polemical. As Helen Bergin suggests, 
such “bald statements attributed to God’s rejection are meant to disturb, in order that 
the horror of Jesus’ death may be realised and that Jesus’ God may be seen to be directly 
involved.”213 However, such striking language implies that God not only takes on 
creaturely suffering in the crucifixion but evil as well! If this is not the case, at least the 
                                                        
211 In the last thirty years, theology has seen an increased interest in “antitheodicy” positions, 
those which reject any attempt at a theodicy on moral grounds. This is what I see at work in CG. For a 
short critical overview of some recent antitheodicy literature see Robert Mark Simpson, “Moral 
Antitheodicy: Prospects and Problems,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65:3 (2009): 
153-169. 
212 Hart, “No Shadow,” 191. 
213 Helen Bergin, O.P., “The Death of Jesus and Its Impact on God – Jürgen Moltmann and 
Edward Schillebeeckx,” Irish Theological Quarterly 52:3 (1986): 193-211 (196).” 
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apparent love in unity between Father and Son in the crucifixion, which Moltmann 
elsewhere adamantly defends, seems to be at stake in such a claim. In the later WJC, 
Moltmann explicitly addresses this: “In the New Testament the Father of Jesus Christ 
is always on Jesus’ side, never on the side of the people who crucified him; for he is 
Israel’s God, not Jupiter, the god of the Romans” (WJC, 176). While some theologians in 
history have suggested that with regard to the cross, “God wishes Jesus to die in this 
way” so that “Betrayer, judges and executioners are doing to Jesus what God charges 
them to do, so that he may die,” Moltmann responds, “This is not an answer at all. It is 
blasphemy, for a monster like this is not God” (WJC, 177). It is ironic then that 
Moltmann’s suggestion of intra-trinitarian enmity in CG seems to flirt with such a 
blasphemy. 
Moltmann probably included this in CG for soteriological reasons. Divine love 
does not overcome human sin and injustice by force. Rather, in the midst of sin and 
injustice it overcomes them in submission to them. This is the enmity to which Christ 
submits on the cross and overcomes through the love of the Father for the Son, 
expressed in the resurrection. Divine love “cannot prohibit slavery and enmity, but 
must suffer this contradiction, and can only take upon itself grief at this contradiction 
and the grief of protest against it, and manifest this grief in protest” (CG, 248). The 
enmity between Father and Son is not then a divine enmity to match the enmities of 
this world. Instead, it is Christ suffering the human enmity of the crucifixion against 
which he cries out to the one who has allowed him to undergo such an evil (though he 
himself has also willingly taken up this suffering). Nonetheless, this concept of intra-
divine enmity can be confusing and misleading, especially where it implies either God’s 
taking on of evil or an opposition between Father and Son. Moltmann would have done 
well to address these issues before characterising the crucifixion as such. 
4.6. Conclusion 
I began this chapter by defining what Moltmann means by divine suffering. Whereas 
many divine passibilists advocate a divine passibility in which God’s feelings are 
affected by the world, Moltmann goes further to say that God undergoes a change in 
nature in relation to the world. Two other terms, patripassianism and theopaschitism, 
are inaccurate descriptors of Moltmann’s theology. The first denotes a form of 
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modalism and the second presupposes the Chalcedonian christology which Moltmann 
rejects. 
I then looked at Moltmann’s adherence to a form of what Gavrilyuk names the 
“Theory of Theology’s Fall into Hellenistic Philosophy.” Gavrilyuk rejects the theory 
because it misunderstands patristic motivations for the development of the doctrine 
of divine impassibility. But, like Gavrilyuk, Moltmann does not oversimplify Hellenistic 
philosophy or the biblical narrative. He also recognises the positive role divine 
impassibility played in the tradition, and attempts to remain faithful to the biblical 
witness to God’s transcendence. However, elsewhere Moltmann makes more 
generalised statements that do not help his case, and neither are his dismissive 
references to theism and monotheism particularly helpful. 
Moltmann rejects the Chalcedonian christology of two natures in one person 
because it arose out of an a priori commitment to divine impassibility. His contention 
holds true in looking at the debate between Cyril and Nestorius, and the context of the 
Chalcedonian Definition. But regardless of the context in which the conclusions of 
Chalcedon were formed, it seems odd that Moltmann would want to rid his theology of 
a framework that brings clarity to christology. He certainly wants to uphold the full 
humanity and divinity of Christ, and he takes pains to do so. Nonetheless, while it 
remains ambiguous just how Moltmann envisages this, apart from the obstacles his 
rejection might provide for an ecumenical theology this is not a major problem for his 
doctrine of the Trinity. 
Next, I assessed the basis on which Moltmann argues for divine passibility. For 
his first two claims I provided impassibilist alternatives to show that it was not 
necessary to follow him here. First, impassibilists affirm the central importance of the 
cross for the doctrine of the Trinity without conceding divine suffering. For them it is 
one aspect of whole biblical witness to God. Second, impassibilists maintain divine love 
in such a way that upholds divine impassibility. God’s compassion manifests not in 
suffering with creation (though he does suffer with creation as a human being in 
Christ) but in delivering creation out of its sufferings. But Moltmann’s claims must be 
seen together. His third argument is from theodicy. Those who suffer can only find 
hope in the trinitarian God of the cross who suffers in love for humanity. However, 
while there may be room for alternative conceptions of divine transcendence, such as 
that to which Moltmann holds in commending divine passibility, it is difficult to see 
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how he can maintain both that God actively suffers with his creation, lest suffering is 
greater than him, and that God really identifies with the problem of suffering, which is 
involuntary for human beings. A second possible problem, that Moltmann’s theology 
eternalises suffering and makes it necessary, is generally avoided in CG but not so much 
in TKG in Moltmann’s nascent doctrine of creation. 
Finally, I examined Moltmann’s attribution of enmity to the relationship 
between Father and Son in the crucifixion. While it is unlikely that he intends a real 
enmity here (it is just the Father’s and the Son’s experience of the world’s enmity), the 
poetic and polemical context of this assertion and Moltmann’s lack of explanation 
might mislead his readers to think that God takes on evil or that the love between 
Father and Son is displaced by enmity. 
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5. Maze Rahner: Navigating the Labyrinth of Rahner’s Rule in 
Moltmann’s Doctrine of the Trinity 
 
Following Karl Rahner, Moltmann affirms, “The economic Trinity is the immanent 
Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity” (CG, 240). Yet others who 
have followed Rahner have reached different conclusions for the doctrine of the 
Trinity. Moltmann is, in Fred Sanders’s terms, a “radicalizer” of Rahner’s rule, 
developing its “implications in the direction of the closest possible identity between 
economic and immanent Trinity.”214 Conversely, “restricters” often acknowledge the 
legitimacy of Rahner’s rule in emphasising the connection between economic and 
immanent Trinity, but “maintain a sharper conceptual distinction” between them 
when interpreting the rule.215 This distinction, to which Moltmann does not hold, can 
be stated as such: “The economic Trinity is the ground of cognition for the ontological 
[i.e., immanent] Trinity, and the ontological Trinity is the ground of being for the 
economic Trinity.”216 In this case the identity between economic and immanent 
Trinity, as well as their traditional asymmetry, is upheld. Before addressing 
Moltmann’s radical reading of Rahner, it is necessary to clarify a distinctive feature of 
his construal of the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity. 
5.1. Moltmann’s Eschatological-Historical Ambiguity 
5.1.1. The Problem 
In a widely cited article, Roger Olson contends that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity 
inadequately assumes a particular relationship between eschatology and history. He 
interprets Moltmann’s statement, “When everything is ‘in God’ and ‘God is all in all’, 
                                                        
214 Fred Sanders, The Image of the Immanent Trinity: Rahner’s Rule and the Theological 
Interpretation of Scripture (New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 6. In the former category, Sanders includes 
Piet Schoonenberg, Hans Küng, Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Robert Jenson, and Catherine 
Mowry LaCugna. In the latter he includes Yves Congar, Walter Kasper, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Thomas 
Torrance and Paul Molnar. For a short historical overview, see ibid., 15-46 and Chung-Hyun Baik, The 
Holy Trinity – God for God and God for Us: Seven Positions on the Immanent-Economic Trinity Relation in 
Contemporary Trinitarian Theology (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), 21-61. 
215 Sanders, Image of the Immanent Trinity, 6. 
216 Seung Goo Lee, “The Relationship between the Ontological Trinity and the Immanent 
Trinity,” Journal of Reformed Theology 3:1 (2009): 90-107 (92). Puzzlingly, Lee does not associate this 
position with Barth, but groups Barth instead with Rahner, Moltmann, and Jüngel (97). 
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then the economic Trinity is raised into and transcended in the immanent Trinity” 
(TKG, 161), to mean, “the immanent Trinity properly belongs to the future.”217 As such, 
“this future kingdom of Glory is the ‘locus’ of the Trinity in immanence and thus both 
the outcome of the economic, historical trinitarian process and the power which gives 
it its ultimate validity.”218 Olson understands that Moltmann situates the immanent 
Trinity in the future and the economic Trinity in history. But this innovation is 
problematic: “if the immanent Trinity is conceived as future, and thus not a completed 
reality at any point in the historical process of the divine life… how does it ‘primarily 
determine’ that process and life?”219 Sanders extends Olson’s critique, noting,  
This could be something of a shell game, which begins by asserting some kind 
of priority for the immanent Trinity but ends by putting the immanent Trinity 
on the receiving end of the action in a twofold sense, thus eliminating 
reciprocity.220 
In place of this ambiguity, Olson suggests that Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity could 
be improved with recourse to something like Wolfhart Pannenberg’s concept of the 
“ontological priority of the future,” i.e., “the concept of the future's determination of 
every present without destruction of the real contingency and historicality of the 
present.”221 
5.1.2. The Immanent-Economic Distinction and the Trinity in Protology, 
History, and Eschatology 
While Moltmann’s presentation of the relationship between immanent and economic 
Trinity in TKG is sufficiently ambiguous to lend itself to such readings, his thinking is 
also more complicated than Olson and Sanders suggest. In a 1977 collection of essays, 
Moltmann differentiates between what he terms “protological” and “eschatological” 
approaches to the Trinity (FC, 86). The protological approach, which characterises 
traditional Western theology, infers from the economic sendings of the Son and the 
Spirit their origin in the immanent Trinity. In contrast, the eschatological approach 
                                                        
217 Roger Olson, “Trinity and Eschatology: The Historical Being of God in Jürgen Moltmann and 
Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Scottish Journal of Theology 36:2 (1983): 213-227 (219). 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid., 221. 
220 Sanders, Image of the Immanent Trinity, 95. 
221 Olson, “Trinity and Eschatology,” 222-223. 
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infers from the future identity of the trinitarian persons their identity in relation to us 
in the present. Moltmann has here gone further than he did in CG, now affirming the 
validity of not only the eschatological but the traditional approach as well, which 
investigates the eternal origins of the economic Trinity. Nonetheless, it must be 
emphasised that Moltmann’s understanding of the protological life of the Trinity 
differs significantly from the traditional approach in that “in the sending of the Son and 
the Spirit the Trinity issues from itself… [I]t not only reveals what is within it but also 
opens itself for history and experience” (FC, 86). God’s constitution in history begins 
with the creation of the world. 
This distinction between protology and eschatology is implied throughout TKG. 
Moltmann notes that for Paul, “The temporally marked beginning of Jesus’ ministry as 
‘the Son of God in power’ and the statements about the pre-existence of the Son… stand 
side by side, without any attempt to reconcile them” (TKG, 87). Indeed, as Douglas 
Farrow observes, for Moltmann “a ‘primordial’ Trinity (God open to the world) is 
perfected via the economy (God suffering with the world) into an eternal or doxological 
Trinity (God glorified in the world).”222 Here protological and eschatological are not 
merely different approaches to understanding the Trinity. These, along with the 
middle term, the divine economy, constitute a threefold structure of distinct stages in 
the life of the Trinity. This is complicated, though, by the non-linearity of these stages. 
For example, “Jesus is risen into the coming kingdom of God. Jesus is risen into the 
innermost being of God himself. He has been exalted into the divine origin of the Holy 
Spirit” (TKG, 88). Moltmann maintains that the economic mission of the Spirit is 
grounded in the Spirit’s intra-trinitarian procession from the Father of the Son,223 but 
here claims that the procession itself is inseparable from the Son’s resurrection. That 
Moltmann sees the procession as eternal (and contingent on the Son’s eternal sonship) 
is clear in his discussion of the filioque: “The Father is in all eternity solely the Father 
of the Son… The procession of the Spirit from the Father therefore has as its premise 
the generation of the Son through the Father in eternity” (TKG, 183). The Spirit 
                                                        
222 Farrow, “Systematic Contributions,” 436. Cf. Moltmann, FC, 92, “Between the Trinity in its 
origins before time and the eschatological Trinity at the end of time lies the whole history of God’s 
dealings with man and creation.” 
223 For Moltmann, in his contribution to the filioque problem, the Spirit proceeds neither from 
the Father alone nor from the Father and the Son but from the Father of the Son (TKG, 185). 
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proceeds both protologically, from the eternal Father of the Son, and eschatologically, 
from the Father of the risen Son. 
Before attempting to see how Moltmann can say this, it is important to clarify 
what he intends to convey. Because Moltmann refers not only to the protological but 
the eschatological stage as immanent Trinity, a terrain which traditionally belongs to 
the doctrine of the economic Trinity, it is unclear exactly where in this threefold schema 
he intends to situate immanent and economic Trinity. Certainly his insistence on the 
identity of immanent with economic Trinity requires that this dual immanent Trinity, 
protological and eschatological, must not be read as Moltmann simply introducing a 
third factor, the eschatological, into the traditional dualism of protological immanent 
and historical economic Trinity so that there are now two immanent Trinities, one 
either side of economic. Moltmann rejects the traditional concept of the immanent 
Trinity insofar as it is “a closed circle of perfect being in heaven” (CG, 255). Thus, 
protologically, God is immanent Trinity because creation has not “yet” taken place. 
Nonetheless, creation will take place and there is no God before the foundation of the 
world who will not create. Historically, God is immanent Trinity because Father, Son, 
and Spirit have their own life which transcends the history that takes place in this life. 
However, as this life is recognised through doxology, the Spirit who gives this 
recognition also further constitutes Father and Son through the praises of believers. 
Eschatologically, God is immanent Trinity as the culmination of his acts in history when 
“the economic Trinity is raised into and transcended in the immanent Trinity” (TKG, 
161). The difference between history and eschatology here, then, is not that the latter 
grounds the former. God is already transcendent in a particular way in history. He does 
not primarily determine history from the future. The future has not yet taken place. 
But he determines history in his own historical trinitarian relations who are 
nonetheless transcendent to the historical process of the world. Moltmann variously 
links God’s transcendence in history to God’s protological or eschatological life, but he 
sometimes simply presupposes it without reference to protology or eschatology, and 
he certainly never situates it exclusively in God’s eschatological life. 
Moltmann’s association of God’s eschatological life with the immanent Trinity 
can be understood in two ways. First, it underscores his thoroughgoing emphasis on 
the unity of immanent and economic Trinity. Because from eternity God opens himself 
to be conditioned by creation, creation’s eschatological inclusion in the Trinity can be 
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called inclusion in the immanent Trinity. God as immanent Trinity is never without this 
openness so that when this openness is answered with his redemption of creation he 
does not retreat into being a God apart from creation. The inclusion of creation in him 
is in keeping with the nature of his being, one that has always been open to inclusion. 
Second, as in traditional accounts of the immanent Trinity, God in his protological life 
is the ground of creation’s possibility and its redemption. Moltmann also situates this 
in God’s eschatological life. In the earlier FC, he addresses the relationship between the 
present and the future, a relationship he seems to presuppose in TKG. In answer to the 
question, “Does the present determine the future, or does the future determine the 
present?” (FC, 20-31), Moltmann concludes that both configurations are evident in the 
New Testament. Thus the New Testament speaks of God’s power in the present 
stretching into and determining the future. Paul can “argue soteriologically… in order 
to deduce the power of Christ’s resurrection from the power of his passion in 
justification and the reconciliation of man” (FC, 30). The New Testament also speaks of 
God’s eschatological power coming into the present to inaugurate the coming kingdom 
ahead of its consummation. Nonetheless, Moltmann sees priority given by the New 
Testament to this latter relationship, by which any present determination on the future 
is “comprehended and enclosed.” As such, “It is only out of the historical descent from 
the future to the present that the converse soteriological descent from the present to 
the future acquires its quickening power” (FC, 31).224 Moltmann employs similar 
reasoning in CG: 
In terms of history and its sense of time, Jesus first died and was then raised. In 
eschatological terms the last becomes the first: he died as the risen Christ and 
was made flesh as the one who was to come (CG, 184). 
On the one hand, Christ’s eschatological sonship has priority in that it reveals who he 
is in the crucifixion. On the other hand, God in history has priority as the trinitarian 
persons constitute themselves in the crucifixion, a constitution that continues in 
various ways until the consummation of the kingdom. 
In TKG, Moltmann can thus refer to God’s eschatological life as immanent 
Trinity: “Anyone who sees the risen Christ is looking in advance into the coming glory 
                                                        
224 Moltmann returns to the relationship between historical and eschatological determination 
in his mature CoG, 22-29. 
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of God” (TKG, 85) and the “presence of the Spirit is the presence of future glory” (TKG, 
125). But he also wants to affirm the priority of God’s acts in history to his being: “The 
economic Trinity not only reveals the immanent Trinity; it also has a retroactive effect 
on it” (TKG, 160). “The pain of the cross determines the inner life of God from eternity 
to eternity” (TKG, 161). To complicate things further, elsewhere the protological life of 
the Trinity appears to be the ground of the cross event, as it is in traditional doctrines 
of the Trinity. Creation “springs from the Father’s love for the Son and is redeemed by 
the answering love of the Son for the Father” (TKG, 59). “The Father loves the Son with 
engendering, fatherly love. The Son loves the Father with responsive, self-giving love.” 
Therefore, “the Son’s sacrifice of boundless love on Golgotha is from eternity already 
included in the exchange of the essential, the consubstantial love which constitutes the 
divine life of the Trinity” (TKG, 168, emphasis added). Here the love of God on the cross 
is first the love between Father and Son in eternity. In this sense, the cross does not so 
much retroactively affect the Trinity as it does reveal the love which is already there 
from eternity. 
In presenting conflicting accounts of protological, historical, and eschatological 
priority in God, Moltmann may well be following a pattern he finds in Paul, who, 
according to Moltmann, also employs conflicting approaches to identifying God 
“without any attempt to reconcile them,” as cited above. This would be fine if 
Moltmann’s statements regarding the constitution of the trinitarian persons in the 
crucifixion and resurrection were merely epistemological. Certainly Moltmann 
understands the resurrection to play an epistemological role. As Richard Bauckham 
writes, “The recognition of God's eschatological action in raising Jesus requires us to 
understand God as active in the cross of Jesus.”225 But Moltmann also explicitly assigns 
ontological import to this eschatological reversal, which the above exposition of FC 
demonstrates. Indeed, J. Matthew Bonzo reads Moltmann’s comments on “the reversal 
of the noetic and ontic orders” in the resurrection (CG, 184) to mean “Noetically, the 
experience of the cross has chronological priority… Ontically, the experience of the 
resurrection has a logical priority.”226 For Moltmann, God determines his being in the 
non-linear protological, historical, and eschatological stages of his life. It is in the 
                                                        
225 Bauckham, “Moltmann’s Eschatology,” 304. 
226 J. Matthew Bonzo, Indwelling the Forsaken Other: The Trinitarian Ethics of Jürgen Moltmann 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 56. 
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middle term, the historical, where the dialectic of protological and eschatological is 
worked out. From the point of the cross, Moltmann’s use of “retroactive” (TKG, 160) 
invokes the protological Trinity. In emphasising the priority of the cross, Moltmann 
underscores the extent of God’s love in constituting himself in history. God’s love is 
such that he identifies with the godless by becoming godless himself. Conversely, in 
emphasising the priority of the eternal love, Moltmann underscores the meaning of the 
cross event as the overflowing of God’s intra-trinitarian love. 
5.1.3. Assessment: The Missing Dialectic 
Olson’s critique falls down where it misunderstands the distinction between immanent 
and economic Trinity in TKG. For Moltmann, “The thesis about the fundamental 
identity of the immanent and the economic Trinity of course remains open to 
misunderstanding as long as we cling to the distinction at all” (TKG, 160). This means 
that for Moltmann not only can God allow himself to be determined by his creation, as 
Olson acknowledges, but he remains transcendent at every stage in the historical 
process because he is the one who allows himself to be determined. 
It remains, however, that Olson has highlighted a significant ambiguity in CG 
and TKG, which Moltmann does not sufficiently clarify. At different points in CG and 
TKG, either stage in God’s protological, historical, or eschatological life variously 
exercises some kind of determination over other stages. So, too, the immanent 
primarily determines the economic Trinity, but the economic also determines the 
immanent Trinity. For Moltmann these are different ways of talking about the same 
God, ways which the cross necessitates must be spoken about together. I have argued 
that Moltmann identifies both immanent and economic Trinity in different ways in 
each of the three stages. It is clear that for Moltmann the interaction between these 
three stages and between the two ways of identifying the one Trinity must be 
understood dialectically. There is no absolute priority in any stage or in either 
economic or immanent Trinity, in contrast to the traditional priority identified with 
the protological immanent Trinity, because God is transcendent in each and through 
this constitutes the others in various ways. Yet what Moltmann omits from this 
characterisation of the Trinity is an explicit situating of these relationships in a 
dialectic, as I have identified here, or other organising structure. He seems to assume 
the validity of these complex relationships without making it clear on what basis he 
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intends to do so. Moreover, careful reading is required to understand exactly how 
Moltmann conceives of these relationships and, as the work of Olson and others show, 
it is not only an explicit framework which is missing but clarification of what Moltmann 
intends by the terms “immanent” and “economic” Trinity in the context of protology, 
history, and eschatology. 
5.2. Issues in Moltmann’s Adoption of Rahner’s Rule 
Moltmann’s construal of the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity 
diverges significantly from the tradition. The doctrine of the Trinity which Karl Barth 
developed in the first half of the twentieth century is a robust alternative to 
Moltmann’s and illustrates some of the difficulties involved with following him. 
5.2.1. Karl Barth on the Relationship between Immanent and Economic 
Trinity 
Barth provides his own rule to determine the relationship between immanent and 
economic Trinity: 
[W]e have consistently followed the rule, which we regard as basic, that 
statements about the divine modes of being antecedently in themselves cannot 
be different in content from those that are to be made about their reality in 
revelation. All our statements concerning what is called the immanent Trinity 
have been reached simply as confirmations or underlinings or, materially, as 
the indispensable premises of the economic Trinity.227 
For Barth, human beings cannot know God apart from his revelation of himself in 
Christ. Thus any attempt to find God apart from his revelation is not theology but in 
actual fact anthropology. This is what the first part of Barth’s rule concerns. Knowledge 
of who God is in himself, the immanent Trinity, can only be attained through who God 
reveals himself to be in relation to us, the economic Trinity. Similarly, because the 
                                                        
227 Barth, CD I/1, 479. I will not be addressing the recent debates on the relationship between 
election and Trinity in Barth’s theology. Some of the relevant literature, with an introduction to the 
issues, is collected in Michael T. Dempsey, ed., Trinity and Election in Contemporary Theology (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans), 2011. Han-luen Kantzer Komline, “Friendship and Being: Election and 
Trinitarian Freedom in Moltmann and Barth,” Modern Theology 29:1 (2013): 1-17, situates Moltmann 
in this context. Regarding TKG, “For Moltmann, then, God’s ‘being-for’ is logically prior to God’s triune 
identity” (13). However, although Moltmann situates God’s ‘being-for’ in eternity, any claim of logical 
priority to triunity imposes an unnecessary order on Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, one which he 
himself does not claim. If Moltmann’s theology is to be brought into dialogue with this framework at 
all, it would be better to say that the two occur simultaneously for him so that the Trinity is always 
already for us. 
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immanent Trinity by definition excludes creaturely being, statements about the 
immanent Trinity, while factual if derived from revelation, can only be made in an 
indirect way, acknowledging their epistemological origin and soteriological end in the 
sphere of the economic Trinity: 
All we can know of God according to the witness of Scripture are His acts. All we 
can say of God, all the attributes we can assign to God, relate to these acts of His; 
not, then, to His essence as such.228 
Conversely, God gives himself completely to human beings in revelation: “We 
have to take revelation with such utter seriousness that in it as God's act we must 
directly see God's being too.”229 Revelation is not a mere image or appearance of God. 
The God who reveals himself is the same God who is eternally Father, Son, and Spirit. 
Moreover, without the eternal, triune God there can be no revelation of him. This is 
what the second part of Barth’s rule concerns. Statements concerning the immanent 
Trinity are the “indispensable premises of the economic Trinity.”230 “He is God our 
Father because He is so antecedently in Himself as the Father of the Son.”231 Who God 
is in relation to us is grounded in the intra-trinitarian relations of the immanent 
Trinity. For Barth, then, God as immanent Trinity is logically prior to and determinative 
of who he is as economic Trinity: 
Jesus Christ is the Son because He is (not because He makes this impression on 
us, not because He does what we think is to be expected of a God, but because 
He is). With this presupposition all thinking about Jesus, which means at once 
all thinking about God, must begin and end.232 
                                                        
228 Ibid., 371, emphasis mine. Cf. Ben Leslie, “Does God Have a Life?: Barth and LaCugna on the 
Immanent Trinity,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 24:4 (1997): 377-398, 
[T]he works of God in revelation and the eternal being of God are essentially one and allow of 
no inherent division. Theology, however, must make this essentially heuristic division (i.e., an 
epistemological as opposed to an ontological division) in order to maintain the freedom in 
which God's acts of grace are executed (381). 
229 Barth, CD I/1, 428. God nonetheless remains free in determining the subjective reception of 
this revelation by his Spirit. 
230 Ibid., 479, cited above. 
231 Ibid., 384, emphasis mine. Cf. p.399, “He is the Son of God who has come to us or the Word 
of God that has been spoken to us, because He is so antecedently in Himself as the Son or Word of God 
the Father,” and p.448, “He is the Holy Spirit, by receiving whom we become the children of God, 
because, as the Spirit of the love of God the Father and the Son, He is so antecedently in Himself.” 
232 Ibid., 415. 
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5.2.2. A Barthian Critique of Moltmann’s Doctrine of the Trinity 
Following Barth, Paul Molnar seeks to radically restate the importance of the doctrine 
of the immanent Trinity against what he perceives as its contemporary misuse.233 For 
him, “the purpose of a doctrine of the immanent Trinity is to recognize, uphold and 
respect God’s freedom.” That is, 
since we know the triune God by grace and through faith, we cannot, as it were, 
read back our concepts and experiences into God. And a properly conceived 
doctrine of the immanent Trinity, while not designed to prevent this, will indeed 
do so to the extent that God’s freedom is recognized and upheld through such a 
doctrine.234 
Molnar contends that it is necessary to maintain the traditional distinction between 
immanent and economic Trinity, epitomised by Barth, to acknowledge God’s freedom 
in se as the basis for his free acts ad extra. Again, following Barth, this doctrine arises 
in the context of human experience, because “we obviously have no alternative but to 
understand God in the categories available to us in our human experience,” but “it is 
not anything within our experience or inherent in those categories that prescribes who 
God is in se and ad extra.”235 Rather, knowledge of God is a response to his acts towards 
humanity, a knowledge made possible only by faith given in the Holy Spirit. Moreover, 
this knowledge of God in the form of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is for the 
purpose of salvation: “If God cannot in fact be distinguished from our experiences and 
thoughts about ourselves and the world we live in… then trinitarian theology, for all its 
attempts to reinvigorate the Christian life, actually makes Christianity more irrelevant 
than ever.”236 Salvation can only save if it arises from the one who is not determined 
by creaturely being in any way. Otherwise it, too, is subject to sin and death. Second, 
“By recognizing that God did not and does not need to act mercifully toward us ad extra, 
even as he in fact did so and does so in his Word and Spirit, we recognize the freedom 
                                                        
233 Interestingly, though he draws heavily on him, Molnar finds that even Barth applies the 
doctrine inconsistently. See Paul D. Molnar, “The Function of the Immanent Trinity in the Theology of 
Karl Barth: Implications for Today,” Scottish Journal of Theology 42:3 (1989): 367-399 (371 n.24). 
234 Molnar, Divine Freedom, ix. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid., 315. A proper doctrine of the immanent Trinity will “eschew irrelevant speculation 
about God’s inner nature, abstracted from God’s own self-revelation” (x). 
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of grace.”237 Only a salvation which is not inherent in creation but is given freely is one 
of grace. There can be no hint of the slightest vice versa without compromising the 
freedom of God and thus the reality of salvation. 
Barth passed away before he got to read Moltmann’s radical contributions to 
the doctrine of the Trinity in CG. However, he did get to read TH, in which Moltmann 
wrote, “The eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but it is the medium of 
Christian faith as such, the key in which everything in it is set” (TH, 16). Barth was 
suspicious of such a method. He wrote to Moltmann, 
To put it pointedly, does your theology of hope really differ at all from the 
baptized principle of hope of Mr. Bloch? What disturbs me is that for you 
theology becomes so much a matter of principle (an eschatological principle)… 
Would it not be wise to accept the doctrine of the immanent Trinity of God?238 
Molnar cites this comment from Barth to call attention to what he understands 
as the problematic aspect of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, i.e., attempting to 
interpret revelation via particular principles rather than acknowledging its origin in 
the immanent Trinity and its sufficiency apart from human principles in the economic 
Trinity. 
This is evident in Moltmann’s tendency to reject dualities such as necessity and 
freedom, replacing them with a “process common to both,” which results in a 
“reconciliation of opposites.”239 But if Moltmann wants to employ this method and at 
the same time maintain a distinction between God and the world, “given the fact that 
it is impossible to conceive of a God who is not creative and who cannot find bliss in 
his eternal self-love,” for example, “the question arises as to whether, in this reasoning, 
there can be an inner-trinitarian process distinct from that trinitarian thinking which 
defines God’s love as selflessness and which insists that God cannot have existed 
                                                        
237 Ibid., 198. 
238 Karl Barth, Letters 1961-1968, ed. Jürgen Fangemeier and Hinrich Stoevesandt, trans. and 
ed. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981), 175, emphasis original. Barth refers 
to the Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch, whose Principle of Hope was a major influence for Moltmann’s 
TH. Moltmann responds to Barth, writing,  
I thought I could so expound the economic Trinity that in the foreground, and then again in 
the background, it would be open to an immanent Trinity. That is, for me the Holy Spirit is 
first the Spirit of the raising of the dead and then as such the third person of the Trinity (in 
ibid., 348). 
239 Molnar, Divine Freedom, 207, emphasis original. 
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without being the creator.”240 According to Molnar, Moltmann cannot logically uphold 
any distinction. By insisting that creation is essential to divine love and that divine 
freedom must be understood as determined by this love, Moltmann has identified the 
immanent Trinity with creation. Moreover, while Moltmann insists that this love does 
not compromise but rather constitutes and upholds divine freedom, Molnar contends, 
“if God is not his own prisoner he is certainly the prisoner of love which by its nature 
must freely create another in order to be true to its own nature.”241 
This compromise is evident in Moltmann’s assertion that the divine processions 
are necessary.242 The Father begets the Son in love necessarily and this love must seek 
not only its like, the Son, but its other, creation. Yet, Molnar asks, “where is the 
distinction between God’s free love and the necessary creation of a reality distinct from 
him to be drawn?”243 In Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, divine freedom disappears 
and, with it, the immanent Trinity apart from the world. Moltmann has made “the love 
of God subject to a higher law encompassing his actual free love. That higher law of 
course would be accessible as a philosophical principle to which God himself was 
subject.”244 His theology thus no longer engages with revelation on its own terms, but 
skews it according to human principles. This differs from the knowledge of God which 
comes from faith and derives “its meaning from God in se acting ad extra and not from 
the realm of history accessible to the philosopher.”245 
Molnar identifies the key principle which Moltmann draws on in TKG as 
experience, human and divine, and especially the experience of suffering: “Moltmann 
consistently defines God by the experiences creatures have of suffering, nothingness 
                                                        
240 Ibid., 209-210. 
241 Ibid., 213, emphasis original. 
242 E.g., TKG, 167, 
The generation and birth of the Son come from the Father’s nature, not from his will. That is 
why we talk about the eternal generation and birth of the Son. The Father begets and bears 
the Son out of the necessity of his being. 
Molnar contrasts Moltmann’s theology with the traditional doctrine of the processions, citing 
Athanasius and the Eleventh Council of Toledo (675): “God the Father begot [the Son] not through his 
will and not of necessity, for there is no necessity in God nor does the will precede wisdom.” See John 
F. Clarkson, SJ, et. al. (trans. and ed.), The Church Teaches: Documents of the Church in English 
Translation (London: Herder, 1955), cited in Divine Freedom, 214. 
243 Molnar, Divine Freedom, 214. 
244 Ibid., 215. 
245 Ibid., 216. 
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and death.”246 Thus, “If a person once feels the infinite passion of God’s love which finds 
expression here [on the cross], then he understands the mystery of the triune God” 
(TKG, 4). But because “Moltmann does not distinguish clearly between human 
experience of the created realm and God’s being and action in his Word and Spirit,” his 
theology results in an ambiguous “synthesis of human and divine experience.”247 This 
leads to a basic epistemological problem: “since these are our experiences, how shall 
we identify the God we are experiencing?”248 Revelation interpreted in this way no 
longer reveals God. 
In the end, Moltmann’s concept of divine freedom 
leaves him in a logical and theological dilemma. Either he may argue that God 
really is subject to no internal or external necessities. Then he would have to 
reject his own panentheist interpretation of the Trinity and of creation because 
the Christian God who loves is intrinsically free both in nature and will. Or he 
may argue that God is subject both to internal and external necessities. Then he 
would have to reject the biblical and traditional view of creation and of the 
Trinity. But he cannot logically hold both positions at once.249 
Moltmann’s panentheism, therefore, not only affords a number of soteriological 
problems otherwise avoided with an asymmetrical distinction between immanent and 
economic Trinity, but at its most basic level it is contradictory.250 
                                                        
246 Ibid., 200, emphasis original. Moltmann develops this principle further in GC, which Molnar 
characterises as “a panentheistic principle of suffering love discovered in relational metaphysics and 
then applied to revelation” (215). 
247 Ibid., 216-217. 
248 Farrow, “Systematic Contributions,” 436. 
249 Molnar, Divine Freedom, 226. 
250 Throughout his book, Molnar also insists that human freedom is only possible on the basis 
of a divine freedom which presupposes a strong distinction between the immanent and the economic 
Trinity. However, he does not explain this connection. Such an explanation is given by Colin Gunton, 
The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997), 128, who conceives of 
divine freedom in trinitarian terms: “Father, Son and Spirit constitute each other as free persons by 
virtue of the shape their inter-relationship takes in the trinitarian perichoresis.” The trinitarian 
persons are free in that they are distinct from one another not in “freedom from others” but “the 
personal space that is received and conferred” (emphasis original). This trinitarian freedom 
determines the shape of the freedom of human beings who “require space as well as relation: to be 
both related to and other than those and that on which we depend” (ibid., 107). Moreover, pantheism 
and panentheism create problems for human freedom because they do not adequately distinguish 
between God and the world: “There is… no basis in any such unitary conception of God for freedom 
because there is in it no space between God and the world.” That is, there is no space between God and 
creatures in which creatures can enact their freedom. Complete determinism follows. Conversely, “the 
doctrine of the Trinity allows for such space because it enables us to conceive the world as other than, 
while yet in relation to God” (ibid., 129). This freedom can only come from a God who already has his 
own personal space, undetermined by any retroactivity of the economic upon the immanent Trinity, 
109 
 
5.2.3. Assessment: Moltmann on Panentheism and Divine Freedom 
If Barth’s concerns regarding his contemporaries’ dismissal of the immanent Trinity 
applied to Moltmann then he might be accused of substituting grace with necessity, 
faith with human knowledge, and revelation with worldly events.251 According to 
Molnar, at least, in Moltmann’s theology God is subjected to a philosophical principle, 
relating him necessarily to the world, confusing him with human experience, and thus 
contradicting Moltmann’s claim that God is distinct from the world. 
While Moltmann’s panentheism clearly differs from classical theism, which 
posits an absolute distinction between infinite and finite being, it is important also to 
distinguish his position from pantheism in which all distinctions are abolished 
between God and creation. Moltmann’s distance from classical theism is probably 
much more explicit because it is more prevalent among Moltmann’s intended 
audience. Nonetheless, where Moltmann mentions pantheism he distinguishes it from 
traditional theology or his own position.252 Although panentheism is a disputed term, 
a helpful distinction from pantheism, which accords with Moltmann’s theology, is 
provided by William Rowe: 
Pantheism is the view that God is wholly within the universe and the universe 
is wholly within God, so that God and the universe are coextensive, but not 
identical. A related, but distinct view known as Panentheism, agrees with 
pantheism that the universe is within God, but denies that God is limited to the 
universe. For according to panentheism, the universe is finite and within God, 
but God is truly infinite and so cannot be totally within or otherwise limited to 
the finite universe.253 
“Infinite” and “finite” take on particular meanings in classical theism which cannot be 
straightforwardly transferred to Moltmann’s panentheism. There is, however, in 
Moltmann’s panentheism a distinction between the infinite God who actively takes 
                                                        
and thus a God who can allow for creaturely space. Unfortunately, because of space limitations in this 
thesis I have decided not to engage with this critique. Neither does Molnar devote any extended 
discussion to this critique. Nonetheless, see TKG, 191-222 for Moltmann’s claim that it is theism (and 
monotheism) which in actual fact inhibits and has historically inhibited truly human freedom. 
Moltmann goes on to present an alternative theology of human freedom on the basis of the doctrine of 
the Trinity which he presents in TKG. 
251 See Barth, CD I/1, 420-422. 
252 E.g., CG, 209, 235, 265, 277; TKG, 107, 110, 165, 199-200. 
253 William Rowe, “Does Panentheism Reduce to Pantheism? A Response to Craig,” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61:2 (2007): 65-67 (65, emphasis original). 
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upon himself finite qualities such as death and suffering in his interaction with the 
world and the finite creation whose limits in death and suffering are transcended in 
the future life of the infinite trinitarian God. God’s love towards human beings is “love 
of man in revolt,” which can be contradicted and crucified, “but in crucifixion it finds 
its fulfilment and becomes love of the enemy. Thus its suffering proves to be stronger 
than hate.” Such a love, from which arises the Spirit who “gives life even to its enemies 
and opens up the future to change,” cannot be realised by creation (CG, 248-249). Only 
where God and humanity come together in Christ can creation be taken beyond its 
bondage into freedom. 
In TKG, too, identifying the immanent with the economic Trinity does not mean 
the abolition of distinctions between God and creation: 
[God’s] world puts its impress on God too, through its reactions, its aberrations 
and its own initiatives. It certainly does not do so in the same way; but that it 
does so in its own way there can be no doubt at all (TKG, 99). 
There is an “interaction between the substance and the revelation, the ‘inwardness’ 
and the ‘outwardness’ of the triune God” (TKG, 160), but “the divine relationship to the 
world is primarily defined by that inner relationship” (TKG, 161, emphasis added). 
Moltmann sees in the cross, as well as creation and the coming kingdom, the historical 
constitution of the trinitarian persons. But this constitution is God’s willing self-
descent into the sphere of creaturely being and not something that creatures thrust 
upon him beyond his will. He may well be confused with creaturely being, and, 
ironically, this is the accusation that Moltmann chiefly levels against classical theism. 
Its vision of the impassible God is based on an anthropological assessment of the limits 
of finite being. But it is Christ in his coming to humanity on the cross who confronts all 
confusions of God with creaturely being, theistic, pantheistic, and panentheistic, to the 
extent that they oppose, however inadvertently, the freedom of creation in the 
kingdom of God. Thus the confusion between God and creation in Moltmann’s theology 
is one that he could attribute to all theologies, and one that is only remedied through 
the cross’s ongoing confrontation of these theologies. 
To assess Molnar’s claim that Moltmann subjects God to a philosophical 
principle of necessity, it is worth clarifying how Moltmann conceives divine freedom. 
For him, the God of love cannot be understood as “one who is free, who could just as 
well not love,” that is, choose not to create. This introduces an “arbitrary element” into 
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this love (TKG, 55). Rather, divine freedom must be understood in terms of love, and 
not vice versa, as Barth presents it. This is perhaps unfair of Moltmann, however, as his 
rejection of Barth and others who maintain this priority of divine freedom appears to 
rest on a caricature. As David Bentley Hart notes, “while one has to avoid the pathetic 
anthropomorphism of imagining God’s decision to create as an arbitrary choice made 
after a deliberation among options, one still has to affirm that it’s free.”254 Moltmann 
overlooks this apophatic aspect of the doctrine of divine freedom: God is bound neither 
internally nor externally to create and yet neither is his free act of creation arbitrary. 
However, Moltmann’s oversight also reveals Molnar’s misunderstanding of the 
function of necessity in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. If the lordship of God 
requires theology to think in terms of a God in whom freedom and non-arbitrariness 
can coincide, then the alternative route proposed by Moltmann, “in God necessity and 
freedom coincide” (TKG, 107), can be no less plausible an interpretation of the love of 
God. Other legitimate objections may be raised, but Moltmann’s dual denial of God’s 
freedom of choice and being “compelled to love by any outward or inward necessity” 
(TKG, 151) is not objectionable unless the dual denial of necessity and arbitrariness in 
the doctrine of divine freedom is also objectionable. In this sense, Moltmann’s concept 
of divine love must be understood apophatically as well. God’s freedom does not 
consist in either choice or anthropomorphic necessity but divine love, which 
transcends all analogies. 
Nonetheless, the core of Moltmann’s understanding of divine freedom is not in 
apophatic denials of choice and necessity but in the positive affirmation of God’s love: 
“in loving the world [God] is entirely free because he is entirely himself” (TKG, 55). He 
freely assents to his loving creation of the world. Stated positively, the necessary 
creation of the world expresses rather than contradicts the divine freedom: “God’s 
‘need’ for the world is not due to imperfection, but issues from the abundance of His 
divine love, which is itself the most authentic divine freedom.”255 Moltmann’s position 
                                                        
254 David Bentley Hart, “God, Creation, and Evil,” paper presented at the “Creation out of 
Nothing: Origins and Contemporary Significance” conference at University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, 
IN, 8 July 2015 <https://soundcloud.com/iclnotredame/god-creation-and-evil> (27 July 2015). Cf. 
John Webster, “Trinity and Creation,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 12:1 (2010): 4-19, 
“the notion of the divine will has to be stripped of connotations of arbitrariness, so that we do not 
think of creation as a mere spasmodic exercise of God’s power not anchored in the divine ethos” (15). 
255 Steen, “Moltmann’s Critical Reception,” 305. 
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is here similar to Augustine’s who writes of the “blessed necessity” of God’s will.256 
There are some things that God cannot do, such as sin, but such constraints are in 
keeping with the being of God and thus with his freedom. However, this does not mean 
that everything God cannot do is akin to sin or evil. From an Augustinian perspective, 
God necessarily creates neither out of moral obligation nor an incompleteness in the 
trinitarian relations: “God does not create out of poverty but abundance… It is fitting 
and natural for the God of love to create, and God can do so voluntarily even if 
necessarily because creation is a willing expression of divine goodness.”257 Both 
Augustine and Moltmann seek to limit God’s freedom of choice in some way by 
situating this in the context of his being, which Moltmann characterises as love, and 
both see this as an expression rather than as a contradiction of God’s freedom. 
Molnar traces Moltmann’s notion of divine freedom to his claim that the 
trinitarian processions are necessary. In itself, this claim should be uncontroversial, 
albeit perhaps stated irresponsibly on Moltmann’s part. As Barth writes, 
He cannot not be Father and cannot be without the Son. His freedom or aseity 
in respect of Himself consists in His freedom, not determined by anything but 
Himself, to be God, and that means to be the Father of the Son. A freedom to be 
able not to be this would be an abrogation of His freedom.258 
Even Barth, then, would affirm a kind of “blessed necessity” with regard to the 
trinitarian processions, necessity because there is no God who is not Father, Son, and 
Spirit, and blessed because this is a necessity which pertains to the divine being so that, 
negatively, it is unlike any conceivable philosophical necessity and, positively, God’s 
freedom consists in this necessity in which he is himself.259 Moltmann attempts to 
                                                        
256 “If, then, you say that the will cannot be attributed to necessity, even this is not universally 
true. For … there is even a certain blessed necessity, because it is necessary that God always lives both 
immutably and most happily.” See Augustine, Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian, in The Works of 
Saint Augustine, vol. I/25, Answer to the Pelagans III, ed. John E. Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde 
Park, NY: New City Press, 1999), v.53, cited in Jesse Couenhoven, “The Necessities of Perfect Freedom,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 14:4 (2012): 396-419 (398). Couenhoven claims that 
Moltmann’s position is similar to Augustine’s, despite being “confused in some ways” (401 n.20). 
257 Couenhoven, “Necessities of Perfect Freedom,” 412. 
258 Barth, CD I/1, 434. 
259 Webster, “Trinity and Creation,” 11, also makes this claim: “God’s immanent activities are 
‘necessary’, not by external compulsion but by absolute or natural necessity: these activities are what 
it is for God to be God.” 
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communicate this same point in claiming that the necessary intra-trinitarian love is at 
the same time a free love.  
Molnar also sees a problematic connection in TKG between this intra-trinitarian 
necessity and the necessary creation of the world. However, Moltmann maintains a 
distinction between the processions and the act of creation. In begetting the Son, the 
Father’s love “goes out of itself” so that “it is no longer merely engendering and 
bringing forth, it is creative love too” (TKG, 58-59). Creation is not another Son nor 
equated with the Son. The Son is God from God. The creation of the world is given in 
this procession in the sense that it naturally and, indeed, necessarily arises from it but 
it is not identical to the Son because it is instead an expression of the Father’s love for 
the Son. As such, Moltmann maintains a distinction between God and creation in the 
protological Trinity.260 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that whereas the Augustinian 
position outlined above allows for the creation of the world to be understood as 
necessary, it only goes so far to conceive of this in terms of an overflowing of God’s 
love. “[C]reation is supererogatory.”261 Moltmann attempts to concede this, but, 
because he rethinks divine love in terms of the cross in which God makes himself 
vulnerable to suffering, he goes one step further in claiming that “God ‘needs’ the world 
and man. If God is love, then he neither will nor can be without the one who is his 
beloved,” that one being creation (TKG, 58). That is, for Moltmann creation is 
necessarily related to the divine processions not only in that it overflows out of the 
Father’s love for the Son but also in that God needs the world to express this love. 
The relationship between creation and the immanent Trinity, then, is indeed 
necessary in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, but this does not mean that every 
necessity in the immanent Trinity needs to be dismissed a priori. Insofar as Moltmann 
presents God’s necessary creation of the world as an apophatic denial of freedom of 
choice and a positive affirmation of his overflowing love, his doctrine of the Trinity 
should not raise any issues.  
However, although Molnar’s analysis of the relationship between the necessary 
processions and the creation of the world is inexact, faulting Moltmann for more than 
                                                        
260 Wood, “Barth’s Trinitarian Christology,” makes the odd claim that “If any theologian has 
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he is perhaps due, he does draw attention to Moltmann’s problematic conception of 
God’s need for the world, which is based in his intra-trinitarian love. So, too, George 
Hunsinger writes, “The fatal move here, of course, is the idea that God’s love requires 
something external.”262 It is not that God is conditioned by something external to him. 
The external does not exist before God creates it. But God is conditioned internally in 
such a way that he needs an external world in which to fulfil his love. This is only 
fulfilled eschatologically when the suffering of creation and therefore God, who 
experiences the suffering of his creation, is overcome. “While Moltmann says God does 
not act out of deficiency of being, it is precisely here that God’s being is indeed deficient 
by virtue of his need for redemption, glory and freedom.”263 If God needs the world in 
this way then Moltmann risks making God’s intra-trinitarian love insufficient for 
himself. And if God’s love is not fulfilled already in himself apart from the history of the 
world then when this history is delivered into his eschatological life it is delivered into 
an incomplete life. Creation would not complete this life either because it could only 
do so in a finite and thus incomplete manner. While Moltmann’s attempt to conceive of 
divine love in light of the cross provides a helpful beginning for understanding God’s 
creation of the world as necessary in some sense, he goes too far in conceiving this in 
terms of need.264 
5.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter I looked at the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity in 
Moltmann’s theology. Roger Olson argues that in making God’s eschatological life the 
ground of his transcendence while at the same time claiming that his actions in history 
constitute this eschatological life Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity rests on an 
illogical relationship between eschatology and history. But Moltmann conceives of a 
dialectical relationship between God’s protological, historical, and eschatological life. 
In each of these aspects God is transcendent. The difficulty with Moltmann’s doctrine 
of the Trinity here, however, is that he neglects to provide an explicit framework within 
                                                        
262 Hunsinger, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 135. 
263 Molnar, Divine Freedom, 208. 
264 The other problem, of course, is that Moltmann risks making suffering necessary. On this 
see subsection 4.4.3. above. 
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which to understand the relationships between these different aspects, and it is 
unclear what he intends to denote with the terms “immanent” and “economic.” 
Following Barth, Paul Molnar maintains the traditional asymmetry between 
immanent and economic Trinity. According to Molnar, Moltmann replaces the doctrine 
of the Trinity with human principles. Specifically, he cannot maintain a defensible 
theology of divine freedom. Yet a closer look at Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity 
reveals that his panentheism allows for a distinction between divine and creaturely 
being. Moreover, if his claim that God creates in the intersection between necessity and 
freedom is to be rejected, then so also is the alternative claim that God creates freely 
and yet not arbitrarily. However, Moltmann attributes “need” to the Trinity, suggesting 
that God is incomplete prior to creation. This creates a soteriological problem as an 
incomplete God would have difficulty redeeming creation.  
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6. Hans Urs von Balthasar: Having Your Orthodoxy and Eating It 
Too? 
 
One contemporary of Moltmann who sought to take seriously the significance of the 
cross for the doctrine of the Trinity without compromising the traditional distinction 
between immanent and economic Trinity is Hans Urs von Balthasar. It is important to 
note that Balthasar’s corpus is expansive. Aidan Nichols writes, “Any one area of his 
publications would constitute a decent life’s work for a lesser man.”265 My intention 
here is only to employ a short but theologically dense section in Balthasar’s work to 
offer a mediating position between Moltmann’s theology and some of the dissenting 
voices I have cited in chapters four and five.266 
6.1. Balthasar on the Intra-Trinitarian Basis for Divine Abandonment 
Balthasar, like Karl Barth and Paul Molnar, maintains that the immanent Trinity is 
distinct from and grounds the economic Trinity: “Otherwise the immanent, eternal 
Trinity would threaten to dissolve into the economic.”267 He also rejects that “the full 
doctrine of the Trinity can be unfolded only on the basis of a theology of the Cross.”268 
Nonetheless, maintaining that a doctrine of the immanent Trinity must remain 
theologically faithful to God as he reveals himself in the divine economy, Balthasar 
writes, “we must see the doctrine of the Trinity as the ever-present, inner-
presupposition of the doctrine of the Cross.”269 Indeed, this is how the cross is 
presented in Scripture. It derives from the Father’s love in giving his Son for the world, 
the love which the Son shares in giving himself for the world. 
                                                        
265 Aidan Nichols, “Introduction,” in Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale, 1-10 (3). 
266 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 5 vols., trans. by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: 
Ignatius, 1988-1998), 319-328 (henceforth TD). Balthasar provides an earlier, substantial statement 
on the relationship between the cross and the Trinity in Mysterium Paschale. For a recent critical 
overview of this development in Balthasar’s thought from Mysterium Paschale to the later Theo-
Drama, see Joshua R. Brotherton, “Damnation and the Trinity in Ratzinger and Balthasar,” Logos: A 
Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 18:3 (2015): 123-150. 
267 Balthasar, TD III, 508. 
268 Balthasar, TD IV, 319. 
269 Ibid.  
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First, the cross presupposes the Father in his intra-trinitarian love. Following 
Sergei Bulgakov, Balthasar situates this in an eternal kenosis: “For the Father strips 
himself, without remainder, of his Godhead and hands it over to the Son; he ‘imparts’ 
to the Son all that is his.”270 Because this kenosis belongs to the Father in his eternal 
generation of the Son, he is never without this kenosis. That is, “he is this movement of 
self-giving that holds nothing back.”271 In bringing forth the Son, the Father posits “an 
absolute, ‘infinite’ distance that can contain and embrace all the other distances that 
are possible within the world of finitude.”272 Second, the Son’s surrendering of himself 
on the cross is made possible by the eternal ground of this self-surrender in the 
immanent Trinity. The Son eternally reciprocates the Father’s love in thanksgiving, “a 
thanksgiving as selfless and unreserved as the Father’s original self-surrender.”273 
Third, the cross reveals the Spirit who is the unity of Father and Son. This unity 
encompasses the Father’s abandonment of the Son so “the uniting Spirit, their ‘We’, 
actually appears in the form of mere distance.”274 The cross thus also presupposes the 
Spirit who as the unity of Father and Son both affirms their distance and “bridges it.”275 
The doctrine of the immanent Trinity which Balthasar provides here differs 
from Moltmann’s in that Balthasar rules out any mutual reciprocity between God and 
the world. Moltmann, and others who make moves similar to him, have “succumbed to 
the illusion that man’s ability to say No to God actually limits the divine 
omnipotence.”276 Rather, God consists completely in his intra-trinitarian relations, 
which absolutely transcend and thus encompass the possibility of all finite sufferings. 
In contrast to Moltmann, Balthasar does not go so far as to situate any kind of “enmity” 
in the Trinity. On the one hand, the intra-trinitarian distance between Father and Son 
is a distance of love. In begetting the Son, the Father gives himself completely but “does 
not lose himself.”277 On the other hand, this is not the first part of a dialectical process 
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in which God must realise himself in his negation. God’s love is complete without this 
negation so that the negation is already eternally present in God in the sense that his 
love is greater than and encompasses it.278 The power of God’s love is sufficient in its 
trinitarian self, independent of any negation it might otherwise need to undergo in 
order to deliver creation from suffering. According to Balthasar, the being of God 
encompasses godlessness but it is a “(divine) God-lessness (of love, of course).”279 As 
Fred Sanders writes of Balthasar’s theology, “Creation and the history that takes place 
in it may be rich, complex, diverse, and multi-faceted, but the God who is responsible 
for it possesses all of these attributes and more in an ever-greater way.”280 That is not 
to say that the historical event of the cross only reveals that the redemption of creation 
has already taken place in eternity. This redemption needs to take place in history not 
for God’s sake but for creation’s sake because the nature of creation is historical. It is 
to say, then, against Moltmann, that the cross does not introduce anything new into the 
being of God which he needs to experience for the redemption of the world to take 
place, let alone his own redemption. Redemption is for creation, taking place in history, 
contingent on the eternal, kenotic love of the Trinity. 
The infinite distance between Father and Son not only contains the possibility 
of the cross but of suffering in general. Thus, “there is something in God that can 
develop into suffering.” Whereas the Son completely reciprocates the Father’s love in 
giving himself completely to the Father, sinful human beings do not reciprocate this 
love, instead responding with a “calculating, cautious self-preservation.”281 As such, a 
suffering which cannot take place between Father and Son who give themselves 
completely to each other, instead takes place for human beings in their non-
reciprocation of God’s love. 
 
 
                                                        
278 As Anne Hunt, “Hans Urs von Balthasar: Love Alone is Credible,” in The Trinity and the 
Paschal Mystery (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 60, writes, “Every possible drama between 
God and the world is thus already contained in, allowed for, and indeed infinitely surpassed and 
transcended in that eternal, supra-temporal ‘event’ of intra-trinitarian love.” 
279 TD IV, 324. 
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6.2. Assessment: The Analogy of Distance 
A critical reading of Balthasar’s proposal reveals some of the difficulties with situating 
the ground for such an abandonment in the immanent Trinity. It is important to engage 
with these difficulties because they are indicative of some of the reservations others 
may have with following suit. First, Balthasar construes “Christ's passion and death as 
most fundamentally a drama of abandonment of Christ by the Father.”282 Balthasar’s 
inference, based on Christ’s cry of dereliction, is disputed by some because the cry may 
indicate Jesus’ faith rather than abandonment, as Jesus cites the first line of Psalm 22. 
As I demonstrated in subsections 3.3.4.-3.3.6. of this thesis, however, Mark certainly 
underscores the harshness of Jesus’ abandonment, which is reflected in the cry of 
dereliction. Yet Mark’s pre-conciliar context prevents us from deciding on the basis of 
exegesis alone whether this refers to the Word of God’s human experience of 
abandonment or a divine abandonment with trinitarian implications. Like Moltmann, 
this lands Balthasar with the accusation of speculation, a point I will address presently. 
Second, assuming the centrality of the cross in divine revelation, Balthasar 
infers that the conditions of the cross’s possibility must have some central role to play 
in the immanent life of God. However, the absolute distance which Balthasar proposes 
“cannot be put forward as a self-evident starting point for further argument or 
reflection, but is at most the rather precarious conclusion to a train of reflection.”283 
Karen Kilby is concerned that Balthasar puts too much confidence in speculation. He 
seems to speak of the immanent Trinity with an “insider's view.”284 Moreover, by 
interpreting the cross as an abandonment exceeded and made possible by an absolute 
distance in the immanent Trinity which grounds this abandonment, “Balthasar seems 
in clear danger of fundamentally blurring the distinction between love and loss, joy 
and suffering, in themselves.”285 This may even mean, as Paul Gavrilyuk points out in 
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Vladimir Lossky’s critique of Bulgakov, that Balthasar risks first making “voluntary 
redemptive suffering into a process inherent in the very nature of God” and second 
replacing the historical event of the cross with a “metaphysical Golgotha.”286 
However, Kilby’s critique can only go so far. She has already conceded that if the 
cross is interpreted as divine abandonment the traditional construal of the 
relationship between immanent and economic Trinity implies “something eternally 
present in the life of the Trinity which anticipates [divine abandonment].”287 This also 
seems to be Balthasar’s motivation for making such an apparently speculative 
inference. Thus his position is commendable in that, unlike Moltmann, he can both 
affirm the economic reality of divine abandonment on the cross and the immanent 
reality of the divine life which transcends and grounds this abandonment. In other 
words, the cross is not a novum for God. Balthasar’s position maintains both the 
seriousness with which Moltmann takes theologia crucis and the seriousness with 
which Barth and Molnar take the asymmetrical distinction between immanent and 
economic Trinity.288 This is not to say that Barth or Molnar do not take the cross 
seriously! Even Moltmann acknowledges that “Barth has consistently drawn the 
harshness of the cross into his concept of God” (CG, 203).289 However, Balthasar 
succeeds in establishing a positive connection between what Moltmann identifies as 
“the two special features of Christianity, faith in the crucified Jesus and in the triune 
God” (CG, 236), without collapsing these features into one another. Thus Balthasar not 
only demonstrates the significance of the cross for the doctrine of the Trinity but, 
conversely, as Moltmann does, interprets the cross in a thoroughly trinitarian way. His 
is an innovative contribution both to the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the 
                                                        
A proclivity in general to cast suffering in a positive light, and to link faith, love, and obedience 
with self-loss, self-abasement, even something like annihilation of the self, in fact frequently 
makes itself felt in Balthasar's writings (219). 
286 Gavrilyuk, “Kenotic Theology,” 267. 
287 Kilby, “Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 217. 
288 Molnar’s Divine Freedom contains three references to Balthasar, two of which are critical 
and none of which directly relate to the relationship between immanent and economic Trinity (202, 
265). 
289 Moltmann’s problem with Barth’s theologia crucis is not a lack of the cross’s centrality but 
the form which Barth accords to that centrality: “Remarkably, I see the critical limitation of Barth in 




cross, underscoring the mutual inseparability of two central aspects of divine 
revelation. 
Understood in this way, Balthasar’s proposal appears less speculative and more 
necessary. Sanders writes of Balthasar that he “is one of the few thinkers to outline 
what investing in the priority of the immanent Trinity might require.”290 Similarly, 
Kilby herself observes,  
[I]f the cross is conceived as God abandoning God, and if we are not, like 
Moltmann, to think of it as introducing something new, something previously 
unexperienced, into the life of the Trinity, then we are bound to suppose that 
there is something eternally present in the life of the Trinity which anticipates 
it.291 
The critique must not be that Balthasar maintains a ground for divine abandonment in 
the immanent Trinity but what he maintains this ground to be. Yet here, again, 
Balthasar’s proposal is commendable. This is because his what does not really go 
beyond what is minimally required for a that. Rather than opportunistically deriving 
from the that an unbridled speculation on the immanent Trinity, Balthasar explicates 
the content of his proposal within the bounds of a traditional trinitarian grammar. He 
proceeds from the cross to the doctrine of the immanent Trinity apophatically, giving 
the impression of someone walking around in the dark: 
[W]e must feel our way back into the mystery of the absolute, employing a 
negative theology that excludes from God all intramundane experience and 
suffering, while at the same time presupposing that the possibility of such 
experience and suffering… is grounded in God.292 
Here “distance” is a particular way of identifying that ground. The strength of 
conceiving this ground as such is that under one term it can denote both a central 
axiom of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity, the distinct persons of Father and Son, 
and an expression of this axiom in the economic Trinity, the Father’s abandonment of 
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the Son. For Balthasar, “suffering and death ad extra are not to be attributed univocally 
to God ad intra; rather the grounds for the possibility of what takes place ad extra are 
to be found in God ad intra.”293 In one word, “distance” affirms both that the divine 
abandonment in the economy does not go beyond who God is in se and that the mystery 
of the immanent Trinity is not exhausted in revelation. At the same time, it avoids 
equating the distance between Father and Son in the economy with the distance that 
infinitely exceeds (and grounds) it in the immanent Trinity. A similar move is made by 
Gary Culpepper who builds an etymological and philosophical case for expanding the 
semantic range of “suffering.” The Latin subferre, for example, can denote “allowing or 
permitting the action of the other in a stance of voluntary receptivity.”294 “Attribution 
of suffering to the divine eternity, then, is rooted in the affirmation that God is moved 
by another in the reciprocal relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”295 Balthasar’s 
“distance” and Culpepper’s “suffering,” in contrast to Moltmann’s “enmity,” suggest 
realities of the economic Trinity which exist in a different way in the immanent Trinity 
without compromising God’s love or transcendence in se. 
Finally, while Balthasar may still be subject to Kilby’s critique that he fails to 
adequately distinguish suffering from bliss across his corpus, something I cannot 
explore here, this need not be the case with the proposal he puts forward in this 
particular section. As shown above, Balthasar maintains the connection between 
suffering and sin, specifically, that it is a result of the misuse of human freedom. It 
follows that sin and suffering are not something other to the immanent Trinity in the 
sense that in his relationship to creation God encounters something new, but they are 
other to the immanent Trinity in the sense that they are distortions or negations of the 
fullness of God’s trinitarian being. God is thus the ground of suffering insofar as 
suffering and the world it presupposes is only possible on account of the triune God 
but this does not require that he grounds suffering in the sense that it necessarily arises 
from his being. Although both the immanent Father-Son relationship and the divine 
abandonment on the cross can be spoken of as “distance,” sin and suffering retain their 
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contingent character, here arising from the misuse of human freedom. So, too, the cross 
retains its gracious character in that God occasions it in response to sin and suffering. 
Nor does the cross merely reveal that human beings are already reconciled to God. 
Although God does not undergo any change in himself, the cross certainly effects the 
historical reconciliation of creation to him because creation undergoes change on 
account of the cross. 
6.3. Conclusion 
Balthasar’s proposal both allows for the traditional asymmetry between immanent 
and economic Trinity to be upheld and underscores the reality of divine abandonment 
on the cross. In the abandonment on the cross, Father and Son willingly take up a 
distance that is a distortion of their eternal and loving intra-trinitarian distance, 
overcoming it in this greater distance. Although in the context of Balthasar’s wider 
thought such a proposal may be found wanting in that it understates the reality of 
suffering, it at least opens the way for others who would pursue this connection but 
find Moltmann’s approach problematic because he identifies immanent with economic 





It would defeat the purpose of this thesis to end with Balthasar and say nothing more 
of Moltmann. I would therefore like to revisit my analysis in chapters three to five 
where I discussed his methodology, divine passibility, and the relationship between 
immanent and economic Trinity. Like Moltmann, I do not intend for this work to end 
the conversation. I offer it as a contribution for better understanding his concerns and 
for critically assessing their value for the church and theology. Therefore, I will not only 
restate my critical conclusions from these chapters but also offer some further 
reflection. After subjecting Moltmann’s theology to various questions across the course 
of this thesis, now, in the spirit of the dialectic, I offer a more appreciative commentary 
on aspects of his project that I have so far only touched on. Without writing another 
whole thesis, I submit these not only by way of looking back but also by way of looking 
forward. I will therefore also suggest some potential avenues for further research. 
In chapter three I began by identifying some distinctive aspects of the 
methodology Moltmann employs to develop his proposals regarding the significance 
of the cross for the doctrine of the Trinity. On CG, I contended that although the cross 
plays a central role in Moltmann’s methodology (on the prior basis of christology), 
other foci such as eschatology heavily influence his methodology, and his commitment 
to the doctrine of the Trinity means not only that the cross determines its content but 
that the Trinity determines the form which theologia crucis must take. I then attended 
to Moltmann’s methodology in TKG, demonstrating that a commitment to dialogue 
guides his methodology. While not dismissing the necessity of critical engagement with 
his theology (indeed, Moltmann expects such engagement), Moltmann’s dialogical 
methodology means that his proposals should be seen as contributions to an ongoing 
conversation rather than conclusions in themselves. The bulk of chapter three was 
dedicated to Moltmann’s use of Scripture, specifically his interpretation of Mark 15:34 
and the function it has in the context of his theology. I claimed that although Moltmann 
is committed to the authority of Scripture in CG and TKG, his appropriation of historical 
Jesus methodology tacitly undermines this commitment by elevating some parts of the 
canon above others. My proposed solution to this was a theologia crucis approach to 
canon. This approach entails bringing to the fore the unique theological insights of 
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various biblical voices to engage with them in their particularity, as well as identifying 
how the dominance of other biblical voices in contemporary and traditional theology 
inadvertently marginalises these various voices. 
Although Moltmann does not make this connection between theologia crucis 
and the biblical canon, I think that such a connection is representative of the critical 
spirit of his theologia crucis. Specifically, his suggestion that the cross calls into 
question both Christ and his Father (CG, 125 and 151, respectively),296 greatly extends 
the scope of critical theology. It situates the protests of Job, the psalmists, and Qohelet, 
among others, in the New Testament witness to the crucifixion. This not only gives 
theological space for those who doubt, allowing them to direct their questions to God 
without leaving the sphere of the church, but it undermines any refuge a dominant 
theology may seek, against dissenting theologies, in divine fiat. Of course, such a critical 
orientation can be misused. At the fundamental level, no theology can be absolutely 
critical because absolute criticality is contradictory. It would have to also be critical of 
its own critical orientation. More pertinently, theologia crucis is misused where it 
opposes the basic confession that God speaks. It then becomes a critical principle 
abstracted from the cross and its end is no longer service in the kingdom of God. 
Nonetheless, while Moltmann’s proposals are variously problematic, the critical 
theology which is theologia crucis, when understood rightly, i.e., christologically, can 
fulfil its function in calling other theologies to account before the cross. A christological 
theologia crucis remembers the whole Christ, crucified, resurrected, and coming again, 
Son of the Father, and bearer of the Spirit. In its orientation to the coming kingdom its 
critiques are aimed at that which is contrary to the kingdom. It is not only 
deconstructive but also constructive, suggesting how theology may better represent 
the coming Christ. As christological it is also trinitarian. It seeks to represent in its 
dialogue with others the love between Father and Son given to believers in the Spirit. 
I would be interested in further researching two areas of Moltmann’s 
methodology. First, I have not come across any sustained treatments of the 
development of Moltmann’s exegesis, hermeneutics, or doctrine of Scripture in 
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English.297 As I noted at the beginning of section 3.3., Moltmann’s attitudes toward 
Scripture have changed over the course of his career. Further research could offer a 
critical examination of the roles that particular verses, passages, and biblical writers, 
etc., play across the development of Moltmann’s theology, what hermeneutics 
Moltmann employs to interpret Scripture, and the place Scripture holds in Moltmann’s 
methodology, for example. Second, I think it would be worth assessing Moltmann’s 
theologia crucis in light of other modern critical theologies, such as feminist or 
liberationist theologies, and attending especially to the potential that these theologies 
have for engaging with the different voices of the biblical canon. 
In chapter four I assessed the theology of trinitarian passibility that Moltmann 
derives from the cross. I first clarified what he meant by divine suffering and then 
considered to what extent he subscribes to the harmful “Theory of Theology’s Fall into 
Hellenistic Philosophy” (Gavrilyuk), harmful because it misunderstands the 
motivations of the fathers for developing the doctrine of divine impassibility. Although 
Moltmann largely avoids this, his sometimes polemical characterisations of patristic 
and medieval theology, such as his dismissive use of the term theism, work against 
understanding history’s theologians in their own context. I also defended Moltmann’s 
claim that Chalcedonian christology arose out of an a priori commitment to divine 
impassibility, though I questioned whether this required throwing out Chalcedon 
altogether, as Moltmann does. Chalcedon brings welcome clarity to christology. Next I 
examined Moltmann’s arguments for divine suffering. I found his claims that divine 
passibility is required by the centrality of the cross to Christian theology and the nature 
of divine love to be wanting. Impassibilists present alternative interpretations of the 
cross and divine love that do not require attributing suffering to God. But these two 
claims must be seen in accordance with Moltmann’s argument from theodicy. Divine 
passibility gives hope to those who might otherwise reject the God whom they come to 
know via the dominant tradition. Nonetheless, Moltmann runs into a logical difficulty 
in claiming that divine suffering is both active and in solidarity with human suffering. 
Either suffering becomes something with which God must come to terms or the central 
function of divine suffering is not ongoing suffering with creation but triumph over it. 
                                                        
297 Moltmann has published a lot since Steven Phillips’s work, “The Use of Scripture in 
Liberation Theologies: An Examination of Juan Luis Segundo, James H. Cone, and Jürgen Moltmann” 
(Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1978). 
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Moreover, especially in TKG, Moltmann risks overriding the contingent nature of 
suffering by making it integral to the historical constitution of God’s being. Finally, I 
found Moltmann’s attribution of enmity to the relationship between Father and Son in 
the crucifixion to be not adequately clarified and therefore potentially misleading. 
Despite some of the problems that I and Moltmann’s readers have identified 
with his theology of divine passibility, the soteriological vision behind it cannot be 
denied.  The suffering God is not a “cold, silent and unloved heavenly power” (TKG, 22) 
but for Moltmann, and many others following Alfred Whitehead, “the great 
companion—the fellow sufferer, who understands.”298 It would be wrong to dismiss 
traditional notions of divine impassibility on just this basis. Moltmann acknowledges 
that the best divine impassibilists in fact have robust understandings of divine love 
(CG, 269-270). Nonetheless, as Rebekah Eklund, herself an impassibilist, asserts, “it is 
difficult to ignore the fact that the preponderance of theologians from minority or Two-
Thirds-World contexts have chosen the path of a suffering God rather than an 
impassible one.”299 Unfortunately, impassibilists have “paid comparatively less 
attention in their arguments about apatheia to concrete contexts of contemporary 
oppression and injustice.”300 In a later preface to CG, reflecting on its legacy, Moltmann 
cites a letter he received following the murders of six Jesuits and their housekeeper 
with her daughter by the Salvadoran Army in 1989: 
When the killers were dragging some of the bodies back into the building, as 
they took one of the bodies into Jon’s room, they hit a bookcase and knocked a 
book on to the floor, which became drenched with the martyr’s blood. In the 
morning, when they picked up the book, they found that it was your The 
Crucified God (cited in CG, xii).301 
For Moltmann it is in such a context, among the martyrs, the poor, and the otherwise 
persecuted or marginalised, that the affirmation of divine passibility finds its home. 
This is in part why Miroslav Volf can say “I know of no theologian from the second half 
                                                        
298 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1960), 532, cited in CG, 255. 
299 Eklund, Jesus Wept, 122. Eklund discusses the theologians to which she refers in ibid., 115-
122. 
300 Ibid., 123. 
301 The Jon to which the letter refers is the theologian Jon Sobrino who was away at the time of 
the attack. Moltmann’s theology has influenced his work. 
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of the twentieth century who has had as powerful a global resonance as Moltmann 
has.”302 Specifically, “His critical engagement with liberation theologians of all kinds 
has made him a major influence in revolutionary and political theologies of the latter 
half of the century around the world.”303 
Clearly the merit of particular theological positions cannot be judged on the 
basis of their popularity among particular groups of people. But Moltmann avoids 
developing his theology of divine passibility merely on the basis of soteriological or 
theodical considerations. It is first because the cross takes centre stage in his doctrine 
of the Trinity and second, on the basis of this, because soteriology is inseparable from 
theology proper, that for Moltmann thinking about God’s presence in human suffering 
is at the same time thinking about the crucified Christ. It is because in the crucifixion 
the Father undergoes Sonlessness and the Son undergoes Fatherlessness that God 
suffers today in human sufferings. The strength of Moltmann’s theology here is that 
rather than abandon Christ, as the increasing secularism in the twentieth century led 
others to do, he drew upon the resources of the Christian tradition to rediscover in a 
new way and communicate to his generation just how God remains present among 
those who suffer. 
This sociological insight obviously should not invalidate any critiques made 
against theologies of divine passibility. Yet the traditional doctrine of divine 
impassibility, which began among the fathers and reached its height in medieval 
theology, particularly in that of Thomas Aquinas (and which was nonetheless 
influenced by the pre-Christian philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, among others), has 
had two-thousand or more years to think through this doctrine, assess its value for 
interpreting the whole biblical witness, and respond to any dissenters. Conversely, 
many contemporary passibilists, arguing like Moltmann on the basis of the cross and 
divine love, or pointing to the divine emotion attested in Scripture,304 can provide good 
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biblical and theological reasons for attributing suffering to God. While there are 
certainly logical problems with this position, maybe even more with Moltmann’s 
because of his poetic and polemical style, its modern manifestation only began to enjoy 
widespread and international acceptance in the twentieth century. That is, it may still 
be too early to judge the validity of divine passibility because this theology has not had 
as long to think through its faithfulness to revelation. Nonetheless, the company that 
this theology keeps, among those who suffer themselves, and the biblical appeals it 
makes, should at least occasion pause on the part of divine impassibilists.305 
There is an increasingly large body of books and articles addressing aspects of 
the contemporary impassibility debate, many of which engage with Moltmann’s 
theology and some of which I have cited in this thesis. As such, it would be difficult to 
offer anything in the way of a new contribution to this conversation without first being 
better acquainted with the conversation. Yet while my assessment of his theology of 
divine passibility in this thesis has been largely critical, I think there is still room for a 
more sympathetic reading of Moltmann’s claims. Laying aside for now its inherent 
weaknesses, Moltmann’s proposal has two strengths that require a more in-depth 
treatment. First, he avoids the negative mirror that he attributes to theism by which 
God is defined in opposition to the limitations of finite being. In doing so, he presents 
a soteriological vision in which new creation is not only new creation but new creation. 
The negation of finite limitations in classical theism “also negate[s] the relative 
goodness of creation and the transitory and mortal happiness of this life” (CG, 230). 
But because the identities of Father and Son contain their own negation in the suffering 
of the crucifixion and yet also transcend this negation by the Spirit in the resurrection, 
the world of suffering human beings can likewise be renewed by the Spirit, maintaining 
its identity as God’s good creation and transcending the negation of this identity 
wrought by suffering and evil. This avoids positing a new creation which is absolutely 
other and thus “terrifying and boring” (CG, 230), but it also avoids the implication that 
creaturely life and this world must be discarded for the world beyond, an otherworldly 
soteriology abstracted from the concrete sufferings of creation. 
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Second, Moltmann affirms the reality of human suffering without abandoning 
people to despair. Suffering becomes real for God too. Consequently, this suffering 
allows “the profound fellowship between God and man in suffering – in compassionate 
suffering with one another, and passionate love for one another” (TKG, 60). Yet even in 
God undergoing the greatest of sufferings, the negation of being, the final note sounds 
with eschatological joy, a joy in which human beings can also hope for through the 
resurrection. The value in this is that it mitigates the offensiveness of someone who is 
external to the sufferer intervening and promising a certain hope for redemption. The 
hope remains certain though not yet answered because the problem of suffering is still 
an ongoing problem throughout history: “the experiences of Auschwitz and Hiroshima 
raise questions for which no answers are endurable, because the questions are 
fundamentally protests” (GC, 91). But it is the hope of one who has experienced 
suffering, indeed the greatest of sufferings, not one who might otherwise appear aloof 
to human suffering, a major difficulty for atheists throughout history (CG, 219-223).306 
This short sketch cannot account for all that needs to be considered in engaging with 
Moltmann’s proposal, but these strengths and weaknesses could be treated at greater 
length in future. 
In chapter five I attended to Moltmann’s construal of the relationship between 
immanent and economic Trinity. I responded to Roger Olson’s critique of the 
relationship between eschatology and history in Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity by 
suggesting that Moltmann conceives of this relationship dialectically so that God is 
transcendent in protology, history, and eschatology and nonetheless acts upon himself 
in each of these stages. However, this remains an ambiguity in Moltmann’s theology as 
he does not make these relationships clear. In the next part of the chapter I engaged 
with Paul Molnar’s Barthian critique of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity. I contended 
that Moltmann’s panentheism does indeed allow for a distinction between God and 
creation. I also claimed that his positing of a middle term between necessity and 
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freedom in the act of creation should be understood apophatically, i.e., as neither 
necessary nor free in the sense of an arbitrary decision. 
The way Moltmann conceives of the relationship between immanent and 
economic Trinity raises again the issue of his use of theological language. John 
Webster’s perceptive comment merits being cited a second time: “Because God is 
defined by reference to historical events of the utmost finitude, [Moltmann] tends to 
assume that language about God is in the end relatively easy to devise.”307 This has 
been a persistent difficulty with Moltmann’s theology that I encountered over the 
course of writing this thesis. Whether it be his poetic attribution to God of enmity 
between Father and Son or of need to be loved by creation, his identification of 
immanent with economic Trinity elicits blame. Nonetheless, perhaps Webster is too 
critical here. Negatively, this problem could be traced to a general carelessness with 
language across Moltmann’s career, as his lack of explanation with regard to the 
relationship between history and eschatology suggests. Positively, and I think this 
more likely, Moltmann’s free approach to language is a methodological quirk 
characteristic of his poetic style. And perhaps he is in the right company as “it is not 
poetry that is impossible after Auschwitz, but rather prose. Realistic prose fails, where 
the poetic evocation of the unbearable atmosphere of a camp succeeds.”308 This does 
not absolve Moltmann of critique in this respect but it opens the way for better 
understanding of what he is trying to achieve.  
After a sympathetic defence of Moltmann in response to Molnar’s critiques, I 
ended chapter five with a critical comment on his attribution of “need” to God (TKG, 
58). I argued that if God as infinite needs the finite world then he is incomplete in some 
way, being limited by the finite and as such ultimately being unable to offer it anything 
beyond finitude, which is subject to sin and death. But I wonder here if Moltmann’s 
argument against classical theism, namely that it relies on an anthropological negation 
of finite being that consequently negates the desirability of any soteriology as well as 
its own received goodness, would benefit from a lengthier treatment, also giving 
attention to the trinitarian panentheism he suggests as a replacement. In such a 
treatment I would like to offer a more sympathetic assessment of the relationship 
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between God and creation, immanent and economic Trinity, infinite and finite being in 
Moltmann’s theology. I think it is too easy to dismiss Moltmann’s panentheism as 
compromising God’s absolute transcendence and thus the possibility of any real 
salvation, while at the same time overlooking his critique of classical theism. It must 
be asked again whether understanding God to be in need of creation, in the middle 
term between freedom and necessity that Moltmann commends, really makes God 
incomplete and hence soteriologically impotent, or whether God can allow for some 
kind of space within his transcendence that can be dedicated to needing creation 
without compromising the whole of that transcendence. If sin and death is inessential 
to creaturely being then surely there must be a way to conceive of God “necessarily” 
creating without his power over sin and death being compromised.  
While I have come across various chapters and articles comparing Barth and 
Moltmann on particular topics, I have not come across any sustained treatment of 
Barth in Moltmann’s thought. Moltmann often engages with him critically, though it is 
clear that Barth has exercised considerable influence on his theology, for example in 
his commitment to christology as the centre of theology.309 
Whether one generally agrees with Moltmann or not, his proposals regarding 
the significance of the cross for the doctrine of the Trinity will only be ignored by future 
theologians at great loss. Through his theology, God has brought hope and challenge to 
various individuals and communities, believers have come to know the Trinity in new, 
confronting, and exciting ways, theologians have been sharpened in their dialogues, 
and those outside of the church have been welcomed into the ongoing conversation. 
May the conversation continue. 
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